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Abstract
The resource allocation problem of multi-agent systems is the problem of deciding how to al-
locate resources, controlled by agents, to agents within a given system. Agents typically have
preferences over alternative allocations of resources. These preferences may be derived from the
agents’ goals, which can be fulfilled by different plans (sets of resources). The problem arises
because agents may not be able to fulfil their goals without being re-allocated resources con-
trolled by other agents and agents may have conflicting preferences over allocations. Examples
of the resource allocation problem include electronic commerce (where resources are commodi-
ties equipped with prices), the grid (where resources are computational entities equipped with
computational power), and scheduling and timetabling (where resources may be tasks with
costs).
The focus in this thesis is distributed decision-making amongst agents, whereby agents actively
participate in computing re-allocations, starting from initial allocations which may or may not
fulfil their goals. A re-allocation is arrived at by means of local negotiation steps wherein re-
sources change hands between the agents involved in the negotiations. The negotiation method
of choice in this thesis is argumentation-based negotiation supported by assumption-based
argumentation. This method allows agents to work towards their goals despite incomplete
information regarding the goals of and resources allocated to other agents, to share knowl-
edge, thereby eliminating unknowns, and to resolve conflicts within themselves and between
one another which may arise because of inconsistent information.
Solutions generated by a resource allocation mechanism may be ranked according to how they
affect the individual welfare of the agents as well as the overall social welfare of the agent society,
according to different notions of social welfare borrowed from economics. The argumentation-
based negotiation mechanism we propose guarantees, for the problem domain of interest in this
thesis, that negotiations between agents always terminate converging to a solution. Moreover,
the mechanism guarantees that solutions reached optimise the welfare of the individual agents
as well as the agent society as a whole according to Pareto optimal and utilitarian notions of
social welfare.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Multi-agent Systems for Resource Allocation
Central to this thesis is the area of multi-agent systems, one of the most vibrant and impor-
tant areas of research and development to have emerged in information technology in recent
years. As the computing landscape moves from a focus on the individual standalone computer
system to a situation in which the real power of computers is realised through distributed,
open and dynamic systems, we are faced with new technological challenges and new opportu-
nities [LMSW05]. The multi-agent paradigm for software development offers a new and often
more appropriate route to the development of complex systems [Jen01], especially in open and
dynamic environments [LMSW05, LM08].
In agent-based systems, the general idea is that decision-making is delegated to programs
which are (in some sense) intelligent. Multi-agent systems in particular can be understood
as consisting of two closely interwoven strands of work [Woo09]. The first is concerned with
individual agents, while the second is concerned with collections of these agents. An individual
agent can be seen as an autonomous computational entity, situated within an environment, that
is capable of both perceiving and actuating changes to that environment in order to meet its
delegated objectives [Woo09, Woo00]. Whilst there is no universally accepted definition of the
term “agent”, an intelligent agent can be expected to contain the following capabilities [WJ95]:
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• Autonomy: Intelligent agents operate without the direct intervention of humans or others,
and have some kind of control over their actions and internal state.
• Social ability: Intelligent agents are capable of interacting with other agents (and possibly
humans) in order to satisfy their design objectives.
• Reactivity: Intelligent agents are able to perceive their environment, and respond in a
timely fashion to changes that occur in it in order to satisfy their design objectives.
• Proactiveness: Intelligent agents are able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking the
initiative in order to satisfy their design objectives.
A multi-agent system then is a system composed of multiple agents, which interact with users,
customers, system resources and each other. In the most general case, the agents in a multi-
agent system represent or act on behalf of users or owners with very different goals and moti-
vations. In order to successfully interact, agents are required to cooperate, coordinate, negotiate
and so on with each other [Woo09, LMSW05]. This interaction typically occurs by exchanging
messages through some computer network infrastructure [Woo09]. The above classification of
an agent is of course not the only classification but does capture somewhat the general idea.
Some further discussion regarding other possible definitions and capabilities of an agent can be
found in [FG97, Cas97].
Our area of interest in this work are multi-agent systems as mechanisms for resource allocation
where the notion of a resource is general but resources would typically be scarce and desired
by more than one agent. A well-known type of resource allocation mechanism are auctions,
which have achieved particular prominence in computer science [CSS10, Kri09]. Our focus in
this thesis is not resource allocation where the allocation of resources is computed (decided)
by means of a central controller agent as in an auction but, rather, computing allocations of
resources by means of the participating agents themselves, i.e. the agents which have prefer-
ences over alternative allocations of resources and perhaps even control some of the resources
to be (re-)allocated. Such a distributed approach is essential in cases where agents do not
wish to disclose their preferences to a central controller, or where a central controller does not
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exist. The distributed computation which we consider could be seen as arising by means of
agent interactions (cooperation, coordination or negotiation as the case may be). Indeed such
multi-agent interactions are an important area of research in artificial intelligence and com-
puter science [RZ94, Kra01, San99] and are expected to become a key part of next generation
electronic commerce and supply chain systems, as well as other application areas [LMSW05].
In reaching agreement regarding the allocation of scarce resources in the presence of conflict-
ing goals and preferences, a multi-agent system can be thought of as an artificial society of
autonomous software agents to which concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social
choice theory can be applied to assess the social welfare of the multi-agent system understood
as an agent society [EMST06, CDE+06]. Our interest then is for agents to arrive at allocations
of resources, possibly by means of a number of local ‘negotiation’ steps (involving proposals
and acceptances of proposals being exchanged), such that the agents themselves benefit and
the agent society (the collection of agents that make up the multi-agent system) as a whole
benefits. Moreover, our interest is with agents that make use of argumentation, allowing par-
ticipants to state justficiation for their negotiation stances, and not just simply propose, accept
and reject proposals. The main distinguishing feature of such an approach is that it allows for
more sophisticated forms of interaction than otherwise possible by means of, for example, game
theoretic [RZ94, Kra01] and heuristic [Far00, FWJ02] approaches [RRJ+03].
1.2 Motivation and Objectives
The overall aim of this thesis is to present a generative framework wherein agents can reason
and interact using argumentation, in order to reach agreements for actions to be performed.
The actions of interest to us are exchanges of resources aimed at solving resource reallocation
problems in the context of multi-agent systems where it is difficult or impossible to organise a
central decision-making “agent” which has full knowledge of the agents and resources involved.
Examples of problems which are appropriate include the following:
• Grid computing: agencies, such as research laboratories and universities which have com-
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putational power that is at times insufficient and at times greater than the amount of
processing required for their respective workloads, interact to share the resources (com-
puters etc) under their control to better fulfil their individual goals than they would be
able to otherwise and in a manner that the disclosure of information and decision-making
is left up to the agents themselves [MBP05, CGG+06, Ton07, TGK+08, JDC08];
• Scheduling and timetabling: in dynamic environments such as air traffic control and
task/appointment allocation where resources are allocated to individuals as they enter
the system or their individual circumstances change, it can often be worthwhile or nec-
essary for agents to refine their allocated share taking these changes into account. Inter-
action (co-operation, negotiation) is the most significant characteristic in such systems
and, as the number of agents increases, delegation of interaction and decision-making
to the agents themselves, which operate autonomously and represent their best interests
(goals), releases the burden and complexity required of a single central decision-making
agent [MHVB00, BHS03, AF03, WVI04, Hal07, GIRS09];
• Disaster response: agencies, such as governmental and non-governmental organisations
which operate independently in their response to and alleviation of disaster, communicat-
ing and exchanging resources under their control as necessary to better fulfil their indi-
vidual goals and to better overcome the overall disaster at hand [FB07, KT01, RFM+09].
We present our generative argumentation-based negotiation framework for resource allocation
by bridging the gap between three different areas of multi-agent systems research, namely:
resource allocation [EMST06, CDE+06], argumentation-based negotiation [JFL+01, RRJ+03]
and assumption-based argumentation [DKT09]. We briefly mention here the scope of exist-
ing work in each subject area in turn and discuss how each connects and fills the gaps in
the others (in this thesis). Firstly, let us consider the resource allocation problem. We find
that existing work [EMST06] identifies the kinds of deals (exchanges of resources) required for
different classes of resource allocation problems, where agents specify utilities over resources
and the task of the resource allocation mechanism is to optimise some notion of social wel-
fare [HP02, CDE+06]. We find, however, that such work does not specify exactly how such
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deals can be found by the agents themselves. This is from where we pick up this work and
this takes us to our second area of interest, argumentation-based negotiation. Argumentation-
based negotiation offers much promise and advantages over standard negotiation for allowing
agents to arrive at decisions, or, more specifically, deals with one another [RRJ+03]. Much
work exists discussing how allowing agents to argue as part of the negotiation process can not
only increase the speed at which decisions are reached, but also improve and expand upon the
decisions that can be reached [RPSD07, RSD03, SJNP97, PSJ98]. We find, however, that the
frameworks that exist are not fully specified, and it is not entirely obvious how the agents’
reasoning and decision making models could be concretely specified to generate moves during
the negotiation process, and to receive and respond to moves by other agents. This takes
us to our third area of interest, assumption-based argumentation, which is a general-purpose
argumentation framework for representing the knowledge and reasoning of agents, as well as
for allowing agents to decide what beliefs and decisions are acceptable, according to various
acceptability criteria [DKT06, DMT07]. Our motivation for this thesis then was to bring these
three areas together to present concretely how agents could negotiate socially optimal alloca-
tions of resources supported by argumentation, by means of a concrete but general-purpose
argumentation framework such as assumption-based argumentation.
1.3 Structure of Thesis
In Chapter 2 we present background on the resource reallocation problem of interest to us in this
thesis, as well as the concepts of social welfare, agent communication (negotiation dialogues)
and computational argumentation which we consider.
In Chapter 3 we define the class of resource reallocation problem to be solved in this thesis.
Moreover, we define the key components of our problem domain, including the notions of agents
and agent systems which we consider in this thesis, as well as the notions of individual and
social welfare.
In Chapter 4 we define the kinds of deals necessary and sufficient for reaching a socially optimal
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allocation of resources for the particular class of resource reallocation problem as defined in
Chapter 3. We prove that any sequence of such deals leads to an optimal allocation.
In Chapter 5 we present a communication language and protocol for argumentation-based
negotiation, which allows agents to negotiate deals (exchanges of resources) and share arguments
in the process. We present also a means of defining agent policies/strategies that allow agents
to generate moves conforming to the protocol, and we discuss how such an agent policy would
need to be defined to negotiate the kinds of deals described in Chapter 4 for solving the resource
reallocation problem of Chapter 3. A concretely defined agent policy is such that an agent can
decide what move to make in any situation it finds itself in, as well as knowing what to do with
what it is told in terms of updating its internal state (beliefs etc) and responding accordingly.
In Chapter 6 we extend the Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) framework for multi-
agent systems, so that agents can build acceptable arguments according to a particular notion
of acceptabilty, but which are also communicable and can be understood by other agents in the
agent system. We term our new framework “Agent ABA” (AABA).
In Chapter 7 we instantiate the agent policy described in Chapter 5 for solving the resource
reallocation problem of Chapter 3 by means of AABA defined in Chapter 6. In particular,
AABA realises the reasoning of agents, allowing each agent to deal with inconsistency and
incompleteness in its beliefs, and in deciding what actions to undertake.
Lastly, in Chapter 8 we summarise achievements of the thesis and conclude discussing related
and future work.
1.4 Contributions
The contributions of the thesis are as follows:
• Presentation of a means of capturing resource reallocation problems in terms of the agents,
goals and resources involved (Chapter 3);
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• Definition of a resource exchange (deal) between agents, termed “minimally cooperatively
rational deals”, sufficient for solving the class of resource reallocation problems of interest
in this thesis (Chapter 4). Given a resource reallocation problem (the agents, resources
and goals involved), these deals determine the smallest incremental steps required for
reaching an optimal solution. Although neutral to a centralised or distributed approach
and also any mechanism for generating the deals, the “minimal” nature of these deals lends
itself to a distributed solution where the successive deals required could be captured by
the relevant agents;
• Definition of an (argumentation-based) negotiation protocol which allows for multiple
agents to agree (or not) to exchange any number of resources (Chapter 5). These protocols
are independent of the particular class of resource reallocation problems of interest to us
in this thesis and allow for capturing exchanges of resources (and arguments) involving
any number of agents and any number of resources;
• Representation of a generative argumentation-based negotiation policy for the exchange of
resources between agents (Chapter 5). This presents a means for agents in an agent system
to generate the (“minimally cooperative rational”) deals required for solving the resource
reallocation problem defined according to the agents, resources and goals involved;
• Extension of the Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) framework to Agent ABA
(AABA), for multi-agent system settings where agents need to communicate arguments
between one another (Chapter 6). This is useful in the context of negotiation settings
in particular, as is the focus in this thesis, where agents are required to generate and
exchange arguments as part of the negotiation process;
• Instantiation of the argumentation-based negotiation policy of Chapter 5 by means of
AABA (Chapter 7). The instantiation demonstrates how a general-purpose argumenta-
tion framework can be used to complete our negotiation policy allowing agents to reason
internally in the absence of information and to share their reasoning in the form of argu-
ments in generating exchanges of resources.
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1.5 Statement of Originality
I declare that this thesis was composed by myself and that the work it presents is my own,
except where otherwise stated.
1.6 Publications
The work in this thesis brings together and builds upon work published as follows:
• The representation of an agent’s negotiation policy for generating dialogues by means of
Communication Rules (Action Rules) in Chapter 5 is as published in ‘Bilateral Agent
Negotiation with Information-Seeking’ at The Fifth European Workshop on Multi-Agent
Systems, 2007 [HT07]. There we defined a negotiation policy for a simpler class of resource
allocation problem than is addressed in this thesis and using instead information-seeking
dialogues for the exchange of information between agents and not arguments as part of
the negotiation dialogues as in this thesis.
• The definitions of resource reallocation problem and agent system in Chapter 3 as well as
the definitions of dialogue instances and dialogue sequences in Chapter 5 build upon those
published in ‘On the Benefits of Argumentation for Negotiation’ at The Sixth European
Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems, 2008 [HT08]. Moreover, there we discussed the use of
a general-purpose argumentation framework such as Assumption-Based Argumentation
for realising an agent’s negotiation policy and how this could be achieved. This idea is
developed and built upon in Chapter 7.
• The extension of Assumption-Based Argumentation for multi-agent system settings in
Chapter 6 is as published in ‘Assumption-Based Argumentation for Communicating Agents’
at The Uses of Computational Argumentation Symposia, as part of the AAAI 2009 Fall
Symposium Series [HT09].
Chapter 2
Background and Preliminaries
This chapter introduces background knowledge on the key subject areas underpinning this
thesis. Section 2.1 introduces the resource reallocation problem in the context of multi-agent
systems, as well the concepts of social welfare and deals. Subsequently, the issues involved
with agent communication and interaction for solving multi-agent problems such as the re-
source reallocation problem by means of agent dialogues (negotiation) is discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2. Section 2.3 provides a general introduction to argumentation as well as discussing
argumentation-based negotiation, the type of dialogue we focus on in this thesis, and its useful-
ness for distributed decision-making. Following on from this, Section 2.4 introduces an abstract
theory of computational argumentation and then, in particular, assumption-based argumenta-
tion, a general-purpose argumentation framework for representing the reasoning of agents in
logic, which we adopt and extend in this thesis.
2.1 Resource Reallocation Problem
Resource allocation in agent societies is the problem of deciding how to distribute a number
of resources amongst a number of agents. The agents are autonomous entities requiring (re-
questing) and receiving the resources. Both resources and agents vary in nature. This is a
major factor which complicates the allocation problem. Thus, the properties of both resources
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and agents must be determined before the problem can be solved. Resources may be shareable,
and/or used up with time, and/or divisible. These properties as well as others need to be deter-
mined. Agents, on the other hand, may have preference of some resources over others, they may
not want to be given some resources, or they may require multiple resources simultaneously.
Given the properties of the resources and agents, it may well be that agents are competing for
the very same (limited) resources. Thus, it may not be possible for every agent to receive the
set of resources that it desires most, or worse yet, it may be that some agents do not receive
any resources at all. The problem then, given an agent system, is to determine which of the
agents receive which of the resources, possibly taking into account the resources that agents
have initially and that agents are autonomous and rational.
Before explaining the kinds of transitions from initial allocation of resources to new allocation
required for solving an allocation problem, another important factor needs to be introduced:
social welfare. The definition of social welfare can vary and, again, it depends on the properties
of the resources and agents. An example of a social welfare consideration for an allocation may
be to guarantee that all agents have at least a certain level of “happiness” defined in terms
of the resources allocated to them, or for at least one agent to receive its most-desired set of
resources. We discuss each of the issues touched upon above in greater detail in this section.
2.1.1 Resources
These are the items being distributed. The nature of resources is a central parameter in
any resource allocation problem and resources can vary. Some properties, as characterised by
Chevaleyre et al. in [CDE+06], are as follows:
• Divisible or indivisible: Whether an agent can receive a fraction of a resource. For
example, a fruit which can be split and its consituent parts allocated to different agents
is said to be divisible, whereas a (piece of a) fruit which can only be allocated wholly is
said to be indivisible;
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• Sharable or non-sharable: Whether the resource can be allocated to a number of different
agents at the same time. For example, it may be possible (or not) that multiple patients
(the agents in this case) who are family members may make a joint appointment to see
a doctor in which case appointments (the resources in this case) are sharable (or non-
sharable respectively);
• Static or not: A static resource is one whose properties do not change during the allocation
process. On the flip side are resources which, for instance, are consumable and can be
used up by the agent holding it (e.g. fuel), or perishable and lose their value over time
(e.g. food);
• Single-unit or Multi-unit : In a multi-unit setting it is possible to have many resources
of the same type and to refer to these resources using the same name. In a single-unit
setting, every resource to be allocated is distinguishable from the other resources and has
a unique name. For example, if there are a number of bottles of drink to be allocated,
but agents cannot distinguish between the bottles, then the bottles are multi-unit. In
a single-unit setting, on the other hand, every bottle would be distinguishable from the
others and would have a unique name.
More details on the nature of resources can be found in [CDE+06].
In this thesis, the focus is on indivisible, non-sharable, static, single-unit resources.
An example of the kinds of resources we consider in this thesis are rooms or appointments to
be allocated to booking or patient agents as part of a scheduling system. Indeed in such a
setting each time slot would be uniquely distinguishable, allocated wholly to a single agent and
its properties would not change over time.
2.1.2 Allocations
Given a set of agents A and a set of resources R, an allocation, as defined similarly by Endriss
et al. in [EMST06], is a partitioning of R amongst the agents in A, as follows:
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Definition 2.1 (Allocations of resources [EMST06]) An allocation of resources P is a
function from A to subsets of R such that P (i)∩P (j) = ∅ for i, j ∈ A, i 6= j and
⋃
i∈A P (i) = R.
For agent i ∈ A, P (i) is the bundle of resources held by agent i in allocation P .
An allocation then is a distribution of resources such that a (possibly empty) bundle of resources
is assigned to each agent. The above definition makes sense in particular in the case where
resources are assumed to be non-sharable and indivisible, as in this thesis.
In this thesis, an allocation is such that each and every resource is allocated to one and only
one agent, and agents only receive resources that exist (are available for distribution) in the
system.
2.1.3 Agent Preferences
Agents have preferences over alternative allocations of resources, and, in particular, the bundle
of resources they receive in these allocations. This preference expresses the relative or absolute
satisfaction of an agent when faced with a choice between alternatives. A preference structure
represents an agent’s preferences over a set of alternatives, and this preference structure can
take various forms (as further discussed by Chevaleyre et al. in [CDE+06]):
• Cardinal : Consists of a utility function where a value is assigned to alternative allocations
(or bundles);
• Ordinal : Consists of a binary relation on alternative allocations (or bundles);
• Binary : Consists of a partition of alternative allocations (or bundles) into a set of good
and a set of bad allocations (bundles respectively);
• Fuzzy : Consists of a fuzzy relation such that, given two alternatives x and y, the fuzzy
relation is the degree (between 0 and 1 inclusive) to which x is preferred over y.
Ordinal preferences allow only for comparing the satisfaction of a given agent for different alter-
natives, but cannot express preference intensity and do not allow for interpersonal comparison
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of preferences (e.g. “agent i is happier with x than agent j with y”). Any cardinal preference
induces an ordinal preference, since an allocation or bundle x is ordinally preferred to y if a
better utility value is assigned to x than y. Fuzzy relations, on the other hand, are more general
than both ordinal and cardinal preferences. A disadvantage of cardinal and fuzzy preferences
is that it can be difficult to accurately specify utility values or the degree of preference respec-
tively to different alternatives, and alternatives can be exponentially many. Lastly, a binary
preference structure is a special case of both cardinal and ordinal preferences since it is possi-
ble to translate cardinal or ordinal preferences into a partioning of good and bad alternatives.
Despite the apparent simplicity of a binary preference structure, this is particularly interesting
in problems where agents have goals with multiple plans, as is the focus in this thesis.
In this thesis, we will adopt a cardinal utility function ui : 2
R → {0, 1} where i ∈ A.
We can translate the cardinal utility function ui as above to an ordinal preference relation i
and write x i y iff ui(x) ≤ ui(y) (x, y ∈ 2
R). We say that ui as above is dichotomous in the
sense that utility values are either 0 or 1. Moreover, we can translate ui to a binary partioning,
for example, by splitting bundles into a set of bad and good bundles depending on their utility
value — 0 and 1 respectively. Lastly:
In this thesis, agents assign utility to an allocation P solely according to the bundle they
receive in P , i.e. ui(P ) = ui(P (i)) for all i ∈ A.
As a consequence of the above choice, an agent i prefers an allocation P over an allocation Q
iff i prefers the resources it receives in P over the resources it receives in Q, i.e. Q i P iff
Q(i) i P (i).
2.1.4 Social Welfare
Multi-agent systems can sometimes be seen as a society of agents, and allocations may be ranked
according to how they affect the social welfare of the system, depending on the preferences
of the individual agents in the system and according to different notions of social welfare
borrowed from economics [EMST06, CDE+06]. There are various measures of social welfare
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over alternative allocations of resources given some utility function ui or preference relation
i (for each i ∈ A) assessing the overall quality of an allocation for the agent system. Some
of these measures, as found in the works of Herreiner and Puppe [HP02] and Chevaleyre et
al. [CDE+06], are as follows:
• Pareto Optimality [HP02, CDE+06]: An allocation P is Pareto-optimal if there does
not exist an allocation Q that is unanimously preferred to P by all agents with a strict
preference for at least one individual agent. Formally, there is no allocation Q such that:
– P i Q for all agents i ∈ A; and
– P ≺i Q for at least one agent i ∈ A.
The concept of Pareto optimality is purely ordinal, and the definition does not take into
account the preferences agents might have on resources allocated to other agents.
• Utilitarian Social Welfare [CDE+06]: The utilitarian social welfare of an allocation P is
the sum of the utilities each agent assigns to P . Formally,
swu(P ) =
∑
i∈A
ui(P )
This provides a meaningful metric for overall (as well as average) utility of an allocation.
The optimal utilitarian social welfare value is given by the allocation that maximises the
utilitarian social welfare of the agent system.
• Nash Product [CDE+06]: The Nash product of an allocation P is the product of the
utilities each agent assigns to P . Formally,
swN(P ) =
∏
i∈A
ui(P )
Note that this only provides a meaningful metric if utilities are positive (non-zero). The
optimal Nash product value is given by the allocation that maximises the Nash product
of the agent system.
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• Egalitarian Social Welfare [CDE+06]: The egalitarian social welfare of an allocation P is
given by the utility of the agent that assigns the worst utility to P . Formally,
swe(P ) = min { ui(P ) | i ∈ A }
This offers a level of fairness and may be suitable when the minimal needs of agents needs
to be satisfied. The optimal egalitarian social welfare value is given by the allocation that
maximises the egalitarian social welfare of the agent system.
• Elitist Social Welfare [CDE+06]: The elitist social welfare of an allocation P is given by
the utility of the agent that assigns the best utility to P . Formally,
swel(P ) = max { ui(P ) | i ∈ A }
This is clearly not a fair measure for social welfare, but can be useful where it is sufficient
for one agent to achieve its goals. The optimal elitist social welfare value is given by the
allocation that maximises the elitist social welfare of the agent system.
• Envy-freeness [HP02, CDE+06]: An allocation P is envy-free if and only if each agent
prefers the bundle of resources allocated to it in P over the bundles assigned to the other
agents in P , i.e. for each agent i ∈ A, P (j) i P (i) holds for all agents j ∈ A. This
measure does not require the intercomparability of the utilities of different agents (i.e.
it is defined solely on the basis of agents’ private preferences). A concept of optimality
could be defined, for example, in terms of minimising the number of envious agents in
the agent system.
Further details of the above-mentioned measures of social measure and other measures can be
found in [HP02, CDE+06]. Indeed it is necessary to choose appropriate social welfare orderings
for a given application of multi-agent resource allocation, for example, the elitist measure of
social welfare where the interest is in achieving the objective of one agent as quickly as possible.
In this thesis the focus is on Pareto optimal and utilitarian notions of social welfare.
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Once the social welfare measures of interest are decided upon, a choice is to be made as to how
such an optimal allocation is to be computed. We present next the distinction between cen-
tralised and distributed approaches to allocation, and then subsequently the kinds of transitions
(deals) that can take an agent system from one allocation to another.
2.1.5 Centralised versus Distributed Allocation Procedures
The objective of a resource allocation procedure is to find an allocation that is optimal in some
sense (according to some measure of social welfare). Generally speaking, the allocation proce-
dure used to find a suitable allocation of resources may be somewhere between a centralised or
distributed approach. As outlined in the works of Herreiner and Puppe [HP02] and Chevaleyre
et al. [CDE+06], central or distributed approaches are categorised as follows:
• Centralised : A single entity (the central host agent) decides on the final allocation of
resources amongst agents, possibly after having elicited the agents’ preferences over al-
ternative allocations.
• Distributed : The computational burden of finding an allocation is shared amongst several
agents and allocations emerge as a result of a sequence of local negotiation steps. Such
local negotiation is often restricted to bilateral trading (exchanges of resources between
two agents) but this is not necessary.
Both the centralised and the distributed approach to multi-agent resource allocation have their
advantages and disadvantages, as follows:
• Centralised procedures are limited computationally because of the burden put on one
(central) agent. As the number of agents increases with a wider number of resources,
central allocation is likely to become less viable. Possibly the most important arguments in
favour of the centralised approach concerns the simplicity of the communication required
to implement such procedures, as well as the fact that it can deliver optimal allocations.
However, agents might not want to disclose their preferences to a central controller and,
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as the number of agents increase, the requirement of communication with a single central
controller can lead to bottlenecks. In such scenarios a centralised approach is not viable.
• Distributed allocation of resources will almost certainly scale, since processing is shared
amongst agents. A drawback of the distributed approach is that results are much less
likely to be as good, but it does seem more natural in cases where finding an optimal
allocation may be (computationally) infeasible, and even small improvements over an
initial allocation of resources would be considered a success.
In this thesis our focus is on the distributed approach where the agents to be allocated
resources actively participate in computing the allocation by means of local negotiation
steps where each negotiation step involves two or more of the agents.
We discuss next the kinds of exchanges of resources (deals) that typically result from local
negotiation steps in the distributed approach and then, in the subsequent section, how such
deals can be identified (using agent dialogues).
2.1.6 Deals
Given a particular allocation of resources, agents may agree on a (multilateral) deal to exchange
some of the resources they currently hold. We define below a deal, the agents involved in a
deal and a composition of deals as in the works of Endriss et al. [EMST06] and Dunne and
Chevaleyre [DC08]. In the most general case, any numbers of agents and resources could be
involved in a single deal. From an abstract point of view, a deal takes us from one allocation
of resources to the next:
Definition 2.2 (deals [EMST06, DC08]) A deal is a pair δ = (P,Q) where P and Q are
allocations of resources and P 6= Q.
The intended interpretation of the above definition is that the deal δ = (P,Q) is only applicable
in situation P and will result in situation Q. It specifies for each resource in the system whether
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it is to remain with the same agent or to which agent it is to be moved to. The agents between
which resources “change hands” in a deal are the agents involved in the deal, as follows:
Definition 2.3 (agents involved in a deal [EMST06, DC08]) The set of agents involved
in a deal δ = (P,Q) is given by Aδ = { i ∈ A | P (i) 6= Q(i) }.
The agents involved in a deal are exactly those that hold a different bundle of resources after
the deal has been implemented. Moreover, two deals may be composed to give a single deal, as
follows:
Definition 2.4 (composition of two deals [EMST06]) The composition of two deals δ1 =
(P, P ′) and δ2 = (P
′, Q) is given by δ1 ◦ δ2 = (P,Q).
A deal that follows another in sequence can be composed with the deal or composition of deals
that it follows to give a single deal, as follows:
Definition 2.5 (sequence of deals) A sequence of n deals δ1 ◦ δ2 ◦ . . . ◦ δn is a composition
of deals δ1 and δ2 composed with deal δ3 and so on, as follows: (. . . ((δ1 ◦ δ2) ◦ δ3) ◦ . . .) ◦ δn.
Note that a sequence of deals as above is identical to a contract path as defined by Dunne
and Chevaleyre in [DC08] except that it is defined here in terms of compositions of deals.
Sometimes, as for deals found in the works of Sandholm [San98] and Endriss et al. [EMST06],
a deal may be accompanied by a number of monetary side payments to compensate some of
the agents involved for accepting a loss in utility. However, in this thesis, we consider only
deals where the resources are exchanged and the deals are not accompanied by monetary side
payments.
An agent may or may not find a particular deal δ acceptable. As discussed by Endriss et
al. in [EMST06], whether or not an agent will accept a given deal depends on the rationality
criterion it applies when evaluating deals. We provide below a few examples of rationality
criteria as similarly found in the work of Endriss et al. [EMST06]:
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• Individually rational deals : A deal δ = (P,Q) is called individually rational iff ui(P ) <
ui(Q) for all i ∈ A, except possibly ui(P ) = ui(Q) for all i /∈ A
δ. In a negotiation model
based on individual rationality agents would only propose or accept deals (i.e. be involved
in deals) that strictly increase their own welfare. This would make sense in the case of
self-interested (selfish) agents.
• Cooperatively rational deals : A deal δ = (P,Q) is called cooperatively rational iff ui(P ) ≤
ui(Q) for all i ∈ A and there is an agent j ∈ A such that uj(P ) < uj(Q). This rationality
criterion maintains the utility of all agents whilst strictly increasing the utility of at least
one agent. The agent increasing in utility could, for instance, be the agent proposing the
deal in question.
• Pigou-Dalton transfers : A deal δ = (P,Q) is called individually rational iff it satisfies the
following criteria:
– Only two agents i and j are involved in the deal: Aδ = {i, j}.
– The deal is mean-preserving: ui(P ) + uj(P ) = ui(Q) + uj(Q).
– The deal reduces inequality: |ui(Q)− uj(Q)| < |ui(P )− uj(P )|.
The Pigou-Dalton principle states that whenever a utility transfer takes place which
reduces the difference between the two, then that transfer should be considered socially
beneficial [Mou88]. Indeed, as discussed by Endriss et al. in [EMST06], Pigou-Dalton
transfers capture certain egalitarian principles though they not sufficient as acceptability
criteria to guarantee negotiation outcomes with maximal egalitarian social welfare.
• Equitable deals : A deal δ = (P,Q) is called equitable iff it satisfies the following criterion:
min { ui(P ) | i ∈ A
δ } < min { ui(Q) | i ∈ A
δ }
Agents operating according to this criterion help any of their fellow agents that are worse
off than they are themselves (as long as they can afford to do so without themselves
ending up even worse). Indeed, the purpose of any exchange of resources is to improve
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the welfare of the weakest agent involved in the respective deal. It is shown by Endriss
et al. in [EMST06] that Pigou-Dalton transfers are equitable deals but not vice-versa.
It is necessary to choose appropriate rationality criteria, as well as interaction mechanisms (see
Section 2.2), for negotiating agents in view of different notions of social welfare, for example, to
achieve Pareto optimal outcomes in negotiation (by means of a sequence of deals), the agents
should negotiate cooperatively rational deals. Indeed, in [EMST06], it is shown by Endriss et
al. that any sequence of cooperatively rational deals will eventually result in a Pareto optimal
allocation of resources.
The types of deals of interest in this thesis are cooperatively rational deals which are not
accompanied by monetary side payments.
As discussed by Endriss et al. in [EMST06], a class of deals may be characterised by both
structural constraints (number of agents and resources involved, etc.) as well as rationality
constraints (relating to the changes in utility experienced by the agents involved) as above. In
the work of Sandholm [San98], a number of structurally different types of deals (contracts) are
distinguished, and shown to be sufficient and necessary for distributed task allocation where
agents negotiate on a basis of individual rationality. The concept of individual rationality is
invoked by Sandholm in [San98] on a per contract basis, i.e. a contract is individually rational
to an agent if that agent is better off with the contract than without it. The classification of
contract types in [San98] is as follows:
• O-contract : one task given by an agent i to an agent j (plus the contract price i pays to
j for handling the task set).
• C-contract : a cluster (more than one) of tasks given by an agent i to an agent j (plus the
contract price i pays to j for handling the task set).
• S-contract : swaps of tasks where agent i subcontracts a (single) task to agent j and
vice-versa (plus the amount i pays to j and the amount j pays to i).
• M-contract : A multi-agent contract involving at least three agents, wherein each agent
involved gives away a single resource to another agent (plus payment).
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• OCSM-contract : combines/merges characteristics of the above contract types into one
contract type - where the ideas of the above four contract types can be applied simulta-
neously.
Each of the first four contract types above is shown by Sandholm in [San98] to be necessary (and
avoids some of the local optima that the other three do not) but is not sufficient in and of itself
for reaching the global optimum via individually rational contracts. Building upon [San98],
in [EMST06], Endriss et al. investigate the different kinds of negotiation outcomes that agents
can achieve by using different classes of deals. It is shown by Endriss et al. in [EMST06],
for negotiation frameworks with and without monetary side payments, deals of any structural
complexity may be necessary in order to be able to guarantee an optimal allocation of a nego-
tiation (with respect to the chosen notion of social welfare) if deals are required to conform to
the rationality criterion in question. Accordingly:
The allocation/negotiation mechanism we propose in this thesis realises the “OCSM-
contract” type.
2.2 Dialogues in Multi-agent Systems
This section introduces the need and uses of dialogues in multi-agent system contexts where
agents are likely to differ in their beliefs and goals, and are required to communicate. It is
useful to distinguish firstly communication between autonomous agents and communication in
an object-oriented programming context, as is done by Wooldridge in [Woo09]. Communication
is treated in object-oriented programming as method invocation — an object o1 may invoke
and thereby execute a “publicly available” method m1 of another object o2. However, in an
agent-oriented context, an agent a1 may communicate (utter) to another agent a2 to execute
an action α, but the decision to execute or not lies entirely with a2. It cannot be taken for
granted that a2 will execute action α just because another agent wants it to. Performing the
action α may not be in the best interests of a2, or a2 may still decide not to do α even if it is
in its best interests (because, for example, it might violate certain norms of the agent society
or obligations it finds itself in if it was to do α).
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Walton and Krabbe [WK95] define a dialogue as an orderly sequence of utterances (moves)
between two participants where each participant has a goal and the dialogue, as a whole,
has a goal. We interpret the “goal” of a dialogue, as discussed by McBurney and Parsons
in [MP09], to mean the reaching of a desired type of outcome. An utterance is evaluated as
good to the extent that it contributes to the goal of the dialogue. An utterance is evaluated
as bad to the extent that it blocks the goal of the dialogue. It is possible to distinguish
several important, characteristic types of dialogue, where each has its own distinctive rules
and goals (desired types of outcomes), its permitted types of move, and its conventions for
managing the commitments incurred by the participants as a result of the moves they make.
Table 2.1 (adapted from [WK95]) characterises the six main types of dialogue as distinguished
by Walton and Krabbe [WK95] according to the primary or main goal of the dialogue, which
the participants implicitly subscribe to, the aims of the participant to get the best out of
that dialogue type for itself, the initial situation that gives rise to the dialogue and some side
benefits that can be important motives for entering the dialogue. Also in [WK95] are four kinds
of dialogue rules that can be used to characterise the different types of dialogue, as follows:
• The “locution rules” of a dialogue define the permissible locutions, like statements, ques-
tions, inferences, and so on.
• The “structural rules” define turn taking and the order in which moves can be made by
each participant (i.e. which moves are permitted or required after each move).
• The “commitment rules” define which propositions go in or out of commitment stores in
each type of move, where a commitment store is a type of information store used as a
way of tracking the claims/assertions/propositions made by participants in dialogue.
• The “win-loss rules” define the participants’ aims in the dialogue and determine the
conditions under which a player wins or loses the game.
The kind of dialogues of interest to us in this thesis are such that allow agents to commun-
icate in spite of their differing preferences over resources and to agree on deals (exchanges
of resources) of the kind defined in Section 2.1.6.
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Type Initial Main Goal Participant’s Side
Situation Aims Benefits
Persuasion Conflicting Resolution of Persuade the Develop & Reveal
Dialogue Points of View Such Conflicts Other(s) Positions,
(Critical by Verbal Means Build Confidence,
Discussion) Influence Onlookers,
Add to Prestige
Negotiation Conflict of Making a Deal1 Get the Best out Agreement,
Interests & of It for Oneself Build Up Confidence,
Need for Reveal Positions,
Cooperation Influence Onlookers
Add to Prestige
Inquiry General Growth of Find a “Proof” Add to Prestige,
Ignorance Knowledge & or Destroy One Gain Experience
Agreement Raise Funds
Deliberation Need for Reach a Influence Agreement,
Action Decision Outcome Develop & Reveal
Positions,
Add to Prestige,
Vent Emotions
Information- Personal Spreading Gain, Pass on, Agreement,
Seeking Ignorance Knowledge & Show, or Hide Develop position,
Dialogue Revealing Personal Influence Onlookers,
Positions Knowledge Add to Prestige,
Vent Emotions
Eristics Conflict & Reaching a Strike the Other Develop & Reveal
Antagonism (Provisional) Party & Win Positions,
Accommodation in the Eyes of Add to Prestige,
in a Relationship Onlookers Gain Experience,
Amusement,
Vent Emotions
Table 2.1: Types of Dialogue
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Similar to [AS99, NMJ08], the goal of participating agents in the kinds of (negotiation) dialogues
we will consider is to obtain their preferred (desired) resources and the goal of the dialogues as
a whole is to facilitate exchanges of resources between agents. In order for agents to generate
such dialogues (and represent a resource allocation mechanism/procedure), it is necessary to
define a shared communication language and protocol, as well as identifying the policies that
allow agents to act desirably best exploiting the protocol. A protocol in this thesis is taken
to mean the possible actions that agents can take at different points of the interaction (the
“locution” and “structual” rules as above), addressing issues in our case such as what types of
deals (exchanges of resources) are possible, as well as what messages/locutions agents have to
exchange and in what order to agree on such deals. A policy on the other hand is taken to mean
the agent’s strategy for determining what move to make at any given point of the interaction
given the choices that the protocol allows.
In the following subsections we summarise existing work in the multi-agent field for agent com-
munication languages, negotiation in general, logic-based negotiation, and then, in the subse-
quent section, the specific type of negotiation we consider in this thesis, namely argumentation-
based negotiation.
2.2.1 Agent Communication Languages
To allow inter-operability between autonomous (heterogeneous) agents, a commonly understood
agent communication language (ACL) is used. We present here background on two of the
main languages developed in recent past: the Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language
(KQML) and the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) ACL. The FIPA ACL
in particular supersedes KQML, as we will see, and is the product of a standardisation body
for the specification of a syntax and semantics for a ‘standard’ ACL. Both languages (KQML
and FIPA ACL) are loosely based on speech act theory [Aus62, Sea69, CL90], which treats
communication as action, and are defined in terms of a set of communicative acts as well as a
formal semantics for the communicative acts. A communicative act occurs whenever one agent
1A “deal” here is meant in the general sense of the word and not as in Section 2.1.6.
2.2. Dialogues in Multi-agent Systems 25
sends a message to another. In particular, agents perform actions - communicative actions - in
an attempt to influence other agents appropriately [Woo09].
KQML is an ‘outer’ message-based language for agent communication. It defines a common
‘envelope’ format for messages and is not concerned with the content part of messages [MLF96,
PFPS+92]. A KQML message may be crudely thought of as an object (in the sense of object-
oriented programming): each message has a performative (which may be thought of as the class
of the message), and a number of parameters (attribute/value pairs, which may be thought of
as instance variables) [Woo09]. Some of the main parameters used in KQML messages are
summarized as follows:
• :content — content of the message or, equivalently, the object of the communicative
action;
• :reply-with—whether the sender expects a reply to this message, and, if so, an identifier
or expression which will be used in the reply by the agent responding to identify the
original message;
• :in-reply-to—an expression that references an earlier action/message (i.e. the :reply-with
parameter) to which this message is a reply;
• :sender — the identity of the sender of the message, i.e. the name of the agent of the
communicative act.
• :receiver — the identity of the intended recipient of the message.
Different performatives require different sets of parameters. Examples of performatives are the
following, for some sender S of the message, receiver R and content C:
• achieve — S wants R to make something true of their environment;
• ask-one — S wants to know one of R’s answers to queston C;
• tell — S claims to R that C is in S’s knowledge base.
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A more complete list containing a total of 41 performatives can be found in the specification of
the KQML ACL [FWW+93]. An example of a KQML message, adapted from [Woo09], is the
following:
(ask-one
:content (PRICE IBM ?price)
:receiver stock-server
)
The intended interpretation of this message is that the sender is asking about the price of IBM
stock.
Some criticisms of KQML regarding the performatives and lack of adequate semantics in par-
ticular lead to the development of a new, but rather closely related, agent communication
language by the FIPA consortium [ffipa]. As discussed by Wooldridge in [Woo09], this ACL is
superficially similar to KQML: it defines an ‘outer’ language for messages, it defines a number of
performatives for defining the intended interpretation of messages, and it does not mandate any
specific language for message content. In addition, the concrete syntax/structure for FIPA ACL
messages closely resembles that of KQML — each message has a performative and a number of
parameters (attribute/value pairs) very similar to KQML. Probably the most important differ-
ence between KQML and the FIPA ACL is in the collection of performatives it provides. Some
of the performatives provided by the FIPA ACL, as summarised in its specification [FIP98],
are as follows:
• accept-proposal — a general-purpose acceptance of a proposal that was previously
submitted (typically through a propose act).
• agree — a general-purpose agreement to a previously submitted request to perform some
action (typically through a request act).
• cancel — this performative (action) allows an agent to stop another agent from contin-
uing to perform (or expecting to perform) an action which was previously requested.
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• cfp — a general-purpose action to initiate a negotiation process by making a call for
proposals to perform the given action.
• confirm — the sender informs the receiver that a given proposition is true, where the
receiver is known to be uncertain about the proposition.
• disconfirm — the sender informs the receiver that a given proposition is false, where
the receiver is known to believe, or believe it likely that, the proposition is true.
• failure — the action of telling another agent that an action was attempted but the
attempt failed.
• inform — the sender informs the receiver that a given proposition is true.
• not-understood— the sender received a communicative act which it did not understand.
• propose— a general-purpose action to make a proposal or respond to an existing proposal
during a negotiation process by proposing to perform a given action subject to certain
conditions being true.
• query-if — the action of asking another agent whether or not a given proposition is
(believed to be) true.
• query-ref — the action of asking another agent for the object referred to (or identified)
by an expression (or definite descriptor).
• refuse — the action of refusing to perform a given action, and explaining the reason for
the refusal.
• reject-proposal— a general-purpose rejection to a previously submitted proposal. The
agent sending the rejection informs the receiver that it has no intention that the recipient
performs the given action under the given preconditions.
• request — the sender requests the receiver to perform some action. The content of the
message is a description of the action to be performed, in some language the receiver
understands.
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As well as an informal English description for each performative, the developers of the FIPA
ACL provided a formal semantics to the language, defining feasibility conditions and rational
effects of the communicative actions in terms of the intentional stance of the agent (i.e. men-
talistic notions such as uncertain and certain beliefs, as well as desires and intentions). These
logical definitions, further details of which can be found in the FIPA ACL specification [FIP98],
generally characterise the belief state of the sending agent before performing the communica-
tive act, and the expected possible belief states of the receiving agent after the act has been
performed.
Singh argues in [Sin98] that there are considerable limitations of intentionality as a basis for
defining the semantics of an ACL (i.e. using mental attitudes for standardising the semantics
of the ACL). Notably, intentionality is concerned with agent internals and a communicative
act is an external phenomenon. Intentionality can give guidance to developers but may be
too strong a constraint for autonomous (heterogeneous) agents given that communication is
inherently context-dependent and different applications may require variations on the agent
behaviour and the performative semantics [Sin98]. In addition to this, internal states of agents
cannot be verified and also the performatives and protocols specified as part of the FIPA ACL
are not exhaustive [Sin98]. Recognising the above, we adopt an alternative semantic framework
with an emphasis on pragmatics [MP09] and the protocols that agents agree to communicate
under [PM99a, PM99b], as follows:
In this thesis we give meaning to the communicative acts which we consider in terms of the
protocols governing the interactions, where representation of the protocols as finite-state
automata will suffice.
2.2.2 Negotiation
Negotiation arises out of a conflict of interests and need for interaction, and the desired outcome
is to make a deal1 [WK95, MP09]. Indeed, in a society of self-interested agents, agents cannot
be assumed to share a common goal or a common set of preferences. One agent’s interests
may therefore conflict with those of others. Despite the potential for conflicts of interest,
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the agents in a multiagent system will ultimately need to cooperate in order to achieve their
goals [Woo09]. How agents can negotiate or compromise to reach agreement in situations where
they are apparantly at loggerheads is an important area of research in artificial intelligence and
computer science [RZ94, Kra01]. The kinds of negotiation and deals of interest in this thesis
are those wherein participants bargain over the division of some (scarce) resources. We give an
overview in this section of a couple of the protocols developed for negotiation over resources in
a distributed setting. Namely, the Contract-Net [Smi80] and Task-Swap [GMR97] negotiation
protocols. These protocols allow for an agent to negotiate simultaneously with multiple agents
to decide which (single) agent to give or exchange resources with.
The Contract-Net Protocol [Smi80] is a protocol initially developed for task allocation over
a distributed network of sensors, but is also perfectly suited to negotiation over resources in
multi-agent distributed settings. It is inspired by a market-like model of negotiation. Ignoring
much of the lower-level detail, the protocol consists of four interaction phases, involving two
roles (initiator and bidders):
• Announcement phase: The initiator sends out a call for proposals of a task (resource)
and then acts as the manager of the resource. An announcement can be addressed to all
agents, to a subset of agents, or to a single agent.
• Bidding phase: Agents maintain a rank-ordered list of announcements that have been
received and have not yet expired, and each agent can formulate a bid for each announce-
ment received. The agent checks its list of announcements and selects one on which to
submit a bid. The agents (bidders) send their proposals to the initiator.
• Assignment phase: The initiator maintains a rank-ordered list of bids that have been
received for the task. When a bid is received, the initiator ranks the bid relative to others
under consideration. If a bid is received that is determined to be satisfactory, then the
resource is awarded immediately to the associated bidder. Otherwise, the initiator waits
for further bids. If the expiration time is reached and the task has not yet been awarded,
several actions are possible:
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– awarding the task to the most acceptable bidder(s);
– transmitting another announcement (if no (acceptable) bids have been received);
– ending without awarding the task or transmitting another announcement.
Successful bidders are informed through an announced award message.
• Confirmation phase: The elected bidder confirms its intention to obtain the task, and the
initiator rejects other bids.
Any agent can initiate an interaction, and the protocol is really a one-to-many protocol, possibly
leading to the assignment of a single task (resource) to a single bidder.
The Contract-Net negotiation process is discussed under the assumption that an agent cannot
submit a bid until it is idle (i.e. it completes processing of its current task and becomes available
for processing another task). This strategy can lead to difficulty. For example, an initiator that
issues an announcement may not receive any bids because there are no idle agents. Therefore, an
initiator requires a way of determining what caused the lack of response. A possible technique
for doing so is suggested by Smith in [Smi80]. Namely, for a bidding agent to specify why it
cannot bid, e.g. it is busy, or ineligible, or it gives the task a low level ranking. The initiator
(manager) agent can then proceed more appropriately. Indeed such a technique can be seen
as a kind of argumentation-based negotiation (see Section 2.3). Other potential complications
and possible extensions of the Contract-Net Protocol are also discussed in [Smi80].
The Task-Swap Negotiation Protocol developed by Golfarelli et al. [GMR97] uses a variant of the
classical Contract-Net Protocol to allow negotiation over the exchange of bundles of resources
and to cope with domains where task swap is the only possible type of contract (i.e. tasks are
not sold and there are no monetary side payments as part of deals). The agents considered are
heterogeneous, self-interested, have limited communication capabilities and as in the Contract-
Net Protocol are not coordinated by any central supervisor. Indeed many realistic applications
may benefit from adopting swap-based contracts instead of sale-based ones. In particular, as
is discussed by Golfarelli et al. in [GMR97], autonomous robotic agents can decrease the costs
for executing their missions by swapping the tasks they have been assigned.
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The Task-Swap Negotiation Protocol is based on three main phases:
• Announcement Phase: The announcing agent formulates an announcement and broad-
casts it to the other agents. An announcement consists of one or more tasks which the
announcer is interested in exchanging.
• Bidding Phase: Each agent receiving the announcement formulates a bid and sends it to
the announcer. The bid associated to an announcement consists of one or more tasks,
owned by the bidder, which the bidder is interested in exchanging with the tasks included
in the announcement. A swap is proposed only if it is individual rational (i.e. advan-
tageous to the bidder). The bidder cannot bid other announcements nor can it start
a new announcement until it receives either an award or an acknowledgement from the
announcer.
• Award Phase: The announcer collects the bids for a fixed time. When this time expires
the announcer determines, among all the bids received, the swap having the highest utility.
If the utility is positive, then the swap is individual rational for both the announcer and
the bidder. In such a case an award is broadcast to the winner and the swap is confirmed.
Otherwise, no swap is confirmed. An acknowledgement is broadcast to all the non-winner
bidders. The negotiation session is over.
Like the Contract-Net Protocol, the Task-Swap Negotiation Protocol is a one-to-many protocol
possibly leading to the assignment of a single task (resource) to a single bidder.
The negotiation protocol we present in this thesis is an adaptation of the Contract-Net and
and Task-Swap negotiation protocols, allowing not only for an agent to negotiate simultan-
eously with multiple agents but allowing also for agents to agree on exchanges of resources
involving multiple (two or more) agents.
2.2.3 Logic-based Negotiation
Sadri et al. present in [STT01] a formal, logic-based approach to one-to-one agent negotiation,
in the context of goal achievement in systems of agents with limited resource availability. Agents
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have a dichotomous (0-1) cardinal utility function as in this thesis, such that an agent’s utility
value of a bundle is 1 if that bundle allows the agent to achieve its goal, 0 otherwise. More
specifically, each agent is equipped with a knowledge base, which would contain beliefs such as
the resources held by the agent, as well as the goal the agent is equipped with, an intention
that might consist of the goal, a plan to achieve that goal, which may be to obtain a certain
bundle of resources, and an associated set of available and missing resources that are needed
to carry out the plan.
The purpose of negotiation in [STT01] is for agents to obtain missing resources, while retaining
available ones that are necessary for the plan in its current intention. A dialogue move (or
utterance) in [STT01], and somewhat similarly in this thesis, is an instance of a schema tell(X,
Y, Subject, T), where X is the utterer and Y is the receiver of the dialogue move, and T is
the time when the dialogue move is uttered. Subject is the content of the dialogue move,
expressed in some given content language. A language for negotiation in [STT01] is a set of
dialogue moves and, as part of a given language, there are two subsets of dialogue moves: initial
moves and final moves. An example of an initial move could be a request that is initiated by
an agent for a resource that it requires. Each final move is either successful or unsuccessful.
Examples of the types of dialogue moves that may make up a language are resource requests,
acceptance of moves, refusal of moves and promise to exchange resources (see [STT01] for a
possible concrete language for negotiation).
Conversation between agents in [STT01], and similarly in this thesis, is based on dialogues,
where a single dialogue is a sequence of dialogue moves (utterances), according to a pre-defined
acceptable sequence of utterances (the protocol), used to obtain a resource and such that agents
alternate utterances in a dialogue. Intuitively, a dialogue should begin with an initial move,
according to the given language for negotiation. Agent dialogues can be connected within
sequences (of dialogues), all aimed at achieving an individual agent’s goal. Sets of sequences
of dialogues aim at allowing all agents in the system to achieve their goals, and can be used to
solve the resource reallocation problem.
The proposed solution in [STT01] for allowing agents to achieve their goals (i.e. obtain needed
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resources) is based on fully distributed agent dialogues as a way to request resources, propose
resource exchanges, suggest alternative resources, and so on. The negotiation framework pre-
sented is a general one for representing policies governed by protocols and generating dialogues
accordingly. A negotiation policy for an agent is specified as a set of dialogue contraints, which
are if-then rules of the form p(T ) ∧ C ⇒ pˆ(T + 1) where p(T ) and pˆ(T + 1) are shorthand
for dialogue moves of the form tell(X, Y, Subject, T) as above and C is a conjunction of
literals in the language of the knowledge base of the agent. If this is a dialogue constraint for
an agent x, for example, then it is interpreted as follows: if at a certain time T in a dialogue
some other agent y utters to x a dialogue move p(T ), then the corresponding instance of the
dialogue constraint is triggered and, if the condition C is entailed by the knowledge base of x,
then x will utter a dialogue move pˆ(T +1), with y as receiver, at the next time T +1. An agent
program (set of dialogue constraints associated with an agent) should ideally guarantee that the
agent’s utterances are conformant to the protocols governing its dialogues and that the agent’s
dialogues terminate. Other ideal properties desired of an agent program are discussed by Sadri
et al. [STT01] and Endriss et al. [EMST03], e.g. the agent always produces exactly one reply
to a (non final) move made by the other agent.
Our communication rules in this thesis for representing agent negotiation policies combine ideas
from the dialogue constraints of Sadri et al. [STT01], which do not say how agents’ beliefs are
modified, and theactions of Rueda et al. [RGS02]. An action (ability) A in [RGS02] is an
ordered triple < P,X,C > denoted as {X1, . . . , Xn}
A
← {P1, . . . , Pm}, {not C1, . . . , not Ck},
where P is a set of m literals representing preconditions for A, C is a set of k constraints of the
form not L (L is a literal) and X is a set of n literals representing consequences of executing
A. An agent, according to [RGS02], can consider an action only if its beliefs tell it that the
preconditions and constraints are satisfied. The consequences specify the revisions to be made
to the agent’s set of beliefs as a result of applying the action, where revision consists of removing
any literal in the belief base of the agent that is complimentary of any literal in X and then
adding X to the resulting set.
It is assumed in [STT01] that all dialogues between an agent i and any other agents are atomic,
i.e., it is not possible for i to be engaged in two different dialogues at the same time. This is
34 Chapter 2. Background and Preliminaries
an assumption we relax in this thesis, as follows:
Conversation between agents in this thesis will be based on dialogues (sequences of utter-
ances by agents) generated by the agents’ negotiation policies (sets of communication rules)
and governed by protocols represented as finite-state machines. The negotiation policies will
allow for an agent to be engaged in two or more different dialogues at the same time.
Moreover, we consider one-to-many agent dialogues in this thesis as well as one-to-one dialogues
as in [STT01].
2.3 Argumentation-Based Negotiation
Negotiation deals with the problem of agents coming to agreement on matters of common in-
terest (exchanges of resources in this thesis). Argumentation on the other hand deals with
the problem of exchanging arguments (which could be for example reasons or justifications
supporting a certain stance) for deciding what to believe or do. Implicitly, it involves pro-
viding principled techniques for handling inconsistencies among the beliefs of multiple agents,
which would come to be known as agents put forward arguments, and extracting rationally
justifiable positions from the inconsistent pool of arguments [Woo09]. We give in this section
a general introduction to argumentation and then a discussion on the use of argumentation for
negotiation.
2.3.1 Introduction to Argumentation
Argumentation is a large topic of interest spanning over a number of research areas ranging
from philosophy to artificial intelligence. As pointed out van Eemeren et al. in [vEGH02], it
is important to note that there are statements whose acceptability can be established with no
problem. Examples of these are factual statements whose truth can be verified. The acceptabil-
ity of nonfactual statements can also sometimes be agreed on quickly, for instance, when they
concern commonplace values or judgements (e.g. “Parents should take care of their children”).
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In many other instances it is very difficult to agree on the acceptability of a statement, partic-
ularly if it involves a complex matter or is strongly tied to particular values and norms (e.g.
“Reading is (not) the best way to improve your language skills”). It is such statements that
must be supported by further proof for the speaker’s argumentation as a whole to be accepted
as an adequate defence (or refutation) of the standpoint.
An argument can be seen as a claim with some justification, e.g. “This film should have won
an Oscar because it was a good movie with an edge.” As discussed in [BH08a], argumentation
is a key way humans deal with conflicting information. It can be seen as a cognitive process
involving identifying arguments and counterarguments (e.g. “What are the pros and cons for
the safety of mobile phones for children?”); weighing, comparing, or evaluating arguments
(e.g. “What sense can we make of the arguments concerning mobile phones for children?”); or
drawing conclusions (e.g. “A parent answering the question ‘Are mobile phones safe for my
children?’ ”). Moreover, it may be monological involving one agent (e.g. a newspaper article
by a journalist, a political speech by a politician etc) or dialogical involving more than one
agent (e.g. lawyers arguing in a court, politicians debating about new legislation etc). As
discussed in [BH08a], monological argumentatation is an internal process involving collating
and analysing information, possibly producing a tangible output (e.g. an article or speech
or decision). The emphasis of the monological view is on how to construct the arguments
and how to draw conclusions from the assembled arguments. Dialogical argumentation on
the other hand can be seen as incorporating monological argumentation but the emphasis is
on interaction, i.e. the nature of the interactions between the agents and on the process of
building up (constructing) the set of arguments (for and against a particular claim) until the
agents collectively reach a conclusion.
A few examples of approaches which exist for representing arguments are the Toulmin
Model [Tou58], Argument Schemes [vEGH02, Wal95] and the Carneades Argumentation Frame-
work [GPW07]. These allow capturing justification for a claim by bringing together various
interrelated components in specific ways. In evaluating the soundness of arguments, defective
argumentation can occur due to contradictions in the argumentation as a whole, or individual
arguments may be unacceptable or otherwise flawed. In assessing the soundness of argumenta-
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tion all complex argumentation must be broken down into single arguments, each of which must
be assessed. However, it is often advisable not to proceed to the assessment of the individual
arguments before determining whether the argumentation as a whole is consistent. According
to van Eemeren et al. [vEGH02], this holistic checking for consistency occurs at two levels:
• Logical Inconsistency : When statements are made that, because they contradict each
other or have conflicting implications, cannot possibly both be true.
• Pragmatic Inconsistency : When argumentation contains two statements that, although
not logically inconsistent, have consequences in the real world that are contradictory. As
an example, the promise “I’ll pick you up in the car” does not in a strict sense logically
contradict the statement “I don’t know how to drive”, but in everyday conversation, it is
unacceptable for such a promise to be followed by this statement.
To handle arguments systematically and “formalise” the argumentation process, it is necessary
to capture and analyse the arguments and counterarguments relevant to a particular claim.
Moreover, a framework for doing so should have in place principled criteria for suggesting
whether the claim is “warranted” or “unwarranted” given the “constellation” of arguments
and counterarguments [BH08a]. Numerous formal theories for modelling the argumentation
process exist, e.g. abstract systems [Dun95], defeasible systems [GS04, DKT09] and coherence
systems [BH08a].
The main approach we consider for modelling the argumentation process in this thesis is
Assumption-Based Argumentation [DKT09] which can be seen as a defeasible logic-based
“instantiation” of Abstract Argumentation [Dun95].
See Section 2.4 for a more detailed discussion on Abstract Argumentation and Assumption-
Based Argumentation.
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2.3.2 Argumentation for Negotiation
The basic idea of argumentation-based negotiation (ABN) is stated as allowing additional
information to be exchanged as part of the negoatiation process, over and above proposals.
For example, two agents negotiate over which should carry out a particular task or receive
some resource, putting forward proposals and counter-proposals. Then the idea is, in addition,
for an agent to put forward arguments as a means of justifying its negotiation stance and/or
persuading the other to change its negotiation stance [JFL+01]. In doing so, the agents dialogue
with one another in an argumentative sense, each seeking to make its proposal more attractive
(acceptable) by providing additional meta-level information in the form of arguments for its
position. It is argued that doing so can increase the efficiency of the negotiation process and
increase the range of possible agreements [JFL+01, RRJ+03], a claim which has begun to be
analysed formally and experimentally in recent works [RPSD07, PHD+07, KJRM09].
An example of a model developed to allow argumentation to fit into the general negotiation
process is that of van Veenen and Prakken [vVP05]. Here a simple negotiation language for
trading proposals as that of Wooldridge and Parsons [WP00] is augmented with a series of
illocutionary moves which allow for the passing of arguments. In this model, as in other
models such as [RSD03, KJRM09], the passing of an argument or a challenge for justification
can be seen as marking a transition from the negotiation protocol to a separate argumentation
protocol. Possible protocols for such argumentative dialogues have been suggested and analysed
in [AMP00, APM00, Pra05]. On completion of the argumentation dialogue, the dialogue as
a whole would make the reverse transition and pick up the negotiation dialogue once again.
This general idea of one dialogue type being embedded within or following another is discussed
by McBurney and Parsons in [MP02] where a logic-based formalism is presented for modelling
such complex dialogue occurrences between intelligent and autonomous software agents.
As discussed by Rahwan et al. in [RRJ+03], there is a growing community of researchers
that advocate the idea that agents can increase the likelihood and quality of an agreement by
exchanging arguments which influence each others’ states, and that sometimes this argument
exchange is essential when various assumptions about agent rationality cannot be satisfied.
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Section 2.2.2 discussed briefly how the Contract-Net protocol could benefit from allowing agents
to exchange arguments. Namely, for bidding agents to specify why they cannot bid (when
they cannot bid) and for the initiator (manager) agent to use this information and proceed
more appropriately. The logic-based dialogue approach of Sadri et al. [STT01] (discussed in
Section 2.2.3) also includes a form of argumentation using counter-proposals intended to change
the intention (and perhaps the plan) of the other agent. A counter-proposal is an alternative
proposal generated in response to a proposal, with the promise of a different resource deal.
The framework could readily be extended to incorporate more argumentation moves, such as
critique (comments on which parts of a proposal the agent like or dislikes), and moves to
challenge and justify prior proposals and decisions. In using these argumentative moves the
negotiator provides additional meta-level information and seeks to make her position or proposal
more attractive (acceptable). As stated by Jennings et al. in [JFL+01], the nature and types
of the arguments can vary enormously. Common categories, as occurring in [KSE98], include:
threats (i.e. failure to accept the proposal means something negative will happen), rewards
(i.e. acceptance of the proposal means something positive will happen), and appeals (i.e. this
option should be preferred over alternatives for some reason).
In [JFL+01], Jennings et al. state two main areas of future work for ABN, as follows:
1. The definition of suitable argumentation protocols, that is, sets of rules that specify how
agents generate and respond to arguments based upon what they know.
2. The transition between the underlying negotiation protocol and the argumentation proto-
col. When is the right time to make this transition, when is it right to start an argument?
We address the first challenge above in this thesis for the resource reallocation problem. We
do not consider the second challenge above and instead, similar to [SJNP97, PSJ98], define a
single protocol that combines both negotiation and argumentation. The work of Rahwan et
al. [RRJ+03] aims at setting up a broader research agenda for ABN in multi-agent systems. It
does so by splitting the elements of an ABN framework into two main parts, the interaction
environment and the agents participating in that interaction, as follows:
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• the elements that are external to the agents, namely the communication and domain
languages, the negotiation protocol, and various information stores.
• the internal elements and functionalities necessary to enable an agent to conduct ABN.
More precisely, the process of argument and proposal evaluation, argument and proposal
generation, and argument selection.
We address both parts of ABN in this thesis in putting together a generative (fully worked
out) ABN framework for the resource reallocation problem. In particular, firstly, we present
a rich communication and domain language that enables agents to exchange meta-information
(e.g. why a particular outcome is not suitable for the agent), as well as information that
describes outcomes (potential agreements or potential deals). Secondly, we specify a protocol
for our ABN dialogues, constraining the use of the language and governing the interaction of
participants. We do so by specifying at each stage of a dialogue instance who is allowed to say
what. Thirdly, we define the agents’ internal specification (communication rules and associated
procedures) to conform to the protocols. In addition to interpreting and evaluating incoming
proposals regarding exchanges of resources and generating outgoing proposals and responses,
as is minimally required in negotiation, our agents are capable of generating and evaluating
accompanying arguments (and updating their mental states accordingly).
We put together a generative (fully worked out) ABN framework in this thesis for the
resource reallocation problem, defining the necessary internal and external elements
required of agents and the interaction environment.
2.4 Computational Argumentation
The different forms of reasoning that an agent may perform (e.g. epistemic, practical, etc)
are often defeasible as the information available to the agent may be conflicting in general
(e.g. if this information comes from different sources) [Ton08] or may be presumptious in the
sense defined by Walton in [Wal95] (i.e. tentative and subject to later retraction)2. Thus the
2Presumptions are ofen required, for example, if a decision or stance needs to be taken in the presence of
incomplete information. A presumption, according to Walton [Wal95], is functionally opposed to burden of
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approaches to representing argumentation in logic are often based on non-monotonic systems.
With monotonic inference rules, once the premises of a rule are proved, the rule can be applied,
the conclusion of the rule can be derived and will continue to hold no matter no matter how
many new premises are added (even to the point where they form an inconsistent set) [AvH04].
However, in non-monotonic systems, a rule may not be applied even if all premises are known
because contrary reasoning chains have to be considered [AvH04]. In general, such rules are
called defeasible because they can be defeated by other rules. As new information comes in
it can change the circumstances of a given situation. The Assumption-Based Argumentaion
(ABA) approach explained in this section is such that a rule is defeasible if one (or more) of its
premises is an “assumption”. An assumption can be seen as a presumption in the sense defined
by Walton in [Wal95]. We discuss first in this section the abstract view of argumentation and
then the particular argumentation framework (ABA) which we use and build upon in this thesis
to instantiate the decision-making of the agents and their ability to exchange arguments as part
of the negotiation process. An overview of other possible argumentation frameworks can be
found in [RS09].
2.4.1 Dung’s Abstract Argumentation Framework
The work of Dung [Dun95] develops a highly abstract theory for argumentation whose central
notion is the acceptability of arguments. This is done in two steps. Firstly, a formal, abstract
but simple theory of argumentation is developed to capture the notion of acceptability of
arguments in a general way. Secondly, the “correctness” (or “appropriateness”) of this theory
is demonstrated. The theory is based on a notion of argumentation framework defined as a
pair of a set of arguments and a binary relation representing the attack-relationship between
arguments. Here, an argument is an abstract entity whose role is solely determined by its
relations to other arguments. No special attention is paid to the internal structure of the
arguments.
Dung [Dun95] defines various notions of semantics (that define the acceptability of sets of
proof, in the sense that it removes or absolves one side from the burden and shifts the burden to the other side.
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arguments) in terms of the attack relation between arguments; ranging from the credulous to
the sceptical, and the relations between these semantics are given. Given two sets of arguments
X and Y , we say that X attacks Y iff there exists x ∈ X and y ∈ Y such that x attacks y. As
summarised in [Ton08], a set X of arguments then is
• conflict-free iff X does not attack itself;
• admissible iff X is conflict-free and X attacks every set of arguments Y such that Y
attacks X;
• preferred iff X is maximally admissible;
• sceptically preferred iff X is the intersection of all preferred sets of arguments;
• complete iff X is admissible and X contains all arguments x such that X attacks all
attacks against x;
• grounded iff X is minimally complete;
• ideal iff X is admissible and it is contained in every preferred set of arguments.
Deciding upon a semantics can be seen as a means of choosing/deciding the kinds of sets of
arguments (positions) that are acceptable for an agent. Conflict-freeness can be thought of
as the most basic requirement for a rational position: it basically says that an argument set
should be internally consistent. An admissibile position is one that is internally consistent and
which defends itself against all attackers. The preferred semantics can be seen as going a step
further than admissibility and encompassing as much of the available evidence (arguments)
as possible [Woo09]. More sceptical semantics still are the sceptically preferred, complete,
grounded and ideal semantics, which unlike the previous three determine unique solutions and
do not allow multiple (different) sets of arguments to be acceptable for a given argumentation
framework. The last notion was not in the original [Dun95], but has been proposed recently by
Dung et al. [DKT06] as an alternative, less sceptical semantics than the grounded semantics.
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2.4.2 Assumption-Based Argumentation
The abstract view of argumentation in particular [Dun95] does not deal with the problem of
actually finding arguments and attacks amongst them. This section introduces Assumption-
Based Argumentation (ABA), an approach for representing argumentation in logic, giving the
arguments themselves structure, giving a precise meaning to the notion of “attack” between
arguments and presenting a notion of semantics for arguments in terms of ABA. Further details
to that presented here can be found in [DKT06, DMT07, DKT09].
ABA Framework
Typically, as in Defeasible Logic Programming [GS04] and Deductive Argumentation [BH08a],
arguments are built by connecting rules in the belief set, and attacks arise from conflicts among
such arguments. In ABA, arguments are (implicitly meant to be) obtained by reasoning back-
wards with a given set of inference rules (the belief set), from conclusions to premises that are
assumptions, and attacks are defined in terms of a notion of contrary of assumptions. The ABA
approach for representing argumentation, as presented in this section, as well as approaches
such as Defeasible Logic Programming [GS04] and Deductive Argumentation [BH08a], deal
with cases where there is a single agreed upon knowledge-base. Thus, these approaches can be
seen as intra-agent argumentation, whereby an agent engages in a dialectical argumentation
process with itself to determine its “acceptable” beliefs (desires, intentions).
An agent’s belief set and backward reasoning in ABA are defined in terms of a deductive system,
which is defined as follows:
Definition 2.6 (Deductive System) A deductive system is a pair (L,R) where
• L is a formal language consisting of countably many sentences, and
• R is a countable set of inference rules of the form
x1, . . . , xn
x
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where x ∈ L is called the conclusion and x1, . . . , xn ∈ L are called the premises of the
inference rule, and n ≥ 0.
A deduction of a conclusion by means of a deductive system (L,R) then is obtained by applying
backwards the rules in R, as follows:
Definition 2.7 (Deduction of a conclusion) Given a deductive system (L,R) and a se-
lection function f (any function that maps from sets of elements to elements), a (backward)
deduction of a conclusion x based on (or supported by) a set of premises P , denoted P ` x, is
a sequence of multi-sets S1, . . . , Sm, where S1 = x, Sm = P , and for every 1 ≤ i < m, where σ
is the sentence occurrence in Si selected by f :
1. If σ is not in P then Si+1 = Si−{σ}∪S for some inference rule of the form σ ← S ∈ R.
2. If σ is in P then Si+1 = Si.
Each Si is referred to as a step in the deduction.
Deductions are the basis for the construction of arguments in ABA. To obtain an argument
from a backward deduction the premises are restricted to ones that are assumptions. Indeed a
set of assumptions and a contrary mapping, together with a deductive system as above, make
up an ABA framework, as follows:
Definition 2.8 (ABA framework) An ABA framework is a tuple 〈L,R,A, c〉 where
• (L,R) is a deductive system, consisting of a language L and a set R of inference rules;
• A ⊆ L, A 6= {}. A is referred to as the set of (candidate) assumptions;
• If x ∈ A, then there is no inference rule of the form x← x1, . . . , xn ∈ R;
• c is a (total) mapping from A into L, where c(x) is referred to as the contrary of x.
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Intuitively, assumptions are sentences that can be assumed to hold but can be questioned
and disputed (as opposed to axioms that are instead beyond dispute), and the contrary of an
assumption stands for the reason why that assumption may be undermined and thus may need
to be dropped. Indeed an inference rule containing one or more assumptions in the premises can
be seen as a “defeasible rule” in the sense of [GS04], used for representing defeasible knowledge,
i.e. weak or tentative information that may be used if nothing could be posted against it. On
the other hand, an inference rule containing no assumptions in the premises can be seen as a
“strict rule” in the sense of [GS04], used for representing non-defeasible information, i.e. strict
(sound) knowledge.
We assume in this thesis that the inference rules in R have the syntax l0 ← l1, . . . ln (for n ≥ 0)
where li ∈ L. We will represent l0 ← simply as l0, and refer to this as a fact. As in [DMT07] we
restrict attention to flat ABA frameworks, such that if l0 ∈ A, then there exists no inference
rule of the form l0 ← l1, . . . , ln ∈ R, for any n ≥ 0. Lastly, an argument in favour of a sentence
p ∈ L is a backward deduction A ` p such that A ⊆ A
Attack-relationship between arguments
Unlike Dung’s abstract argumentation framework [Dun95] wherein the attack-relationship be-
tween arguments is explicit, in ABA this relationship is determined by the internal structure
of the arguments. In ABA, as defined above, arguments are deductions from conclusions based
solely upon assumptions. A set of assumptions attacks another set of assumptions as follows:
Definition 2.9 (Attack in ABA) A set of assumptions A attacks a set of assumptions B iff
there exists an assumption x in B and, for some y ∈ c(x), a deduction A′ ` y such that A′ is
a subset of A: if this is the case, it is said that A attacks B on x.
This notion of attack between sets of assumptions implicitly gives a notion of attack between ar-
guments supported by sets of assumptions: the attacking argument needs to have as conclusion
the contrary of an assumption in the support of the attacked argument.
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Argument Semantics
Standard argument semantics as per abstract argumentation (see Section 2.4.1) can be ascribed
to ABA frameworks, as follows: A set of assumptions A is
• conflict-free iff it does not attack itself;
• admissible iff A is conflict-free and A attacks every set of assumptions B that attacks A;
• preferred iff it is maximally admissible;
• sceptically preferred iff A is the intersection of all preferred sets of assumptions;
• complete iff A is admissible and contains all assumptions x such that A attacks all attacks
against {x};
• grounded iff it is minimally complete;
• ideal iff A is admissible and it is contained in every preferred set of assumptions.
Our focus in this thesis is the admissibility semantics. We will say that a claim is admissible
if it is the conclusion of an argument that is supported by a set of assumptions that can be
extended to an admissible set of assumptions. Indeed computational mechanisms exist for
computing sets of assumptions corresponding to the various semantics, which we discuss next.
Dialectic proof procedures
Within ABA, implicitly, a set of assumptions stands for the set of all arguments whose premises
are contained in the given set of assumptions. Thus, the computation of “acceptable” sets
of arguments amounts to computing “acceptable” sets of assumptions. The work of Dung
et al. [DMT07] present a family of dialectical proof procedures for ABA that can compute
“acceptable” sets of assumptions according to various semantics. The proof procedures find a
set of assumptions, to defend a given belief (claim), by starting from an initial set of assumptions
that supports an argument for the claim and adding defending assumptions incrementally to
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counter-attack all attacks. They can be seen as generating a winning strategy for a proponent
to win a dispute against an ideal opponent who attacks in every possible way the initial and
defending arguments of the proponent. The proponent wins if it has a counter-attack against
every attacking argument by the opponent.
The proof procedures in [DMT07] generate and find arguments by reasoning backwards from
conclusions to assumptions. They use backward reasoning both to find an initial argument for a
given belief and to find attacking and defending arguments for the contrary of an assumption.
Each step in a backward argument is viewed as a partially completed, potential argument.
Any assumption in such a potential argument can be attacked (by finding an argument for its
contrary) before the argument is completed. We present next the AB-dispute derivations of
Dung et al. [DMT07] which prove that a claim is admissible by building an admissible set of
assumptions which support/defend the claim. The proponent’s winning strategy is represented
as a sequence of quadruples consisting of proponent and opponent nodes labelled by multi-sets of
sentences, representing steps of potential arguments, as well as the set of defence assumptions
(assumptions used by the proponent) and culprits (opponent’s assumptions that have been
attacked) generated so far, as follows:
Definition 2.10 (AB-dispute derivation) Let 〈L, R, A, c〉 be an ABA framework.
Given a selection function, an AB-dispute derivation of a defence set A for a sentence α
is a finite sequence of quadruples
〈
P0,O0, A0, C0
〉
, . . . ,
〈
Pi,Oi, Ai, Ci
〉
, . . . ,
〈
Pn,On, An, Cn
〉
where P0 = {α}, A0 = A ∩ {α}, O0 = C0 = {}, Pn = On = {}, A = An and for every
0 ≤ i < n, only one σ in Pi or one S in Oi is selected, and:
1. If σ ∈ Pi is selected then
(i) if σ is an assumption, then
• Pi+1 = Pi − {σ}
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• Ai+1 = Ai
• Ci+1 = Ci
• Oi+1 = Oi ∪ {{c(σ)}}
(ii) if σ is not an assumption, then there exists some inference rule σ ← R ∈ R such
that Ci ∩R = {} (filtering of potential defence arguments by culprits) and
• Pi+1 = Pi − {σ} ∪ (R− Ai) (filtering of defence assumptions by defences)
• Ai+1 = Ai ∪ (A ∩R)
• Ci+1 = Ci
• Oi+1 = Oi
2. If S is selected in Oi and σ is selected in S then
(i) if σ is an assumption, then
(a) either σ is ignored, i.e.
• Oi+1 = Oi − {S} ∪ {S − {σ}}
• Pi+1 = Pi
• Ai+1 = Ai
• Ci+1 = Ci
(b) or σ 6∈ Ai (filtering of culprits by defence assumptions) and σ ∈ Ci (filtering of
culprits by culprits) and
• Oi+1 = Oi − {S}
• Pi+1 = Pi
• Ai+1 = Ai
• Ci+1 = Ci
(c) or σ 6∈ Ai (filtering of culprits by defence assumptions) and σ 6∈ Ci (filtering of
culprits by culprits) and
(c.1) if c(σ) is not an assumption, then
• Oi+1 = Oi − {S}
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• Pi+1 = Pi ∪ {c(σ)}
• Ai+1 = Ai
• Ci+1 = Ci ∪ {σ}
(c.2) if c(σ) is an assumption, then
• Oi+1 = Oi − {S}
• Pi+1 = Pi (filtering of defence assumptions by defences)
• Ai+1 = Ai ∪ {c(σ)}
• Ci+1 = Ci ∪ {σ}
(ii) if σ is not an assumption, then
• Pi+1 = Pi
• Ai+1 = Ai
• Ci+1 = Ci
• Oi+1 = Oi − {S} ∪
{
S − {σ} ∪ R
∣∣ σ ← R ∈ R, andR ∩ Ci = {}
}
(filtering of
culprits by culprits)
Note that the dispute derivations as above incorporate filtering of and filtering by defence and
culprit assumptions so that the final assumption-defence set constructed by the derivation does
not attack itself, and so that the dispute derivations can be more efficient and can (finitely)
compute infinite dispute trees. Further details can be found in [DMT07], including discussions
of the soundness and completeness of the dispute derivations.
In closing, it is important to note that ABA, and to a large extent argumentation frameworks in
general (e.g. [GS04, BH08a]), up to now have been considered in a single-agent setting. ABA, in
particular, is such that an agent engages in a dispute (dialectic proof procedure) with itself (an
imaginary opponent) to decide whether a claim is acceptable according to some acceptability
criteria. Amongst our aims in this thesis are to present a generalised proof procedure for the
admissibility semantics of ABA, which is still a dispute by an agent with itself but such that the
outcome can be readily communicated to other agents. This is important for applications in
multi-agent systems (an example of which is argumentation-based negotiation, see Section 2.3.2)
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wherein agents may differ in the knowledge they have and may need to communicate their
arguments between one another to convince each other of the acceptability or not of a given
claim (or negotiation stance as the case may be).
2.5 Summary
We have presented in this chapter background knowledge on the key subject areas underpinning
this thesis. The introduction of resources, allocations, agent preferences and social welfare
in Section 2.1, as well the choices we make in this thesis regarding these concepts, will be
useful in framing the resource reallocation problem of interest in this thesis (see Chapter 3).
The introduction, also in Section 2.1, of distributed allocation procedures and deals will be
useful in capturing the kinds of deals that are necessary and sufficient for solving our resource
reallocation problem of interest in this thesis (see Chapter 4). The discussion in Section 2.2
of issues involved with agent communication and interaction for solving multi-agent problems
such as the resource reallocation problem by means of agent dialogues (negotiation), as well
as the discussion in Section 2.3 of issues surrounding argumentation-based negotiation, will be
useful in presenting an argumentation-based negotiation protocol and policy for solving our
resource reallocation problem of interest in this thesis (see Chapter 5). Lastly, the presentation
of assumption-based argumentation in Section 2.4 will provide a basis for the general-purpose
argumentation framework which we define for multi-agent settings (see Chapter 6) and which
we use for grounding our argumentative negotiation policy (see Chapter 7).
Chapter 3
Agent Systems for the Resource
Reallocation Problem
We define in this chapter the key components of our problem domain, amounting to the notion
of agent system (Section 3.1), resource reallocation problem (Section 3.3), and individual and
social welfare (Section 3.4). Informally, the problem domain is as follows: An agent is initially
allocated a set of resources, possibly none, where resources are single-unit (distinguishable by
name), indivisible (an agent either has a particular resource or it does not) and unshareable
(no two agents have the same resource). Each agent has a goal which it desires to fulfil. A
certain goal may be fulfilled by a choice of different resources. Also, a certain resource may
fulfil a choice of different goals. We demonstrate in Section 3.2 an example application domain.
Throughout the thesis we will adopt the following notation: ¬ stands for (classical) negation;
terms beginning with a capital letter are variables; terms beginning in small-case are constants;
stands for an anonymous variable (as in Prolog).
50
3.1. Agent System 51
3.1 Agent System
We consider agent systems where (i) each (resource reallocation) agent may have in its posses-
sion some (or no) resources; and (ii) each agent has a goal, which is fulfilled if the agent has
a particular resource which the agent believes to fulfil its goal. In addition to beliefs about
resources fulfilling goals, agents may hold beliefs about other agents existing in the system,
holding resources, and having goals.
Definition 3.1 (Agent System) An agent system is a triple (G,R,A) such that
• G is a (finite) set of constants, representing goals of agents in the system
• R is a (finite) set of constants, representing resources (owned by agents) in the system
• A is a (finite) set of (resource reallocation) agents, where an agent is a quadruple 〈x,
Res(x), G(x), B(x)〉 such that
– x, the name, is a constant, uniquely identifying the agent in A
– Res(x) ⊆ R is the set of resources allocated to x,
– G(x) ∈ G is the goal of x,
– B(x), the belief set of x, is a consistent set of ground literals including (some)
instances (for Y 6= x, 〈Y, , , 〉 ∈ A) of
(i) isAgent(Y ), representing the information that Y is another agent in the system;
(ii) has(Y ,R), for R ∈ R, indicating x’s belief that agent Y is currently allocated
resource R;
(iii) ¬has(Y ,R), for R ∈ R, indicating x’s belief that agent Y is not currently
allocated resource R;
(iv) goal(Y ,G), for G ∈ G, indicating x’s belief that G is the goal of agent Y ;
(v) fulfils(R,G), for R ∈ R and G ∈ G, representing that resource R fulfils goal
G.
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Note that each agent has a single goal but several agents may have the same goal. Note
also that each agent may have several resources. Given AS = (G,R,A), let names(AS) =
{x | 〈x, , , 〉 ∈ A}.1 We will assume that names(AS) ∩ G = {}, names(AS) ∩R = {} and
G∩R = {} (namely, the constants used to refer to agents, goals and resources are distinct). We
will also assume that resources held by agents do not overlap. Namely: Res(x)∩Res(y) = ∅ for
x, y ∈ names(AS) where x 6= y, and that
⋃
x∈names(AS)Res(x) = R. An allocation of resources
in an agent system then is a partitioning of R amongst the agents in A, as follows:
Lemma 3.1 (allocation in an agent system) Given an agent system AS = (G,R,A), let
P : A → 2R such that P (〈x, , , 〉) = Res(x). Then, P is an allocation of resources (in the
sense of Definition 2.1).
We will refer to the allocation P as Res, and say that AS contains the allocation Res.
The lemma above implies that, in our agent systems, resources are indivisible (i.e. agents cannot
receive fractions of resources) and non-sharable (i.e. a resource cannot be allocated to two or
more agents at the same time). Note also that, by using constants to distinguish resources,
these are single-unit (i.e. there is only one copy of each resource in our agent systems).
In our agent systems it may be the case that two (or more) agents have the same goal. Each
goal may be achieved by acquiring any of a number of resources, as indicated by the fulfils
beliefs in the agents’ belief sets. Note that we assume, for simplicity, that single resources
suffice for the fulfilment of goals. Each resource fulfilling a goal may be seen as a plan for that
goal.
Definition 3.2 (agent’s beliefs about plans in an agent system) An agent x’s beliefs
about plans in an agent system AS is defined as follows: PlAS(x) = { fulfils(R,G) |
fulfils(R,G) ∈ B(x) }. We denote all beliefs about plans in an agent system as follows:
PlAS =
⋃
x∈names(AS) PlAS(x).
1By abuse of notation we will sometimes refer to an agent 〈x, , , 〉 ∈ A simply by its name, i.e. x.
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With an abuse of terminology, from now on we will refer to beliefs about plans simply as plans.
Note that it may be the case that there are no (beliefs about) plans for a goal in an agent
system.
In general, in our agent systems, agents may have incorrect and only partial beliefs of the
resources and goals of the other agents in the system. In this thesis we assume initial agent
systems such that agents are aware of the existence of all their fellow agents in the agent system
and have beliefs as to which resources fulfil which goals but have no beliefs (initially) about the
resources held (or not held) by other agents, nor any beliefs about the goals of other agents, as
follows:
Definition 3.3 (initial agent system) For an initial agent system AS = (G,R,A), all agents
〈x, Res(x), G(x), B(x)〉 ∈ A are such that:
• isAgent(y) ∈ B(x) for all y ∈ names(AS) where y 6= x;
• PlAS(x) = PlAS(y) for all agents y ∈ names(AS) where y 6= x;
• has( , ), ¬has( , ), goal( , ) /∈ B(x).
We will refer to the allocation that the initial agent system AS contains as the initial allocation.
Agents would come to hold beliefs about the resources and goals held by other agents by means
of dialogue (see Chapter 5).
To summarise:
In this thesis we assume that single resources suffice for the fulfilment of goals, that
agents know which resources fulfil which goals, and that agents are aware of the existence
of all their fellow agents in the agent system.
As a consequence of assuming that agents know which resources fulfil which goals, we have that
PlAS = PlAS(x) for any x ∈ names(AS).
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Figure 3.1: Plans Pl in Example 3.1.
3.2 Example Application Domain
Although simple, our agent systems are sufficiently powerful for representing real applications.
We described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 the kinds of problems that are of interest to us in this
thesis. We illustrate in the following example how one such problem, namely the allocation and
possible reallocation of medical appointments to booking agents, can be captured according to
our representation of agent systems. Note that this would typically be a very large problem
involving hundreds if not thousands of agents and although the example we present below
consists of just three agents, this is for the sake of simplicity and clarity of illustration and not
a restriction imposed on the framework which we present in this thesis. This example will be
built upon and referred back to throughout the thesis to demonstrate the key concepts which
we present.
Example 3.1 (application) Consider an initial agent system consisting of three agents (ag1,
ag2, ag3) representing patients; three resources (r1, r2, r3) representing medical appointments;
three possible goals (g1, g2, g3), e.g. to see the doctor by the end of the week (g1), to see the
doctor today (g2), and to have a morning appointment (g3). Consider also plans Pl as follows
and as depicted in Figure 3.1:
Pl = {fulfils(r1,g1), fulfils(r2,g1), fulfils(r1,g2), fulfils(r1,g3), fulfils(r3,g3)}
i.e. the first two appointments (r1 and r2) allow to see the doctor by the end of the week, the
first appointment only (r1) allows to see the doctor today, and the first and third appointments
(r1 and r3) are morning appointments. This can be represented as AS = (G,R,A) with:
• A = {〈ag1, Res(ag1), G(ag1), B(ag1)〉,
〈ag2, Res(ag2), G(ag2), B(ag2)〉,
3.2. Example Application Domain 55
〈ag3, Res(ag3), G(ag3), B(ag3)〉}
• G = {g1, g2, g3}
• R = {r1, r2, r3}
where
ag1 ag2 ag3
Res(ag1) = {r1}, Res(ag2) = {r2}, Res(ag3) = {r3},
G(ag1) = g1, G(ag2) = g2, G(ag3) = g3,
B(ag1) = {isAgent(ag2), B(ag2) = {isAgent(ag1), B(ag3) = {isAgent(ag1),
isAgent(ag3)} isAgent(ag3)} isAgent(ag2)}
∪ Pl ∪ Pl ∪ Pl
This system may represent the situation where patients (ag1, ag2, ag3) compete for available
medical appointments (r1, r2, r3) with the same doctor, to achieve their goals g1 (for the first
patient to see the doctor by the end of the week), g2 (for the second patient to see the doctor
today) and g3 (for the third patient to have a morning appointment). The first two appointments
(r1 and r2) suit the first patient. Only the first appointment (r1) suits the second patient. The
first and third appointments (r1 and r3) suit the third patient. Note that agents have no beliefs
about the appointments or goals of other agents, though they know which appointments fulfil
which goals.
The problem of booking medical appointments is usually solved by a centralised system that
does not take into account the patients’ preferences, expressed in the example above simply
as goals, and does not allow for assigned appointments to be later changed as new agents are
considered, even if a change would satisfy the goals of all agents. Avaliable appointments are
naturally indivisible, non-sharable and single-unit resources, as in our agent systems. More-
over, in the setting of booking medical appointments, goals are fulfilled by individual resources
(appointments), and goals may be shared by several agents (patients), again as in our agent
systems.
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3.3 Solving the Resource Reallocation Problem
The resource reallocation problem (r.r.p.) amounts to identifying a reallocation of resources in
an agent system wrt the initial allocation in the system, so that as many agents as possible can
fulfil their goals.
Definition 3.4 (solving the r.r.p.) Given an agent system AS = (G,R,A)
• the r.r.p. for an agent 〈x,Res(x), G(x), B(x)〉 ∈ A is the problem of finding an agent
system AS ′ = (A′,G,R) with 〈x,Res′(x), G(x), B′(x)〉 ∈ A′ such that r ∈ Res′(x) and
fulfils(r,G(x)) ∈ B′(x);
we say that this AS ′ solves the r.r.p. for x (wrt AS);
and we say that any such r solves the r.r.p. for x;
• the r.r.p. for the agent system AS is the problem of finding AS ′ = (G,R,A′) with
names(AS ′) = names(AS) solving the r.r.p. for as many agents in A as possible wrt
AS, namely, given that, for any agent system Z, happyAS(Z) is a set of agent names
such that happyAS(Z) ⊆ names(AS) and Z solves the r.r.p. for every x ∈ happyAS(Z),
AS ′ is such that
– happyAS(AS) ⊆ happyAS(AS
′)
– there does not exist AS ′′ 6= AS ′ such that happyAS(AS
′′) ⊃ happyAS(AS
′);
we say that this AS ′ solves the r.r.p. for AS;
we also say that the r.r.p. for AS is solved if such AS ′ is found.
Note that we take the term “solving the r.r.p.” to mean “optimising the r.r.p.”, i.e. finding
an agent system and a possible reallocation of resources such that as many agents as possible
have fulfilled their goals wrt the initial agent system. Also, we assume that the agents’ goals
(G(x)) are fixed and cannot change during the reallocation. Instead, the reallocation may
require changing the agents’ belief sets, e.g. so as to include information about other agents’
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resources and goals. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Note also that
our definition above disallows for the set of agents in a solution AS ′ to the r.r.p. for an
agent system AS to contain agents other than the ones originally in AS (namely such that
names(AS) 6= names(AS ′)). Our definition allows different plans (i.e. PlAS(x) 6= PlAS′(x)) in
principle. However, in this thesis, our aim is to obtain AS ′ with the same plans (PlAS(x)) as
in AS. In summary:
Our aim, in this thesis, is to obtain an agent system AS ′ that solves the r.r.p. for an
agent system AS with the same agents in AS ′ as in AS (namely such that names(AS)
= names(AS ′)), with the same goals (G) and resources (R), and such that the agents’
goals (G(x)) and plans (PlAS(x)) are the same in AS
′ as in AS. It is the resources and
beliefs of agents that may undergo change.
We demonstrate below how the resource reallocation problem of Example 3.1 could be solved.
Example 3.2 (solving the r.r.p. for an agent system) Given the agent system AS =
(G,R,A) of Example 3.1, the r.r.p. for ag1 is solved since it has goal g1, resource r1 and there
is a plan such that r1 fulfils g1, and the r.r.p. for ag3 is solved since it has goal g3, resource r3
and there is a plan such that r3 fulfils g3. The r.r.p. for ag2 on the other hand is not solved since
it has goal g2, resource r2 but no plan such that r2 fulfils g2. The r.r.p. for the agent system AS
is solved by the agent system AS ′ = (G,R,A′) with A′ = {〈ag1, Res′(ag1), G(ag1), B′(ag1)〉,
〈ag2, Res′(ag2), G(ag2), B′(ag2)〉, 〈ag3, Res(ag3), G(ag3), B′(ag3)〉} as follows, with resources
that have changed hands between agents underlined:
ag1 ag2 ag3
Res′(ag1) = {r2}, Res′(ag2) = {r1}, Res(ag3) = {r3},
G(ag1) = g1, G(ag2) = g2, G(ag3) = g3,
B′(ag1) = B(ag1) B′(ag2) = B(ag2) B′(ag3) = B(ag3)
Indeed AS ′ solves the r.r.p. for all agents in AS, and hence solves the r.r.p. for AS.
58 Chapter 3. Agent Systems for the Resource Reallocation Problem
The agent system AS ′ in the example above could be seen as arising from AS by allowing agents
ag1 and ag2 to exchange resources r1 and r2. In our realistic example, this would amount to
the two patients swapping medical appointments. Note that ag3 (i.e. its resources, goal and
beleifs) is unchanged by the swap and hence still happy, and ag1 is happy before the swap and
still happy after the swap. ag2 is happy after the swap since it has obtained a resource that
solves its r.r.p. Generally:
Lemma 3.2 (obtaining a resource that solves the r.r.p. for an agent) Let AS =
(G,R,A) be an agent system that contains allocation Res and such that 〈x,Res(x), G(x), B(x)〉
∈ A. Let AS ′ = (G,R,A′) be an agent system that contains allocation Res′ and such that
〈x,Res′(x), G(x), B′(x)〉 ∈ A′. Assume PlAS(x) = PlAS′(x). If AS
′ solves the r.r.p. for x and
AS does not solve the r.r.p. for x, then there exists some r ∈ R such that fulfils(r,G(x))
∈ PlAS(x), r /∈ Res(x) and r ∈ Res
′(x).
The lemma above follows trivially from Definition 3.4. The assumption in the lemma above
makes sense for the kind of settings considered in this thesis, where plans are common knowledge
and do not change.
Lastly, note that the agent system AS ′ found in Example 3.2 is such that all agents are happy
and is trivially a solution of the resource reallocation problem for the initial agent system AS.
However, in general, it may not be the case that such an “ideal” solution can be found where
all agents are happy.
3.4 Individual and Social Welfare
We can restate the problem of solving the r.r.p. of an agent system in terms of the utilitarian
social welfare of the system (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4). In turn, this requires a notion of
individual welfare (utility) for agents, as follows:
Definition 3.5 (individual welfare wrt an agent system) Given an agent system AS =
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(G,R,A) and 〈x, Res(x), G(x), B(x)〉 ∈ A, let
uAS(x) =


1 if AS solves the r.r.p. for x
0 otherwise.
uAS(x) is x’s utility function in AS and gives a measure of x’s individual welfare wrt AS.
The definition of individual welfare (utility) above is a specialisation of the class of utility
functions described in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3. Notably, the presentation of an agent’s utility
function in the definition above and here on after (i.e. uAS(x)) is different from that of Sec-
tion 2.1.3 where an agent’s utility function was given as ui(P ) (and ui(P (i))) for some agent i
and allocation P (resource bundle P (i) respectively). The allocation Res (and resource bundle
Res(x) of an agent x) contained in an agent system AS is implicit in our notation. Note also
that the utility an agent assigns to a set of resources depends only on those resources and not on
the resources assigned to other agents or any other externalities. We can write happyAS(AS
′),
given in Definition 3.4 to represent the set of agents that have solved their r.r.p. in an agent
system AS ′ wrt to an initial agent system AS, in terms of the agents’ individual welfare, as
follows:
• Given agent systems AS and AS ′, happyAS(AS
′) = { x | x ∈ names(AS), uAS′(x) = 1 }
We adopt a utilitarian view similar to that described in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4 in defining
the social welfare of an agent society, i.e. we use the sum of the utilities that the agents in that
society ascribe to the sets of resources they hold.
Definition 3.6 (utilitarian social welfare wrt an agent system) Given agent systems
AS and AS ′, the utilitarian social welfare (usw) of AS ′ wrt AS is given by swAS(AS
′) =
Σx∈names(AS)uAS′(x).
Note that in the case where names(AS) = names(AS ′), as is the case of interest in this thesis,
swAS(AS
′) = swAS′(AS
′). We say that an agent system AS ′ maximises the usw of an initial
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system AS iff all agents in AS ′ are at least as happy as in AS and there is no other agent
system AS ′′ with greater usw than AS ′ and such that all agents in AS ′′ are at least as happy
as in AS:
Definition 3.7 (maximising usw of an agent system) Given AS, AS ′ agent systems, AS ′
maximises the usw of AS if and only if
1. uAS′(x) ≥ uAS(x) for all x ∈ names(AS); and
2. there exists no AS ′′ such that uAS′′(x) ≥ uAS(x) for all x ∈ names(AS) and swAS(AS
′′) >
swAS(AS
′).
Note that the definition above differs from the definition of optimal (maximal) usw given in
Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.4) where the maximal usw measure is defined independently of the initial
allocation. This is illustrated in the following example:
Example 3.3 (maximising usw of an agent system versus maximal usw) Let us con-
sider an agent system AS consisting of three agents ag1, ag2 and ag3, two resources r1 and r2
and two possible goals g1 and g2, such that all agents know of one another, know of plans for
r1 to fulfil g1 and r2 to fulfil g2 as depicted in Figure 3.2, agents have goals as follows:
G(ag1) = g1 G(ag2) = g1 G(ag3) = g2
and AS contains allocation Res as follows:
Res(ag1) = {r1} Res(ag2) = {r2} Res(ag3) = ∅
Only one of the agents (ag1) has its r.r.p. solved in this setup. Also, there are two agent systems
with maximal usw as given in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.4): one, AS1, containing allocation Res1
as follows:
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g2
r2
Figure 3.2: Plans in Example 3.3.
Res1(ag1) = {r1} Res1(ag2) = ∅ Res1(ag3) = {r2}
and the other, AS2, containing allocation Res2 as follows:
Res2(ag1) = ∅ Res2(ag2) = {r1} Res2(ag3) = {r2}
Indeed, swAS(ASi) > swAS(AS
′) for any agent system AS ′ such that AS ′ 6= ASi (i = 1, 2).
However, there is only one agent system that maximises the usw of the initial agent system
AS, i.e. the agent system AS1 wherein ag1 has r1 and ag3 has r2. This is because r1 solves
the r.r.p. of ag1 already and hence ag1 would not give it away (as required in AS2) except if
receiving another resource that solves its r.r.p.
Note that an agent system that maximises the usw of another contains an allocation that is a
“Pareto optimal” allocation (as defined in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4), and vice versa. We will
prove this in Chapter 4 (Theorem 4.2) after introducing the kinds of deals which we consider
in this thesis. We have the following result also:
Lemma 3.3 (solving the r.r.p. for an agent system is to maximise its usw) Given
agent systems AS and AS ′, AS ′ solves the r.r.p. for AS if and only if AS ′ maximises the
usw of AS.
The lemma above is an immediate consequence of Definitions 3.4 and 3.7.
Whenever there are sufficiently many resources available in an agent system to fulfil all goals
of all agents in the system, a solution to the r.r.p. of the system exists that is a solution for
each agent in the system (i.e. with usw of |A|, the set of agents in the system). The necessary
conditions for this are as follows:
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Lemma 3.4 (necessary conditions for solving the r.r.p. of all agents) Given an
agent system AS = (G,R,A), if an agent system AS ′ solves the r.r.p. for all agents wrt AS
(such that swAS(AS
′) = |A|), then:
1. |A| ≤ |R|; and
2. for all 〈x,Res(x), G(x), B(x)〉 ∈ A, there exists a plan fulfils(r,G(x)) ∈ PlAS such
that r ∈ R; and
3. there exists no agent 〈x,Res(x), G(x), B(x)〉 ∈ A such that, for each
fulfils(r,G(x)) ∈ PlAS, there exists an agent 〈x
′, Res(x′), G(x′), B(x′)〉 ∈ A such
that fulfils(r,G(x′)) ∈ PlAS and there exists no fulfils(r
′,G(x′)) ∈ PlAS for r
′ 6= r.
The first condition in the lemma above says that there are at least as many resources as agents
in the agent system. The second condition amounts to saying that, for each agent, there is at
least one resource in the system that can fulfil its goal. The third condition says that there
are no two agents needing the same resource in a way that both agents are dependent on that
resource for fulfilling their goal. Note that these are necessary, not sufficient, conditions for the
existence of a solution to the r.r.p. for the agent sytem. This is illustrated by the following
example:
Example 3.4 (necessary not sufficient conditions for solving the r.r.p. of all agents)
Let us consider an agent system AS consisting of three agents ag1, ag2 and ag3, three resources
r1, r2 and r3 (owned by some agents) and one possible goal g1, such that all agents know of
one another, know of plans for r1 to fulfil g1 and r2 to fulfil g1 as depicted in Figure 3.3, and
all agents have goal g1. In this agent system:
1. there are at least as many resources as agents (first condition of Lemma 3.4);
2. for each agent, there is at least one resource in the system that can fulfil its goal (second
condition of Lemma 3.4);
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Figure 3.3: Plans in Example 3.4.
3. there are no two agents needing the same resource in a way that both agents are dependent
on that resource for fulfilling their goal (third condition of Lemma 3.4).
The third condition holds in paricular since there is more than one way (i.e. resource by
means of which) each agent can fulfil its goal. However, it is clear that any agent system
(say AS ′) that maximises the usw of AS has swAS(AS
′) = 2 and it cannot be the case that
swAS(AS
′) = |A| = 3, since there are only two resources (r1 and r2) that are useful for solving
the r.r.p. of the agents.
3.5 Discussion
We have presented in this chapter a means of capturing the kinds of resource reallocation
problems of interest to us in this thesis (as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2). Given the
goals and resources that make up a particular system, we show how agents in that system can
be represented to understand the goals that they have, as well as the resources and also beliefs
(about themselves and others) that they hold at the outset. We have demonstrated this in
the case of a multi-agent medical booking system where the resources to be allocated are the
appointments (bookings) and the goal of an agent would represent the date/time for when an
appointment is required, or for the agent to be seen by a particular doctor, or other factors or
even a combination of these factors. Although we have focused on small-sized systems in our
examples involving just a few agents, this is only for purposes of illustration and our analysis is
intended on the contrary to be applied to large scale systems involving hundreds of agents at the
least. Moreover, the means of capturing agent systems which we present can be easily applied
to other resource reallocation problems and is not limited to this particular application domain.
For example, in the case of a grid computing system, the resources to be distributed (allocated)
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would be various amounts of computational power held/controlled by various institutions and
required for performing calculations (or some other computing intensive tasks), and the goal of
each agent would represent the amount of computational power required for the task assigned to
it, which could be fulfilled by a choice of some of the resources. Based on such a representation
of an agent system (i.e. the goals, resources and agents involved), we have discussed in this
chapter what it then means for agents to fulfil their goals and also what it means for the agent
system to be solved, i.e. to make best use of the resources available between the agents given
their individual goals and the resources and beliefs that they hold at the outset.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have set out the key components of our problem domain amounting to the
notion of agent system, resource reallocation problem, and individual and social welfare. We
have defined an agent system in terms of the agents, goals and resources comprising the system,
and an agent in terms of its name, resources held, goal and beliefs. Indeed our formulation of
an agent system paves the way to a distributed solution of the reallocation problem as is the
focus in this thesis. An allocation is defined as a partitioning of the set of resources amongst
the agents. We have discussed what it means for the resource reallocation problem to be
solved for an agent as well as for an agent system. Namely, that an agent (as many agents
as possible, respectively) have a resource that fulfils its goal. We have introduced a utility
function for computing the individual welfare of an agent, and a utilitarian social welfare
measure based on the utility function. Using this utility function and social welfare measure
we have discussed what it means for an agent system to maximise the utilitarian social welfare
of another initial agent system, and show that this amounts to solving (optmising) the resource
reallocation problem for the initial system. Finally, we have presented an example application
to demonstrate the concepts introduced in this chapter and to be referred back to in later
chapters for demonstrating the various concepts which we cover in this thesis.
Chapter 4
Minimally Cooperative Rational Deals
for the Resource Reallocation Problem
We define in this chapter the kinds of deals sufficient and necessary for solving the class of
resource reallocation problems as defined in Chapter 3. We prove that any sequence of these
deals, which we term “minimally cooperative rational” deals, leads to an optimal allocation.
Moreover, we prove that whenever there exists a deal, of any kind, resulting in an optimal
allocation, then there exists also a sequence of the deals we define which results in an optimal
allocation. This chapter is structured as follows: In Section 4.1 we define deals that transition
an agent system from one allocation to another, and we define a particular kind of deal which
we term “cooperatively rational”. In Section 4.2 we define minimally cooperative rational deals.
In Section 4.3 we prove that any sequence of minimally cooperative rational deals leads to an
allocation that maximises the utilitarian social welfare (usw) of an agent system as defined in
Chapter 3. In Section 4.4 we break down and discuss characteristics of minimally cooperative
rational deals. In Section 4.5 we prove completeness of minimally cooperative rational deals
for finding an allocation that maximises the usw of an agent system. Lastly, in Sections 4.6
and 4.7, we discuss related work and conclude. In the definitions and lemmas that follow, we
assume an agent system AS = (G,R,A) (as in Definition 3.1) containing an allocation Res
(see Lemma 3.1). We will assume also that all agent systems considered will have the same
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agent names (names(AS)), goals (G) and resources (R) as in AS.
4.1 Deals and Cooperative Rationality
A deal, the set of agents involved in a deal, a composition of two deals and a sequence of three or
more deals are defined, similarly as for the definitions of Endriss et al [EMST06] and Dunne and
Chevaleyre [DC08] (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.6, Definitions 2.2–2.5 respectively), as follows:
• A deal is a pair δ = (Res,Res′) where Res and Res′ are allocations contained in agent
systems AS and AS ′ respectively and Res 6= Res′;
• the set of agents involved in a deal δ = (Res,Res′) is given by Agentsδ = {x ∈
names(AS) | Res(x) 6= Res′(x)}. Note that Agentsδ contains the names of the agents
and not the agents themselves, and also that the symbol used here onwards differs slightly
from Definition 2.3 where the symbol Aδ was used;
• The composition of two deals δ1 = (Res,Res
′) and δ2 = (Res
′, Res′′) is given by δ1 ◦ δ2 =
(Res,Res′′).
• A sequence of n deals δ1 ◦ δ2 ◦ . . . ◦ δn is given by (. . . ((δ1 ◦ δ2) ◦ δ3) ◦ . . .) ◦ δn.
A deal results in a new agent system, as follows:
Definition 4.1 (agent system resulting from a deal) Given a deal δ = (Res,Res′), let
AS ′ = (G,R,A′) where
A′ = { 〈x, Res′(x), G(x), B′(x)〉 | 〈x, Res(x), G(x), B(x)〉 ∈ A }
We say that the agent system AS ′ results from δ. We also say that a deal δ = (Res,Res′) takes
us from agent system AS to agent system AS ′, and that δ is possible from AS.
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Note that the agent system resulting from a deal δ = (Res,Res′) contains allocation Res′. A
deal can be seen as a set of actions comprising the deal (carried out by the agents involved),
as follows:
Definition 4.2 (actions comprising a deal) The set of actions comprising a deal δ = (Res,
Res′) is given by Actionsδ = {give(x,r,y) | r ∈ Res(x), r ∈ Res′(y), x 6= y}. For each
give(x,r,y) ∈ Actionsδ we say that x gives away r (to y) and y receives r (from x). If
give(x,r,y) ∈ Actionsδ and there is no give( ,r,x) ∈ Actionsδ, we say that x simply gives
away r (receiving no resource in the deal).
The actions comprising a deal capture the resources that change hands between agents in a
deal, and the agents between which the resources change hands. If an agent increases utility
following a deal, then it must have received, in that deal, a resource that solves its r.r.p., as
follows:
Lemma 4.1 (necessary action in a deal) If δ = (Res,Res′) is a deal resulting in an agent
system AS ′ and, for some agent x ∈ names(AS), uAS(x) = 0 and uAS′(x) = 1, then give(y,r,x)
∈ Actionsδ for some agent y ∈ names(AS) (y 6= x) and resource r ∈ R that solves the r.r.p.
of x.
Proof. If uAS(x) = 0 and uAS′(x) = 1, then AS
′ solves the r.r.p. of x and AS does not. So, by
Lemma 3.2, x must have a resource (say r) in Res′, which it does not have in Res, and which
solves its r.r.p., i.e. r /∈ Res(x) and r ∈ Res′(x). This is only possible if r ∈ Res(y) for some
agent y ∈ names(AS) (y 6= x) and hence, by Definition 4.2, give(x,r,y) ∈ Actionsδ. 2
The types of deals we consider in this thesis are those wherein none of the agents involved end
up worse off and at least one ends up better off. We define deals conforming to this criterion as
a variant of the cooperatively rational deals given by Endriss et al. in [EMST06] (see Chapter 2,
Section 2.1.6), adapted according to our notion of individual welfare (utility) as follows:
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Definition 4.3 (cooperatively rational deal resulting in an agent system) A deal δ =
(Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′ is called cooperatively rational (CR) iff uAS′(x) ≥
uAS(x) for all x ∈ names(AS) and there exists y ∈ names(AS) such that uAS′(y) > uAS(y).
CR deals require at least one agent to strictly increase in utility. We will see in Chapter 5 that,
when we allow agents to propose deals for other agents to consider, the agent to increase utility
in the deal will be the proposing agent. The social welfare of any agent system resulting from
CR deals increases wrt the initial system, as shown below:
Lemma 4.2 (CR deal implies increase in social welfare) If a deal δ = (Res,Res′) re-
sulting in agent system AS ′ is cooperatively rational, then swAS(AS
′) > swAS(AS).
The lemma above is an immediate consequence of Definitions 3.6 and 4.3. In general, as
also discussed by Endriss et al. in [EMST06], it is not the case that there exists a CR deal
δ = (Res,Res′) giving AS ′ from AS whenever swAS(AS
′) > swAS(AS). This is illustrated in
the following example:
Example 4.1 (increase in social welfare does not always imply a CR deal) Consider
the agent systems AS, AS1 and AS2 of Example 3.3 containing allocations Res, Res1 and Res2
respectively. Then, the deal δ1 = (Res,Res1) resulting in AS1 is a CR deal since uAS1(x) ≥
uAS(x) for all x ∈ names(AS) and uAS′(ag3) > uAS(ag3). However, the deal δ2 = (Res,Res2)
resulting in AS2 is not a CR deal even though swAS(AS2) = 2 > swAS(AS) = 1. This is because
uAS2(ag1) < uAS(ag1).
It is the case, however, that there exists a CR deal δ = (Res,Res′) giving AS ′ from AS when
all of the agents in AS have equal or better utility in AS ′ than in AS, as follows:
Lemma 4.3 (conditions for a CR deal) Let AS ′ be an agent system that contains alloca-
tion Res′ such that swAS(AS
′) > swAS(AS) and uAS′(x) ≥ uAS(x) for all x ∈ names(AS).
Then δ = (Res,Res′) is a CR deal.
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Proof. If swAS(AS
′) > swAS(AS) and uAS′(x) ≥ uAS(x) for all x ∈ names(AS), then, by the
definition of usw (Definition 3.6), there exists an agent y ∈ names(AS) such that uAS′(y) >
uAS(y). Hence, by the definition of CR deals (Definition 4.3), δ = (Res,Res
′) is a CR deal. 2
In addition, we show that a sequence of CR deals is itself a CR deal, as follows:
Theorem 4.1 (sequence of CR deals is a CR deal) If δ = δ1 ◦ . . . ◦ δn = (Res,Resn)
where each δi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a CR deal, then δ is a CR deal.
Proof. After every CR deal δi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), some agents increase in utility and no agents
decrease in utility. Then, the accumulation of all such deals is also a CR deal, since overall
some agents have increased in utility and no agents have decreased in utility. 2
Lastly, we prove (Theorem 4.2 below) that an agent system which maximises the usw of another
(see Definition 3.7) contains a Pareto optimal allocation, defined by adapting to our problem
domain the definition found in [HP02, CDE+06] (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4), as follows:
• An allocation Res contained in an agent system AS is Pareto optimal if there is no
allocation Res′ contained in an agent system AS ′ such that
– uAS′(x) ≥ uAS(x) for all x ∈ names(AS); and
– uAS′(x) > uAS(x) for some x ∈ names(AS).
We also say that such AS is Pareto optimal.
It is easy to see that in our problem domain, Pareto optimal agents systems and CR deals are
linked, as follows:
Lemma 4.4 (agent system containing a Pareto optimal allocation) An agent system
AS contains a Pareto optimal allocation Res iff there exists no CR deal possible from AS.
The lemma above is a consequence of Definition 4.3 and the adapted definition of Pareto
optimality immediately above.
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Theorem 4.2 (maximising usw amounts to Pareto optimal allocations) Given a CR
deal δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′, then AS ′ maximises the usw of AS iff
AS ′ is Pareto optimal.
Proof. It is easy to see, by Definition 3.7, that if AS ′ maximises the usw of AS, then there are
no CR deals possible from AS ′, and hence, by Lemma 4.4, AS ′ is Pareto optimal. It remains to
show that, if AS ′ is Pareto optimal, then AS ′ maximises the usw of AS. Suppose, for the sake
of contradiction, that AS ′ does not maximise the usw of AS. Then, since δ is a CR deal, the
first condition of Definition 3.7 does indeed hold (i.e. uAS′(x) ≥ uAS(x) for all x ∈ names(AS))
and it must be the case that the second condition of Definition 3.7 does not hold, i.e. there is
some agent system AS ′′ such that uAS′′(x) ≥ uAS(x) for all x ∈ names(AS) and swAS(AS
′′) >
swAS(AS
′). Let Res′, Res′′ be the allocations contained in AS ′, AS ′′ respectively. There are
two cases to consider:
1. happyAS(AS
′) ⊂ happyAS(AS
′′): trivially this implies that uAS′′(x) ≥ uAS′(x) for all
x ∈ names(AS) and uAS′′(y) > uAS′(y) for some y ∈ names(AS), and thus there is a CR
deal δ′ = (Res′, Res′′). But this cannot be, by Lemma 4.4, since Res′ is Pareto optimal.
2. happyAS(AS
′) 6⊂ happyAS(AS
′′): together with “uAS′′(x) ≥ uAS(x) for all x ∈ names(AS)
and swAS(AS
′′) > swAS(AS
′)” as above, this implies that there is some agent x ∈
names(AS) whose r.r.p. is not solved in AS ′ but is solved in AS ′′, and thus some re-
source r ∈ R such that r solves the r.r.p. of x, r ∈ Res′′(x), r ∈ Res′(y) (y ∈ names(AS),
y 6= x), and
• r does not solve the r.r.p. of y; or
• y has some other resource in AS ′ as well as r that solves its r.r.p.
But then there is a CR deal δ′ possible from AS ′ where Actionsδ
′
= {give(y,r,x)}. But
this cannot be, by Lemma 4.4, since Res′ is Pareto optimal. 2
The second case of the proof of Theorem 4.2 above captures a specific case of how a CR deal
which does not maximise the usw of an initial agent system is not prohibitive of a successive
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CR deal which does. This is demonstrated in the following example and it will be proven more
generally in Section 4.3 (Theorem 4.3) that a CR deal which does not maximise the usw of an
agent system is never prohibitive of a successive CR deal which does.
Example 4.2 (existence of CR deal when usw not maximised) Suppose we have agent
systems AS, AS ′ and AS ′′ such that:
• happyAS(AS) = ∅;
• happyAS(AS
′) = {x1};
• happyAS(AS
′′) = {x2, x3}.
Trivially, happyAS(AS
′) 6⊂ happyAS(AS
′′), uAS′′(x) ≥ uAS(x) for all x ∈ names(AS), and
swAS(AS
′′) > swAS(AS
′). Necessarily, also, x1 has some resource r1 in Res
′(x1) which solves
its r.r.p., and z (one of x2 or x3) has some resource r2 (r2 6= r1) in Res
′′(z) which solves its
r.r.p. Then, there is an agent y in AS ′ that has r2 and either
• y = x1 (and x1 does not “need” r2 in AS
′ since its r.r.p. is solved by r1); or
• y 6= x1 (and r2 does not solve the r.r.p. of y, since otherwise the r.r.p. of y would be
solved in AS ′).
Either way, the deal δ′ = (Res′, Res′′) where Actionsδ
′
= {give(y, r2, z)} is a CR deal.
Whilst CR deals are useful in that no agents end up worse off, a CR deal could contain useless
exchanges of resources that do not affect the utilities of the agents involved. We introduce next
a specific kind of CR deal for which this is not the case.
4.2 Minimally Cooperative Rational Deals
We define here a more refined kind of cooperatively rational (CR) deal that contains only
exchanges of resources that are meaningful in that they contribute to agent(s) increasing utility
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Figure 4.1: Plans in Example 4.3 (and as in Example 3.4).
in the deal.
Definition 4.4 (minimally cooperative rational deals) A deal δ = (Res,Res′) is called
minimally cooperative rational (Min CR) iff δ is cooperatively rational and there is no CR deal
δ′ = (Res,Res′′) such that Actionsδ
′
⊂ Actionsδ.
We illustrate next a Min CR deal.
Example 4.3 (Min CR deal) Given the agent system AS as in Example 3.4 with plans as
depicted in Figure 4.1 (and Figure 3.3), and agents’ goals and resources as follows:
G(ag1) = g1 G(ag2) = g1 G(ag3) = g1
Res(ag1) = {r1, r2, r3} Res(ag2) = ∅ Res(ag3) = ∅
then, the deal δ = (Res,Res′) where Actionsδ = {give(ag1,r2,ag2), give(ag1,r3,ag2)} is a
CR deal. This is because ag2 increases in utility and ag1 does not decrease in utility. However,
δ is not a Min CR deal. This is because there exists a deal δ′ = (Res,Res′′) where Actionsδ
′
= {give(ag1,r2,ag2)}, Actionsδ
′
⊂ Actionsδ and δ′ is itself a CR deal. This δ′ is a Min CR
deal.
In what follows, we say that a CR deal δ contains a CR deal δ′ if Actionsδ
′
⊆ Actionsδ. We
show that every CR deal contains a Min CR deal, as follows:
Lemma 4.5 (CR deals contain Min CR deals) If δ′ = (Res,Res′) is a CR deal, then
there is a Min CR deal δ′′ = (Res,Res′′) such that δ′ contains δ′′.
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Proof. If δ′ is itself a Min CR deal, then this is trivial. On the other hand, if δ′ is not a Min CR
deal, then, by Definition 4.4, there is a CR deal δ1 such that Actions
δ1 ⊂ Actionsδ
′
. If δ1 is a
Min CR deal, we are done. On the other hand, if δ1 is not a Min CR deal, then, repeatedly by
applying Definition 4.4, there is a CR deal δi+1 (i ≥ 1) such that Actions
δi+1 ⊂ Actionsδi , until
δn is reached where δn is a Min CR deal. Indeed, δn exists because the actions comprising deals
are finite sets. Since Actionsδn ⊂ . . . ⊂ Actionsδ1 ⊂ Actionsδ
′
, then, trivially, Actionsδn ⊆
Actionsδ
′
. 2
We also have that a sequence of Min CR deals is itself a CR deal, as follows:
Corollary 4.1 (Sequence of Min CR deals is a CR deal) If δ = δ1◦. . .◦δn = (Res,Resn)
where each δi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a Min CR deal, then δ is a CR deal.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1, since all Min CR deals are coopera-
tively rational. 2
This corollary will be used to prove results in Section 4.3. Note that it is not necessar-
ily the case that δ, a sequence of a number of Min CR deals, is itself minimally coopera-
tive rational. To see this suppose we have δ = δ1 ◦ δ2 where Actions
δ1 = {give(x,r1,y)},
Actionsδ2 = {give(y,r2,x)} and both δ1 and δ2 are Min CR deals. Then, r1 6= r2, Actions
δ
= {give(x,r1,y), give(y,r2,x)} but δ is not a minimally cooperative rational deal since δ1
is a CR deal and Actionsδ1 ⊂ Actionsδ.
We use the properties of CR and Min CR deals proven in this section and the previous section
to prove next that Min CR deals are “sufficient” for maximising usw of agent systems.
4.3 Maximising Utilitarian Social Welfare
We prove in this section that Min CR deals are “sufficient” for maximising the utilitarian social
welfare (usw) of agent systems. More so, we prove that any sequence of Min CR deals leads to
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an allocation with maximal usw wrt an initial agent system. We establish firstly termination
for the class of CR deals, as follows:
Lemma 4.6 (Termination) There can be no infinite sequence of CR deals.
Proof. Given that both the set of agents A as well as the set of resources R are required to be
finite, there can only be a finite number of distinct allocations of resources. Furthermore, by
Lemma 4.2, any CR deal will strictly increase usw. Hence, after a finite number of CR deals
no further increase of usw will be possible and thus no further CR deals can take place. 2
Using this termination result, we show that the class of CR deals is sufficient to guarantee an
allocation that maximises the usw of any given agent system, as follows:
Theorem 4.3 (CR deals maximise usw of agent systems) Any sequence of CR deals will
eventually result in a resource allocation (agent system) that maximises the usw of AS.
Proof. Given an initial agent system AS with allocation Res, then, by Lemma 4.6, any sequence
of CR deals must terminate. Let the terminal agent system be AS ′ containing allocation Res′.
Note that, by Theorem 4.1, δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in AS ′ is a CR deal. By Theorem 4.2, it
suffices to prove that AS ′ is Pareto optimal. For the sake of contradiction, assume AS ′ is not
Pareto optimal. Then, there exists another agent system AS ′′ with allocation Res′′ such that
uAS′′(x) ≥ uAS′(x) for all x ∈ names(AS) and uAS′′(y) > uAS′(y) for some y ∈ names(AS).
But then, the deal δ′ = (Res′, Res′′) is cooperatively rational, which contradicts our earlier
assumption of Res′ being a terminal allocation. Given that δ is a CR deal and AS ′ is Pareto
optimal, then, by Theorem 4.2, AS ′ maximises the usw of AS. 2
Theorem 4.3 above is an adaptation of Theorem 4 presented by Endriss et al. [EMST06].
Similarly as for Theorem 4 of [EMST06], the true power of Theorem 4.3 above is in the fine
print: any sequence of CR deals will result in an allocation that maximises the usw of the
initial system. That is, whatever deals are agreed on in the early stages of negotiation, the
system will never get stuck in a local optimum and finding an allocation that maximises social
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welfare remains an option throughout. We prove next that the result above also holds for Min
CR deals, as follows:
Theorem 4.4 (Min CR deals maximise usw of agent systems) Any sequence of Min CR
deals will eventually result in a resource allocation (agent system) that maximises the usw of
AS.
Proof. Given an initial agent system AS containing allocation Res and the fact that every Min
CR deal is a CR deal, then, by Lemma 4.6, any sequence of Min CR deals must terminate.
Let the terminal agent system be AS ′ containing allocation Res′. Note that, by Corollary 4.1,
δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in AS ′ is a CR deal. By Theorem 4.2, it suffices to prove that AS ′
is Pareto optimal. For the sake of contradiction, assume AS ′ is not Pareto optimal. Then,
there exists another agent system AS ′′ with allocation Res′′ such that uAS′′(x) ≥ uAS′(x) for
all x ∈ names(AS) and uAS′′(y) > uAS′(y) for some y ∈ names(AS). But then, the deal
δ′ = (Res′, Res′′) is cooperatively rational, and, by Lemma 4.5, there is a Min CR deal possible
from Res′ (i.e. AS ′). However, this contradicts our earlier assumption of Res′ being a terminal
allocation. Given that δ is a CR deal and AS ′ is Pareto optimal, then, by Theorem 4.2, AS ′
maximises the usw of AS. 2
This last theorem above will be useful in Chapters 5 and 7 when defining a generative agent
negotiation framework that is able to identify and propose Min CR deals, which would solve
the r.r.p. of the proposing agent and lead towards an allocation that maximises the usw of the
agent system. We focus next on breaking down and understanding the actions that make up
Min CR deals.
4.4 Properties of Min CR deals
We characterise in the following three theorems the actions comprising any Min CR deal, and
the agents and resources involved, depending on the number of actions comprising the deal
— one, two or more. These theorems break down Min CR deals in such a way that they
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can be captured by our generative agent negotiation framework to be defined in Chapters 5
and 7. Firstly, we consider Min CR deals comprising one action (of the kind illustrated in
Example 4.3):
Theorem 4.5 (Min CR deal comprising one action) If δ = (Res,Res′) is a Min CR deal
resulting in an agent system AS ′ such that |Actionsδ| = 1, then Actionsδ = {give(y,r,x)}
for some x, y ∈ names(AS) (x 6= y) and r ∈ R, where:
(1) x /∈ happyAS(AS) and x ∈ happyAS(AS
′); and
(2) y ∈ happyAS(AS
′) iff y ∈ happyAS(AS).
Proof. Proving (1) and (2) amounts to proving uAS(x) = 0, r solves the r.r.p. of x (and thus
uAS′(x) = 1), and one of the following conditions hold:
• uAS(y) = 0 and uAS′(y) = 0; or
• uAS(y) = 1 and uAS′(y) = 1.
By Definition of a CR deal, there is at least one agent that has its r.r.p. solved in AS ′ but not in
AS, i.e. uAS(x) = 0 and uAS′(x) = 1 for some x ∈ names(AS). This is only possible if x has a
resource r ∈ R in AS ′ that solves its r.r.p., which it does not have in AS. Since |Actionsδ| = 1,
it must then be the case that Actionsδ = {give(y,r,x)} for some y ∈ names(AS). Since
utilities are dichotomous, then either uAS(y) = 0 or uAS(y) = 1. In the case uAS(y) = 0:
trivially uAS′(y) = 0 since y receives no resource as part of δ. In the case uAS(y) = 1: assume,
for the sake of contradiction, that the r.r.p. of y is unsolved by y simply giving away r, i.e.
uAS′(y) = 0. But then uAS′(y) < uAS(y), which cannot be, since δ is a CR deal. Hence, it must
be the case that the r.r.p. of y is still solved even after simply giving away r, i.e. uAS′(y) = 1.
2
We characterise next a Min CR deal comprising two actions.
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Theorem 4.6 (Min CR deal comprising two actions) If δ = (Res,Res′) is a Min CR
deal resulting in an agent system AS ′ such that |Actionsδ| = 2, then Actionsδ = {give(y,r,x),
give(z1,r1,y)} for some x, y, z1 ∈ names(AS) (x 6= y, y 6= z1, x and z1 possibly the same)
and r, r1 ∈ R (r 6= r1), where:
(1) x /∈ happyAS(AS) and x ∈ happyAS(AS
′); and
(2) y ∈ happyAS(AS) and y ∈ happyAS(AS
′), and
the r.r.p. of y is unsolved by y simply giving away r; and
(3) if z1 6= x, then z1 ∈ happyAS(AS
′) iff z1 ∈ happyAS(AS).
Proof. Proving (1), (2) and (3) is equivalent to proving uAS(x) = 0, r solves the r.r.p. of x (i.e.
uAS′(x) = 1), uAS(y) = 1, the r.r.p. of y is unsolved by y simply giving away r, r1 solves the
r.r.p. of y (and thus uAS′(y) = 1), and one of the following conditions holds:
• uAS(z1) = 0 and uAS′(z1) =


0 if z1 6= x,
1 if z1 = x;
or
• uAS(z1) = 1 and uAS′(z1) = 1.
By Definition of a CR deal, there is at least one agent that has its r.r.p. solved in AS ′ but not
in AS, i.e. uAS(x) = 0 and uAS′(x) = 1 for some x ∈ names(AS). This is only possible if x has
a resource r ∈ R in AS ′ that solves its r.r.p., which it does not have in AS, i.e. give(y,r,x)
∈ Actionsδ for some y ∈ names(AS). Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that either
• uAS(y) = 0; or
• uAS(y) = 1 and the r.r.p. of y is still solved even after simply giving away r.
Then the deal comprising the set of actions {give(y,r,x)} would be cooperatively rational.
But then, since give(y,r,x) ∈ Actionsδ and |Actionsδ| = 2, {give(y,r,x)} ⊂ Actionsδ and δ
cannot beminimally cooperative rational. Hence uAS(y) = 1 and the r.r.p. of y is unsolved after
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simply giving away r, which implies give(z1,r1,y) ∈ Actions
δ for some z1 ∈ names(AS) and
resource r1 ∈ R that solves the r.r.p. of y. We then have that {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y)} ⊆
Actionsδ. Together with |Actionsδ| = 2, this impliesActionsδ = {give(y,r,x),give(z1,r1,y)}.
Since utilities are dichotomous, then either uAS(z1) = 0 or uAS(z1) = 1. Note that the latter
case implies z1 6= x since uAS(x) = 0. In the case uAS(z1) = 0: either z1 = x and, trivially,
uAS′(z1) = 1, or z1 6= x and uAS′(z1) = 0 since z1 receives no resource as part of δ. In the case
uAS(z1) = 1: assume, for the sake of contradiction, that the r.r.p. of z1 is unsolved by simply
giving away r1, and thus uAS′(z1) = 0. But then uAS′(z1) < uAS(z1), which cannot be, since δ
is a CR deal. Hence, it must be the case that the r.r.p. of z1 is still solved even after simply
giving away r1, i.e. uAS′(z1) = 1. 2
We illustrate Min CR deals comprising two actions in the following two examples:
Example 4.4 (Min CR deal comprising two actions, involving two agents) Given the
agent system AS as in Example 3.1 with plans as depicted in Figure 4.2 (and Figure 3.1), and
agents’ goals and resources as follows:
G(ag1) = g1 G(ag2) = g2 G(ag3) = g3
Res(ag1) = {r1} Res(ag2) = {r2} Res(ag3) = {r3}
The r.r.p. of ag1 and ag3 is solved, but the r.r.p. of ag2 is not. Then, the deal δ = (Res,Res′)
where Actionsδ = {give(ag2,r2,ag1), give(ag1,r1,ag2)} results in the agent system AS ′
containing Res′ as follows:
Res′(ag1) = {r2} Res′(ag2) = {r1} Res′(ag3) = {r3}
Here, δ is a Min CR deal comprising two actions. The underlined resources are the resources
that have changed hands between agents. Note that ag2 increases in utility, ag1 does not decrease
in utility, and there is no strict subset of Actionsδ for which this is possible. Indeed δ is the
deal described in Example 3.2 resulting in a solution of the r.r.p. for all agents in AS (and
hence AS itself).
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Figure 4.2: Plans in Examples 4.4–4.6 (and as in Example 3.1).
Example 4.5 (Min CR deal comprising two actions, involving three agents) Given
the agent system AS as in Example 3.1 and Example 4.4 with plans as depicted in Figure 4.2
(and Figure 3.1), and agents’ goals as previously given but containing a resource allocation
instead as follows:
Res(ag1) = {r1} Res(ag2) = ∅ Res(ag3) = {r2, r3}
The r.r.p. of ag1 and ag3 is solved, but the r.r.p. of ag2 is not. Then, the deal δ = (Res,Res′)
where Actionsδ = {give(ag1,r1,ag2), give(ag3,r2,ag1)} results in the agent system AS ′
containing Res′ as follows:
Res′(ag1) = {r2} Res′(ag2) = {r1} Res′(ag3) = {r3}
Here, δ is a Min CR deal comprising two actions. The underlined resources are the resources
that have changed hands between agents. Note that ag2 increases in utility, ag1 and ag3 do not
decrease in utility, and there is no strict subset of Actionsδ for which this is possible.
We characterise next a Min CR deal comprising more than two actions.
Theorem 4.7 (Min CR deal comprising more than two actions) If δ = (Res,Res′) is
a Min CR deal resulting in an agent system AS ′ such that |Actionsδ| = n + 2 (n ≥ 1), then
Actionsδ = {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y), . . . , give(zn+1,rn+1,zn)} for some x, y, z1, . . . ,
zn+1 ∈ names(AS) (x, y, z1, . . . , zn all different, zn 6= zn+1 and one of x, y, z1, . . . , zn−1 possibly
the same as zn+1) and r, r1, . . . , rn+1 ∈ R (r, r1, . . . , rn+1 all different), where
(1) x /∈ happyAS(AS) and x ∈ happyAS(AS
′); and
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(2.1) y ∈ happyAS(AS) and y ∈ happyAS(AS
′), and
the r.r.p. of y is unsolved by y simply giving away r; and
(2.2) for each zi (1 ≤ i ≤ n):
zi ∈ happyAS(AS) and zi ∈ happyAS(AS
′), and
the r.r.p. of zi is unsolved by zi simply giving away ri; and
(3) if zn+1 6= x, then zn+1 ∈ happyAS(AS
′) iff zn+1 ∈ happyAS(AS).
Proof. Proving (1), (2) and (3) is equivalent to proving the following:
• uAS(x) = 0 and r solves the r.r.p. of x (such that uAS′(x) = 1); and
• uAS(y) = 1, the r.r.p. of y is unsolved by y simply giving away r, and r1 solves the r.r.p.
of y (and thus uAS′(y) = 1); and
• for each zi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), uAS(zi) = 1, the r.r.p. of zi is unsolved by zi simply giving away
ri, and ri+1 solves the r.r.p. of zi (and thus uAS′(zi) = 1); and
• one of the following conditions holds:
– uAS(zn+1) = 0 and uAS′(zn+1) =


0 if zn+1 6= x,
1 if zn+1 = x;
or
– uAS(zn+1) = 1 and uAS′(zn+1) = 1.
By Definition of a CR deal, there is at least one agent that has its r.r.p. solved in AS ′ but not
in AS, i.e. uAS(x) = 0 and uAS′(x) = 1 for some x ∈ names(AS). This is only possible if x has
a resource r ∈ R in AS ′ that solves its r.r.p., which it does not have in AS, i.e. give(y,r,x)
∈ Actionsδ for some y ∈ names(AS). Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that either
• uAS(y) = 0; or
• uAS(y) = 1 and the r.r.p. of y is still solved even after simply giving away r.
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Then the deal comprising the set of actions {give(y,r,x)} would be cooperatively rational.
But then, since give(y,r,x) ∈ Actionsδ and |Actionsδ| = n + 2 (n ≥ 1), {give(y,r,x)} ⊂
Actionsδ and δ cannot be minimally cooperative rational. Hence uAS(y) = 1 and the r.r.p. of
y is unsolved after simply giving away r, which implies give(z1,r1,y) ∈ Actions
δ for some
z1 ∈ names(AS) and resource r1 ∈ R that solves the r.r.p. of y. Assume, for the sake of
contradiction, that either
• uAS(z1) = 0; or
• uAS(z1) = 1 and the r.r.p. of z1 is still solved even after simply giving away r1.
Then the deal compromising the set of actions {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y)} would be cooper-
atively rational. But then, since {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y)} ⊆ Actions
δ and |Actionsδ| =
n + 2 (n ≥ 1), {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y)} ⊂ Actions
δ and δ cannot be minimally co-
operative rational. Hence uAS(z1) = 1 and the r.r.p. of z1 is unsolved after simply giving
away r1, which implies give(z2,r2,z1) ∈ Actions
δ for some z2 ∈ names(AS) and resource
r2 ∈ R that solves the r.r.p. of z2. Likewise, for all 1 < i ≤ n, we have that uAS(zi) = 1,
zi /∈ {x, y, z1, . . . , zi−1} (since otherwise zi will receive a resource that solves its r.r.p. in the
deal at that ith point) and the r.r.p. of zi is unsolved by zi simply giving away ri, which
implies give(zi+1,ri+1,zi) ∈ Actions
δ for some ri+1 ∈ R that solves the r.r.p. of zi (and thus
uAS′(zi) = 1). We then have that {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y), . . . , give(zn+1,rn+1,zn)} ⊆
Actionsδ. Together with |Actionsδ| = n + 2, this implies {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y), . . . ,
give(zn+1,rn+1,zn)} = Actions
δ. Since utilities are dichotomous, then either uAS(zn+1) = 0
or uAS(zn+1) = 1. Note that the former case (uAS(zn+1) = 0) implies zn+1 /∈ {y, z1, . . . , zn−1}
since uAS(z) = 1 for each z ∈ {y, z1, . . . , zn−1}, and the latter case (uAS(zn+1) = 1) implies
zn+1 6= x since uAS(x) = 0. (Trivially, zn+1 6= zn since give(zn+1,rn+1,zn) ∈ Actions
δ.) In
the case uAS(zn+1) = 0: either zn+1 = x and, trivially, uAS′(zn+1) = 1, or zn+1 6= x and
uAS′(zn+1) = 0 since zn+1 receives no resource as part of δ. In the case uAS(zn+1) = 1 and
zn+1 ∈ {y, z1, . . . , zn−1}: trivially uAS′(zn+1) = 1 since zn+1 receives a resource as part of δ
which solves its r.r.p. In the case uAS(zn+1) = 1 and zn+1 /∈ {y, z1, . . . , zn−1}: assume, for the
sake of contradiction, that the r.r.p. of zn+1 is unsolved by zn+1 simply giving away rn+1, and
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thus uAS′(zn+1) = 0. But then uAS′(zn+1) < uAS(zn+1), which cannot be, since δ is a CR deal.
Hence, it must be the case that the r.r.p. of zn+1 is still solved even after simply giving away
rn+1, i.e. uAS′(zn+1) = 1. 2
We illustrate a Min CR deal comprising more than two actions in the following example:
Example 4.6 (Min CR deal comprising more than two actions) Given the agent sys-
tem AS as in Example 3.1 and Example 4.4 with plans as depicted in Figure 4.2 (and Fig-
ure 3.1), and agents’ goals as previously given but containing a resource allocation instead as
follows:
Res(ag1) = {r1} Res(ag2) = {r3} Res(ag3) = {r2}
The r.r.p. of ag1 and ag3 is solved, but the r.r.p. of ag2 is not. Then, the deal δ = (Res,Res′)
where Actionsδ = {give(ag2,r3,ag3), give(ag3,r2,ag1), give(ag1,r1,ag2)} results in the
agent system AS ′ containing Res′ as follows:
Res′(ag1) = {r2} Res′(ag2) = {r1} Res′(ag3) = {r3}
Here, δ is a Min CR deal comprising more than two actions. The underlined resources are the
resources that have changed hands between agents. Note that ag2 increases in utility, ag1 and
ag3 do not decrease in utility, and there is no strict subset of Actionsδ for which this is possible.
Having characterised the actions comprising any Min CR deal and the agents involved, we can
determine a number of properties of Min CR deals. Firstly, it is possible to determine the
number of resources that agents involved in a Min CR deal receive, as follows:
Corollary 4.2 (Number of resources agents involved in a Min CR deal receive) For
any Min CR deal δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′, one agent involved in δ
receives zero or one resources and all other agents involved in δ receive exactly one resource
each.
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Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Corollaries A.1, A.2 and A.3, which can be found
in Appendix A. 2
Secondly, as well as the number of resources that agents involved in a Min CR deal receive, it
is possible to determine the number of resources agents give away, as follows:
Corollary 4.3 (Number of resources agents involved in a Min CR deal give away)
For any Min CR deal δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′, one agent x ∈ Agentsδ
gives away zero or one resources, one agent y ∈ Agentsδ gives away one or two resources and
all other agents z ∈ Agentsδ (z 6= x, z 6= y) give away exactly one resource each.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Corollaries A.4, A.5 and A.6, which can be found
in Appendix A. 2
Thirdly, for any Min CR deal, it is always the case that only one agent increases in utility and
none of the agents decrease in utility, as follows:
Corollary 4.4 (Changes in utility of agents involved) For any Min CR deal δ = (Res,
Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′, only one agent increases in utility and none of the
agents decrease in utility, i.e. swAS(AS
′) = swAS(AS) + 1.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Corollaries A.7, A.8 and A.9, which can be found
in Appendix A. 2
We discuss next the completeness of Min CR deals for maximising the usw of an agent system.
4.5 Completeness of Min CR deals
In this section we show how any CR deal can be decomposed as a sequence of Min CR deals,
such that any CR deal which maximises the utilitarian social welfare (usw) of an agent system
can be broken down to a sequence of Min CR deals which also maximise the usw of the agent
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system. We do so by first proving three subsidiary lemmas and then we prove our main theorem.
Firstly, we can know that a certain resource is held by a certain agent following a deal if some
conditions are met, as follows:
Lemma 4.7 (Resource Held) If δ′ = (Res,Res′) and δ′′ = (Res,Res′′) are deals such that
Actionsδ
′′
⊂ Actionsδ
′
, give(x,r,y) ∈ Actionsδ
′
and give(x,r,y) /∈ Actionsδ
′′
, then r ∈
Res′′(x).
Proof. First of all, since give(x,r,y) ∈ Actionsδ
′
, it is clear that r ∈ Res(x), r ∈ Res′(y)
and it cannot be that give(x,r,z) ∈ Actionsδ
′
for any z ∈ names(AS) (z 6= y). Then,
since Actionsδ
′′
⊂ Actionsδ
′
and give(x,r,y) /∈ Actionsδ
′′
, it cannot be that give(x,r,z) ∈
Actionsδ
′′
for any z ∈ names(AS). Hence r ∈ Res′′(x). 2
The lemma above is useful in knowing which agent has a particular resource following a par-
ticular deal. We show for each agent x that increases utility in a CR deal δ, there is a Min CR
deal δ′ where δ contains δ′ (i.e. Actionsδ
′
⊆ Actionsδ) and x increases utility in δ′, as follows:
Lemma 4.8 (CR deal contains Min CR deal where agent increases utility) If δ′ =
(Res,Res′) is a CR deal resulting in an agent system AS ′ wherein x increases utility (i.e.
uAS(x) = 0, uAS′(x) = 1), then give(y,r,x) ∈ Actions
δ′ for some y ∈ names(AS) and
r ∈ R that solves the r.r.p. of x, and there is a Min CR deal δ′′ = (Res,Res′′) such that
Actionsδ
′′
⊆ Actionsδ
′
and give(y,r,x) ∈ Actionsδ
′′
.
Proof. Given that x increases utility in δ′, then, by Lemma 4.1, give(z1,r1,x) ∈ Actions
δ′
for some z1 ∈ names(AS) and r1 ∈ R that solves the r.r.p. of x. If the utility of z1 does
not decrease by simply giving away r1, then {give(z1,r1,x)} ⊆ Actions
δ′ is a set of actions
comprising a Min CR deal and we are done. Otherwise, there must be some give(z2,r2,z1)
∈ Actionsδ
′
(z2 ∈ names(AS), r2 ∈ R solves the r.r.p. of z1), since otherwise δ
′ would not be
a CR deal. If the utility of z2 does not decrease in the deal {give(z1,r1,x), give(z2,r2,z1)}
⊆ Actionsδ
′
, then it is a Min CR and we are done. Otherwise, z2 /∈ {x, z1}, z2 decreases
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utility by simply giving away r2, and there must be some give(z3,r3,z2) ∈ Actions
δ′ (z3 ∈
names(AS), r3 ∈ R solves the r.r.p. of z2). Continuing in this manner for each zi whose utility
would decrease by simply giving away ri, a set of actions {give(z1,r1,x), give(z2,r2,z1), . . . ,
give(zn+1,rn+1,zn)} ⊆ Actions
δ′ comprising a Min CR deal can be found. 2
As well as containing a single Min CR deal, as shown above, if two or more agents increase
utility in a CR deal δ, we show next that δ also contains a composition of two Min CR deals
δ1 and δ2, such that δ1 and δ2 comprise of sets of actions that do not overlap.
Lemma 4.9 (CR deals wherein two or more agents increase utility) If δ = (Res,Res′)
and δ1 = (Res,Res1) are CR deals resulting in agent systems AS
′ and AS1 respectively such that
Actionsδ1 ⊂ Actionsδ and an agent x ∈ names(AS) increases utility in δ but does not increase
utility in δ1, then there exists a Min CR deal δ2 = (Res1, Res2) where Actions
δ2 ⊂ Actionsδ, x
increases utility in δ2 and Actions
δ1 ∩ Actionsδ2 = ∅.
Proof. Since x increases utility in δ, then the r.r.p. of x is unsolved in AS and give(z1,r1,x) ∈
Actionsδ for some agent z1 ∈ names(AS) and resource r1 ∈ R that solves the r.r.p. of x. Also,
since x does not increase utility in δ1, then give(z1,r1,x) /∈ Actions
δ1 and, by Lemma 4.7,
r1 ∈ Res1(z1). If z1 can simply give away r1 in AS1 without decreasing in utility, then the
deal δ2 = (Res1, Res2) where Actions
δ2 = {give(z1,r1,x)} is a Min CR deal. Note that
Actionsδ2 ⊂ Actionsδ, x increases utility in δ2 and Actions
δ1 ∩ Actionsδ2 = ∅. On the other
hand, if simply giving away r1 in AS1 decreases z1’s utility, this implies that r1 solves the r.r.p.
of z1, z1 has no other resource in AS1 that solves its r.r.p. and there is no give(z,r,z1) ∈
Actionsδ1 for any agent z ∈ names(AS) and resource r ∈ R that solves the r.r.p. of z1. But,
since δ is a CR deal and give(z1,r1,x) ∈ Actions
δ, it must be the case that give(z2,r2,z1)
∈ Actionsδ for some agent z2 ∈ names(AS) and resource r2 ∈ R that solves the r.r.p. of
z1. We know give(z2,r2,z1) /∈ Actions
δ1 and hence, by Lemma 4.7, r2 ∈ Res1(z2). If z2
does not decrease in utility in the deal δ2 = (Res1, Res2) where Actions
δ2 = {give(z1,r1,x),
give(z2,r2,z1)}, then it is a Min CR deal. Note that Actions
δ2 ⊂ Actionsδ, x increases
utility in δ2 and Actions
δ1 ∩ Actionsδ2 = ∅. On the other hand, if z2 decreases in utility in
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the deal {give(z1,r1,x), give(z2,r2,z1)}, then, similarly as for z1 not being able to simply
give away r1, we can deduce give(z3,r3,z2) ∈ Actions
δ for some agent z3 ∈ names(AS)
and resource r3 ∈ R that solves the r.r.p. of z2. Continuing in this manner we can find
a Min CR deal δ2 = (Res1, Res2) such that Actions
δ2 = {give(z1,r1,x), give(z2,r2,z1),
. . . , give(zn+1,rn+1,zn)}, Actions
δ2 ⊂ Actionsδ, x increases utility in δ2 and Actions
δ1 ∩
Actionsδ2 = ∅. 2
Lastly we bring together the lemmas and corollaries above to prove that every CR deal δ can be
decomposed into a sequence of Min CR deals δ′ wherein the exact same agents increase utility
in δ as they do in δ′, and δ′ contains no meaningless exchanges of resources, as follows:
Theorem 4.8 (CR deals decomposed as sequences of Min CR deals) If δ = (Res,Res′)
is a CR deal resulting in an agent system AS ′ where swAS(AS
′) = swAS(AS)+n (n ≥ 1), then
there is a CR deal δ1 ◦ . . . ◦ δn = (Res,Resn) resulting in an agent system ASn where each δi
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a Min CR deal and happyAS(ASn) = happyAS(AS
′).
Proof. Let the n agents that increase in utility in δ be happyAS(AS
′) \ happyAS(AS) =
{x1, . . . , xn}. Since δ is a CR deal and x1 increases utility in δ, then, by Lemma 4.8, there
is a Min CR deal δ1 = (Res,Res1) such that Actions
δ1 ⊆ Actionsδ and x1 increases utility in
δ1. Note that, by Corollary 4.4, only x1 increases utility in δ1. If n = 1, we are done. If n > 1,
we continue. Since δ and δ1 are CR deals, and x2 increases utility in δ but not in δ1, then
Actionsδ1 ⊂ Actionsδ and, by Lemma 4.9, there is a Min CR deal δ2 = (Res1, Res2) resulting
in an agent system AS2 where Actions
δ2 ⊂ Actionsδ and x2 increases utility in δ2. If n = 2, we
have δ1 ◦ δ2 where each δi (1 ≤ i ≤ 2) is a Min CR deal, and hence, by Theorem 4.1, δ1 ◦ δ2 is a
CR deal. Also, as required, happyAS(AS2) = happyAS(AS
′). If n > 2, continuing successively
for each i (1 < i < n) in this way, from each CR deal δ1 ◦ . . . ◦ δi = (Res,Resi), we can find
a Min CR deal δi+1 = (Resi, Resi+1) where Actions
δi+1 ⊂ Actionsδ and (only) xi+1 increases
utility in δi+1. Then, we end with a a CR deal δ1 ◦ . . . ◦ δn = (Res,Resn) resulting in an agent
system ASn where each δi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a Min CR deal and happyAS(ASn) = happyAS(AS
′).
2
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As a result of the theorem above we have that there exists a sequence of Min CR deals which
result in agent system that maximises the usw of an initial agent system AS whenever there
exists a CR deal which results in an agent system that maximises the usw of AS, as follows:
Corollary 4.5 (completeness of Min CR deals) If there exists a CR deal δ = (Res,Res′)
resulting in an agent system AS ′ which maximises the usw of AS and such that swAS(AS
′) =
swAS(AS)+n (n ≥ 1), then there exists a sequence of Min CR deals δ1 ◦ . . . ◦ δn = (Res,Resn)
resulting in an agent system ASn which maximises the usw of AS.
Proof. Since δ is a CR deal and swAS(AS
′) = swAS(AS)+n (n ≥ 1), we know by Theorem 4.8
that there exists a sequence of Min CR deals δ1 ◦ . . . ◦ δn = (Res,Resn) resulting in an agent
system ASn such that happyAS(ASn) = happyAS(AS
′). Then, since AS ′ maximises the usw of
AS, trivially by Definition 3.7, ASn also maximises the usw of AS. 2
4.6 Discussion
Given any resource reallocation problem in terms of the goals, resources and agents involved
and represented according to the framework set out in Chapter 3, we have identified in this
chapter the steps (deals) that would take the system from its initial allocation to an optimal
allocation of resources. Though our discussion in this chapter is independent of how these deals
are to be generated and also the nature of the solution (i.e. centralised or distributed), the deals
lend themselves to a distributed solution, as is the focus in this thesis. Notably, since deals are
to be found (agreed) by the participating agents themselves (which have only partial knowledge
at their disposal) and not a central decision-making agent (which would have a more complete
knowledge of the agents, their goals and resources), it is important that the deals are kept simple
and involve as few agents and resources as possible. The deals which we identify meet this
criterion since all actions as part of the deal are relevant and necessary for it to be agreeable to
the agents involved, and hence the number of agents and resources involved in each deal is kept
to a minimum. This is important for the large-scale (Grid computing, scheduling/timetabling
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etc) applications as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 (and Chapter 3, Section 3.5) that our
method is targeting where the total number of agents and resources comprising the system
would be immense and it makes sense to limit the number of agents a particular agent needs
to interact with (and also the number of resources that are subject to discussion) in order to
agree on a suitable deal.
4.7 Conclusion
We have defined in this chapter deals that transition an agent system from one allocation (agent
system) to another allocation (agent system). In particular, we have defined a specific kind
of deal, namely the minimally cooperative rational deal, and have extended results of Endriss
et al. [EMST06] to show that these deals are sufficient for solving the resource reallocation
problem of Chapter 3. We have characterised the actions that comprise these deals in terms
of the number of resources that agents involved receive and give away, and in terms of which
agents change (increase) utility as a result of these deals. The work in this chapter of course
does not address the important and complex problem of how agents would actually find and
generate such deals. The problem is complicated further given that our aim in this thesis is for
deals to be generated locally, in a distributed manner, by the agents involved and given that
agents may have incomplete and/or incorrect information about the other agents. Moreover,
as we have seen in this chapter, minimally cooperative rational deals may involve multiple
agents and an agent may need to give away more than one resource in the deal, i.e. the
negotiation process needs to capture ‘OCSM contract types’ (see Section 2.1.6) as identified
by Toumas Sandholm [San98]. The definition of such a (generative) negotiation process will
be the focus of the next chapter. There, we define a communication language and protocol
that captures minimally cooperative rational deals and which would allow agents to negotiate
towards allocations of resources that solve their own r.r.p. and, as a result, the r.r.p. of the
entire agent system.
Chapter 5
Dialogues for Solving the Resource
Reallocation Problem
We present in this chapter a communication language and protocol for argumentation-based
negotiation, which allows agents that have only limited knowledge to negotiate deals (exchanges
of resources) and share arguments (knowledge) in the process. We present also a means of defin-
ing agent policies/strategies that allow agents to generate moves conforming to the protocol.
We discuss how such an agent policy would need to be defined to negotiate the kinds of deals
described in Chapter 4 for solving the resource reallocation problem (r.r.p.) of interest in this
thesis. A concretely defined agent policy is such that an agent can decide what move to make
in any situation it finds itself in, as well as knowing what to do with what it is told in terms of
updating its internal state (beliefs etc) and responding accordingly.
5.1 Introduction
The inter-agent interaction method of choice in this thesis is that of dialogues, namely orderly
sequences of message exchanges between agents, where each agent has a goal and the dialogues,
as a whole, also have a goal, notably that of solving the resource reallocation problem for all
dialogue participants. Concretely, we focus on negotiation dialogues (see Table 2.1 in Chap-
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ter 2), whereby agents involved in a dialogue try to arrive at a decision concerning possession
of resources by agreeing a deal. We allow two types of dialogue that agents use intermittently
to try and obtain a needed resource. The first, a request, is a dialogue between two agents (an
initiator and a responder). The second, a proposal, is a dialogue between three or more agents
(an initiator and a set of responders).
We adopt a “generative” approach to negotiation, similar to the approach of [BH07] for inquiry
dialogues, by providing a constructive policy for the automatic generation of dialogues by
autonomously reasoning agents. We describe in this chapter the policy which specifies how an
agent initiates requests or proposals, directed at one or more agents respectively, depending on
their beliefs about themselves and other agents. As discussed in Chapter 3, these beliefs may
be partial, in that agents may have incomplete beliefs about the goals and resources held by
other agents. The policy we define allows agents to provide “reasons” for their refusals to other
agents, thus filling in gaps in their knowledge. The policy relies on argumentation (i) to fill the
gaps in the agents’ knowledge at request and proposal time and (ii) to compute “reasons” (in
the form of arguments). When agents share from the onset knowledge as to which resources
fulfil which goals, as assumed in Chapter 3, the policy used by agents allows agents to compute
socially optimal allocations (with a maximal number of agents obtaining a resource that fulfils
its goal) finitely and effectively. In particular, an agent makes use of reasons it has received
previously to make more effective its search for a deal that solves its r.r.p.
For the purposes of this chapter, we will assume an argumentation framework where arguments
will be of the form <Conclusion, Support>. We will not address in this chapter exactly how
such arguments are generated (instantiated concretely) by the agents. This will be addressed in
Chapter 7 for a particular general-purpose argumentation framework. Intuitively, the Support
of arguments include some of the utterer’s beliefs as well as information about the allocated
and needed resources, which may be useful for the receiver to know.
This chapter is structured as follows: In Section 5.2 we define the two types of dialogue (i.e.
the protocols) considered in this thesis. In Section 5.3 we present the communication rules for
a general negotiation policy that conforms to the protocols. In Section 5.4 we give a definition
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of the procedures found in the communication rules that would solve our resource reallocation
problem. In Section 5.5 we provide examples of the kinds of dialogues agents would generate
using the policy and procedures defined in this chapter. In Section 5.6 we discuss properties
of these policies and procedures. Lastly, in Sections 5.7 and 5.8, we discuss related work and
conclude.
5.2 Communication Language and Protocols for Dialogues
We assume in this chapter an agent system AS = (G,R,A) (as in Definition 3.1) containing
an allocation Res (see Definition 2.1). We define in this section a communication language
and two protocols for dialogue which allow an agent to request an exchange of resources with
another agent and to wait for a response (agreement or refusal). Or, alternatively, to propose
an exchange of resources involving a number of agents and to wait for a response (acceptance
or rejection) from each agent involved. In the case of all agents accepting the proposal, the
initating agent confirms, sealing the exchange. In the case of receiving rejection from any
agent, the initiating agent disconfirms the proposal with all agents that accepted, cancelling
the exchange. Requests, proposals, refusals of requests and rejections of proposals may be
accompanied by reasons which are arguments. The dialogue moves and protocols (instances) are
presented generally in this section independent of the particular resource reallocation problem
which we consider in this thesis. In our particular setting, as we will see in Section 5.4, a
dialogue instance allows an agent to attempt to obtain a resource needed to achieve its goal.
Definition 5.1 (Dialogue Moves) The dialogue moves consist of all instances of the follow-
ing schemata (for X, Y ∈ names(AS), X 6= Y , Z ⊆ names(AS), X /∈ Z):
• request(X,Y ,Actions,Reason)
• propose(X,Z,Actions,Reason)
• agree(X,Y ,Actions)
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• refuse(X,Y ,Actions,Reason)
• accept proposal(X,Y ,Actions)
• reject proposal(X,Y ,Actions,Reason)
• confirm(X,Z,Actions)
• disconfirm(X,Z,Actions)
where
• X is the utterer and Y or Z are the receivers;
• Actions, the set of actions (or exchanges of resources) in the dialogue move, is a non-
empty set of atoms of the form give(A,R,B), i.e. the agent named A is to give resource
R to the agent named B, where A,B ∈ {X, Y } or A,B ∈ {X} ∪ Z;
• Reason is null or an argument of the form <Conclusion, Support>.
Note that the dialogue moves take the form of negotiation moves regarding the exchange of
resources. A set of actions in a dialogue move of the form {give(y,r,x)}, for example, is inter-
preted as a request for y to give r to x, with y receiving nothing in exchange, and {give(y,r,x),
give(x,r′,y)} is interpreted as a request for x and y to exchange resources r′ and r.
The kinds of actions in the dialogue moves which will we consider in this thesis are actions
that comprise a minimally cooperative rational (Min CR) deal (see Theorems 4.5–4.7).
The dialogue moves we consider can be seen as FIPA ACL (or KQML) communicative acts in the
sense that they consist of a performative and a number of parameters as follows: utterer of the
dialogue move (X in Definition 5.1), receiver(s) (Y or Z in Definition 5.1) and content (Actions
together with Reason as in Definition 5.1). Whilst each of the performatives in Definition 5.1
is a performative in the FIPA ACL also, our dialogue moves do not necessarily conform to the
semantics of communicative acts (performatives) in FIPA ACL (see Section 2.2.1).
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Dialogue instances are of two types: request and proposal. Request dialogue instances begin
with a request dialogue move and proposal dialogue instances begin with a propose dialogue
move, as follows:
Definition 5.2 (Request Dialogue Instances) A request dialogue involving an initiating
agent named x and a responding agent named y regarding Actions is a sequence of dialogue
moves of one of the following forms:
• request(x,y,Actions, ), agree(y,x,Actions) ( successful request dialogue instance)
• request(x,y,Actions, ), refuse(y,x,Actions, ) (unsuccessful request dialogue in-
stance)
In both cases, Actions is a non-empty set of atoms of the form give(A,R,B) (A,B ∈ {x, y},
A 6= B, R ∈ R), there is at least one give(A, , ) or give( , ,A) in Actions for each
A ∈ {x, y}, and there is at most one give( ,R, ) in Actions for each R ∈ R.
Definition 5.3 (Proposal Dialogue Instance) A proposal dialogue instance involving an
initiating agent named x and a set of responding agents Z regarding Actions is a sequence of
dialogue moves of one of the following forms:
• propose(x,Z,Actions, ), accept proposal(y1,x,Actions), . . . ,
accept proposal(yn,x,Actions), confirm(x,Z,Actions),
( successful proposal dialogue instance)
for Z = {y1, . . . , yn}
• propose(x,Z,Actions, ), FailedSubSeq,
disconfirm(x,{yn+1, . . . , yn+m},Actions)
(unsuccessful proposal dialogue instance)
where FailedSubSeq is a permutation of
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Figure 5.1: Request Dialogue Instance as Finite State Automaton
reject proposal(y1,x,Actions, ), . . . , reject proposal(yn,x,Actions, ),
accept proposal(yn+1,x,Actions), . . . , accept proposal(yn+m,x,Actions),
for Z = {y1, . . . , yn, yn+1, . . . , yn+m} with n > 0 and m > 0
• propose(x,Z,Actions), reject proposal(y1,x,Actions, ) , . . . ,
reject proposal(yn,x,Actions, )
(unsuccessful proposal dialogue instance)
for Z = {y1, . . . , yn}.
In all cases, Actions is a non-empty set of atoms of the form give(A,R,B) (A,B ∈ {x}∪Z,
A 6= B, R ∈ R), and there is at least one give(A, , ) or give( , ,A) in Actions for each
A ∈ {x} ∪ Z, and there is at most one give( ,R, ) in Actions for each R ∈ R.
Basically, the kinds of dialogue instances we consider conform to the protocols given in Fig-
ures 5.1 and 5.2 as finite state automata.
We assume in this thesis that agents initiate requests or proposals to obtain a certain resource,
as follows:
Definition 5.4 (dialogue instance initiated by agent to obtain resource) A request or
proposal dialogue instance d regarding Actions is initiated by an agent x to obtain a resource
r iff x is the initiating agent of d and give( ,r,x) ∈ Actions.
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Figure 5.2: Proposal Dialogue Instance as Finite State Automaton
Given that our interest in this thesis are actions in requests and proposals that comprise a
Min CR deal, it is necessary then that at least one agent is to obtain a resource that solves its
resource reallocation problem. We will see in Section 5.4 that this will be the agent initiating
the dialogue instance. We present next examples of (successful) request and proposal dialogue
instances. Here and throughout the chapter, we associate timepoints to utterances in order
to show how they are sequenced. In addition, we omit the argument (Reason) in writing the
request, propose, refuse and reject proposal dialogue moves when Reason = null.
Example 5.1 (request dialogue instance) A request dialogue instance that captures the
deal of Example 4.4 could proceed as follows, where the dialogue instance is initiated by ag2
to obtain r2, and t1 is a timepoint prior to t2:
t1: request(ag2,ag1,{give(ag2,r2,ag1), give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
t2: agree(ag1,ag2,{give(ag2,r2,ag1), give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
Example 5.2 (proposal dialogue instance) A dialogue instance that captures the deal of
Example 4.6 could proceed as follows, where the dialogue instance is initiated by ag2 to obtain
r2, and t1, t2, t3, t4 are successive timepoints:
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t1: propose(ag2,{ag1,ag3},{give(ag2,r3,ag3),give(ag3,r2,ag1),give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
t2: accept proposal(ag1,ag2,{give(ag2,r3,ag3),give(ag3,r2,ag1),give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
t3: accept proposal(ag3,ag2,{give(ag2,r3,ag3),give(ag3,r2,ag1),give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
t4: confirm(ag2,{ag1,ag3},{give(ag2,r3,ag3),give(ag3,r2,ag1),give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
Only a successful (request or proposal) dialogue instance results in an actual exchange of
resources such that (some) agents have different sets of resources following the dialogue instance
than they did before the dialogue instance, as follows:
Definition 5.5 (resources held by agents following successful dialogue instance) Let
Res be the allocation of resources contained in the agent system AS before a successful (request
or proposal) dialogue instance d regarding Actions, where an allocation contained in an agent
system is as in Lemma 3.1. ResActions is the assignment of resources to agents following d,
defined for each agent x ∈ names(AS) as follows:
ResActions(x) = Res(x) ∪ { r | give( , r, x) ∈ Actions } − { r | give(x, r, ) ∈ Actions }
We will assume in this thesis that every resource to be given away by an agent in a dialogue
instance regarding an exchange of resources Actions is held by that agent, i.e. r ∈ Res(x)
for each give(x,r, ) ∈ Actions. We show next that, under this assumption, the assignment
of resources to agents following a successful dialogue instance is an allocation in the sense of
Lemma 3.1, as follows:
Lemma 5.1 (successful dialogue instance results in new allocation of resources) Let
Res be the allocation of resources contained in AS before a successful (request or proposal) di-
alogue instance d regarding Actions. Then, the assignment of resources to agents following d,
i.e. ResActions as in Definition 5.5, is an allocation.
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Proof. Firstly, for each r ∈ R such that give( ,r, ) /∈ Actions, we have, by assumption of
⋃
x∈names(AS)Res(x) = R, that r ∈ Res(x) for some x ∈ names(AS), and, by Definition 5.5,
that r ∈ ResActions(x) and r /∈ ResActions(y) (for all y 6= x). Secondly, by Definitions 5.2 and 5.3,
there is at most one give( ,r, ) ∈ Actions for each r ∈ R. Then, for each r ∈ R such that
give(x,r,y) ∈ Actions (x, y ∈ names(AS)), by assumption of Res being an allocation and
every agent holding the resource it is to give away, we have that r ∈ Res(x) and r /∈ Res(z) (for
all z 6= x), and, by Definition 5.5, that r ∈ ResActions(y) and r /∈ ResActions(z) (for all z 6= y).
So, every resource is held by one and only one agent before the dialogue instance, and it is
either retained by that agent or given to one other agent as a result of the dialogue instance.
Therefore, ResActions(x) ∩ResActions(y) = ∅ for x 6= y and
⋃
x∈names(AS)Res
Actions(x) = R, and
hence ResActions is an allocation. 2
As a corollary of the previous lemma, a successful dialogue instance then results in a deal in
the sense of Definition 2.2, as follows:
Corollary 5.1 (successful dialogue instance results in a deal) Let Res be the allocation
of resources contained in AS before a successful (request or proposal) dialogue instance d re-
garding Actions, and ResActions the assignment of resources to agents following d as in Defi-
nition 5.5. Then, δ = (Res,ResActions) is a deal.
Proof. Trivial since we know by Lemma 5.1 that ResActions is an allocation, and, since Actions
is a non-empty set (i.e. resources change hands between agents), Res 6= ResActions. 2
In lieu of the above lemma and corollary we will say that a successful dialogue instance results
in a new allocation, or that a successful dialogue instance results in a deal. The agents involved
in a deal (i.e. those that receive or give resources as part of the deal, see Definition 2.3) resulting
from a successful dialogue instance are exactly those that are involved in the dialogue instance
(i.e. the initiating and responding agents).
Lemma 5.2 (agents involved in a deal are those involved in the dialogue instance)
Let Actions be a set of atoms of the form give(A,R,B) as in Definition 5.2 or 5.3 for a
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successful request or proposal dialogue instance, respectively, involving a set of (initiating and
responding) agents Z. Let δ = (Res,ResActions) be the deal resulting from the dialogue instance.
Then, Agentsδ = Z.
Proof. By definition of agents involved in a deal (Definition 2.3) we have x ∈ Agentsδ if
x ∈ names(AS) and Res(x) 6= ResActions(x). By Definition 5.5, Res(x) 6= ResActions(x) for all
x ∈ names(AS) such that give(x, , ) ∈ Actions or give( , ,x) ∈ Actions, and Res(x) =
ResActions(x) otherwise. Since, by Definitions 5.2 and 5.3, there is at least one give(x, , )
or give( , ,x) in Actions for each x ∈ Z, then Agentsδ = Z. 2
In general, an agent may need to initiate a number of dialogue instances with a number of
agents before a particular resource is obtained or before it gives up its intention of obtaining
the resource.
Definition 5.6 (Dialogue Sequence) A dialogue sequence wrt an agent x and a resource r
is a sequence of (request or proposal) dialogue instances all initiated by x to obtain r such that
a dialogue instance in the sequence is only initiated after the previous dialogue instance has
completed and the only successful dialogue instance in the sequence, if any, is the last one in
the sequence. A dialogue sequence terminates successfully if it is finite and the last dialogue
instance is successful. A dialogue sequence terminates unsuccessfully if it is finite and the last
dialogue instance is unsuccessful.
In our problem domain, an agent attempts to obtain a resource that fulfils its goal (solves its
r.r.p.) and can be seen as succeeding if any such dialogue sequence terminates successfully. By
virtue of Definition 5.6, we assume in this thesis that an agent does not instantiate concurrent
dialogue instances, such that an agent that has initiated a dialogue instance will not instantiate
another dialogue instance until the first has ended. Each dialogue sequence can then be seen as
a serial sequence of dialogue instances. Note however that an agent may be running multiple
dialogue sequences concurrently, as follows:
Example 5.3 (concurrent dialogue sequences) Let d1, d2, d3 be unsuccessful dialogue in-
stances initiated by an agent x to obtain a resource r1. Let d4 and d5 be unsuccessful and
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successful dialogue instances respectively initiated by x to obtain a resource r2. Assume the di-
alogue instances proceed in the following order: d1, d2, d4, d3, d5. This merges an unsuccessful
dialogue sequence d1, d2, d3 wrt x and r1, and a successful dialogue sequence d4, d5 wrt x and
r2, in a way that both dialogue sequences are intertwined (running concurrently).
We will allow an agent to ask the same resource from the same agent more than once within
a dialogue sequence, though the particulars of the request or proposal would be expected
to differ. Note that agents will take the role of initiator or responder in different dialogue
instances, possibly occurring simultaneously, and different agents may be initiating dialogue
instances simultaneously each in pursuit of a resource that fulfils their own individual goal. We
illustrate this as follows:
Example 5.4 (concurrent dialogue instances) Consider the following dialogue moves ut-
tered at successive timepoints t1, t2, t3, t4:
t1: request(ag1,ag2,{give(ag2,r2,ag1)})
t2: request(ag3,ag1,{give(ag1,r1,ag3)})
t3: agree(ag1,ag3,{give(ag1,r1,ag3)})
t4: agree(ag2,ag1,{give(ag2,r2,ag1)})
Then, the dialogue moves uttered at timepoints t1 and t4 make up a dialogue instance d1 initiated
by ag1 to obtain r2, and the dialogue moves uttered at timepoints t2 and t3 make up a dialogue
instance d2 initiated by ag3 to obtain r1. Notice in particular that d2 is initiated after d1 but
completed before d1, and that ag1 is initiator in d1 and responder in d2.
We will discuss in the next section how agents can be defined to ensure dialogical correctness
properties given that an agent may be involved in multiple dialogue instances simultanously.
For example, it should never be the case that an agent offers to give away the same resource
to two agents simultaneously.
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5.3 Communication Rules
We present in this section the procedures and communication rules that make up a communica-
tion policy which generates dialogue instances between agents for the reallocation of resources
according to the protocols of the previous section (Definitions 5.2 and 5.3). We present these
generally in this section, to be given a specific definition in Section 5.4 for our particular resource
reallocation problem of interest.
We begin by defining the state of an agent as follows:
Definition 5.7 (state of an agent) The state of an agent is a triple (〈x,Res(x),G(x),B(x)〉,
M(x), D(x)) such that:
• 〈x, Res(x), G(x), B(x)〉 is the name, resources, goal and beliefs of the agent as in Defi-
nition 3.1 (Chapter 3);
• M(x) is the set of dialogue moves received in x’s incoming “message queue”, i.e. the
dialogue moves with x as recipient which x has not yet “dealt” with;
• D(x) is the dialogical status of the agent, i.e. a set of ground literals operating as flags.
Flags will be used to “remember” when the agent has initiated a dialogue instance, accepted a
proposal or received acceptance of a proposal.
We will see that, as a result of engaging in dialogue instances, the state of an agent undergoes
changes.
The negotiation policy is defined as a set of communication rules. These rules have associated
with them “preconditions”, possibly the reception of an “incoming” dialogue move, and “con-
sequences”, which may be the utterance of an “outgoing” dialogue move and/or a number of
“revisions” to the state of the (uttering) agent. Formally, a communication rule for an agent x
is specified as a tuple
〈In, P,Out,X〉
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where
• In, the incoming dialogue move, is a dialogue move (with x as receiver) or is null;
• P , the preconditions, is a set (conjunction) of boolean “procedures”;
• Out is the outgoing dialogue move (with x as utterer) or is null;
• X, the revisions, is a set of “procedures” that modify the agent’s resources (R(x)), beliefs
(B(x)) and dialogical status (D(x)).
It is intended that agent x applies a communication rule 〈In, P,Out,X〉 removing the dialogue
move corresponding to In from M(x) (if In 6= null), generating (uttering) the corresponding
Out (if Out 6= null) and enforcing the revisions in X whenever
• In 6= null and In matches a dialogue move in M(x), or In = null; and
• the preconditions P “hold” (evaluate to true).
The evaluation of P will typically lead to instantiation of variables in the communication rule.
The procedures used in the communication rules will be split into two kinds:
• “general procedures”, which can be realised in several ways according to an agent’s owned
resources, goal and beliefs in order for it to fulfil its purpose;
• “control procedures”, guaranteeing that dialogues are appropriately sequenced and inter-
leaved.
We describe informally in this section the role of the different “general procedures” and “control
procedures”, and present the communication rules accordingly.
The “general procedures” called within the preconditions of communication rules of an agent
x are:
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• generateRequest(Y ,Actions,Reason), that evaluates to true (returns successfully) and
instantiates an exchange of resources Actions to request of an agent Y (Y 6= x) as well
as an argument (Reason, possibly null) justifying the request, or otherwise evaluates to
false (returns unsuccessfully);
• generateProposal(Z,Actions,Reason), that evaluates to true and instantiates an ex-
change of resources Actions to propose to a set of agents Z (x 6∈ Z) as well as an argument
(Reason, possibly null) justifying the proposal, or otherwise evaluates to false;
• acceptableExchange(Actions,ReasonIn), that evaluates to true if the exchange of re-
sources Actions with justification ReasonIn is acceptable for x,1 and evaluates to false
otherwise;
• ¬acceptableExchange(Actions,ReasonIn,ReasonOut), that evaluates to true if the ex-
change of resources Actions with justification ReasonIn is not acceptable for x 1 and in-
stantiates an argument (ReasonOut, possbily null) justifying the decision, and evaluates
to false otherwise.
The “general procedures” called within the revisions of communication rules of agent x are:
• exchangeResources(Actions), that revises x’s owned resources and belief set as to which
agents have which resources according to Actions;
• reviseBeliefs(Y ,Reason), that modifies x’s belief set given an argument Reason ut-
tered to it by some agent Y .
In Section 5.4 we will define more formally but at a high-level the “general procedures” that
allow us to capture Min CR deals sufficient for solving our resource reallocation problem of in-
terest. In Chapter 7 we will define these procedures concretely using a particular argumentation
framework.
1The acceptability or not of an exchange of resources, and to what extent the justification provided is
considered, will depend on the particular problem domain and definition given to this procedure. It could be
required for example that the “utility” of this agent increase as a result of the exchange or, as we will see in
Section 5.4, that the “utility” of this agent does not decrease.
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The “control procedures” called within the preconditions and revisions of the communication
rules are of the form valid( ) and do( ) respectively. Indeed procedures of the form
valid( ) check if certain dialogical properties hold for the agent, and procedures of the
form do( ) are used to make modifications of an agent’s dialogical status. We assume that
the “control procedures” govern the policy according to the dialogue instance protocols (see
Definitions 5.2 and 5.3) and our assumption of dialogue sequences (see Definition 5.6), and
maintain correctness so that, for example, the agent does not offer the same resource, or the
only two resources it has that solve its r.r.p., to two or more agents simultaneously. We provide
an example definition of these procedures in Appendix B, as well as describing these informally
in the remainder of this section along with the communication rules (CR1–CR15 ) defining a
general policy for a generic agent x.
Initiating Request Dialogues
(CR1 )
In1 = null
P1 = {generateRequest(Y ,Actions,Reason), valid(initiateDialogue(Actions))}
Out1 = request(x,Y ,Actions,Reason)
X1 = {do(initiateDialogue({Y },Actions))}
As a result of performing CR1, the agent (x) utters a request dialogue move to the agent Y
regarding Actions and revises its dialogical status according to do(initiateDialogue({Y },
Actions)). Note that no incoming dialogue move is required to execute CR1. This is be-
cause CR1 is not executed in response to a previous dialogue move. The precondition valid(
initiateDialogue(Actions)) could be defined, for example, as in Definition B.1 (see Ap-
pendix B) to check that x is not currently awaiting a response of any kind from any agent
for a resource that would solve its r.r.p., and that the request (for Actions) at this point in
time would not mean x has offered the same resource to two agents simultaneously. The revi-
sion do(initiateDialogue({Y },Actions)) would record in x’s state that it has initiated a
dialogue with Y regarding Actions (see Definition B.7 in Appendix B).
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Initiating Proposal Dialogues
(CR2 )
In2 = null
P2 = {generateProposal(Z,Actions,Reason), valid(initiateDialogue(Actions))}
Out2 = propose(x,Z,Actions,Reason)
X2 = {do(initiateDialogue(Z,Actions))}
As a result of performing CR2, the agent (x) utters a propose dialogue move to the set of agents
Z regarding Actions and revises its dialogical status according to do(initiateDialogue(
Z,Actions)). As for CR1, no incoming dialogue move is required to execute CR2. The pre-
condition valid(initiateDialogue(Actions)) and the revision do(initiateDialogue(Z,
Actions)) are as in CR1.
Responding to Requests
(CR3 )
In3 = request(Y ,x,Actions,Reason)
P3 = {acceptableExchange(Actions,Reason), valid(accept(Actions))}
Out3 = agree(x,Y ,Actions)
X3 = {reviseBeliefs(Y ,Reason), exchangeResources(Actions)}
As a result of performing CR3, the agent (x) removes the received request dialogue move from
M(x), utters an agree dialogue move and revises its state according to reviseBeliefs(Y ,
Reason) and exchangeResources(Actions). The precondition valid(accept(Actions))
could be defined, for example, as in Definition B.2 (see Appendix B) to check that x has
not presently offered to give away any of its resources which solve its r.r.p., nor any resources
which it would be required to give away in Actions.
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(CR4 )
In4 = request(Y ,x,Actions,ReasonIn)
P4 = {¬acceptableExchange(Actions,ReasonIn,ReasonOut)}
Out4 = refuse(x,Y ,Actions,ReasonOut)
X4 = {reviseBeliefs(Y ,ReasonIn)}
The agent (x) refuses a request (CR4 ) which is not acceptable for it and provides an argument
for its decision (ReasonOut), which could be useful for the requesting agent (Y ) in revising its
belief set and generating future requests/proposals or not. x also revises its belief set according
to the argument it received in the request via reviseBeliefs(Y ,ReasonIn).
Responding to Proposals
(CR5 )
In5 = propose(Y ,Z,Actions,ReasonIn)
P5 = {x ∈ Z, acceptableExchange(Actions,ReasonIn), valid(accept(Actions))}
Out5 = accept proposal(x,Y ,Actions)
X5 = {reviseBeliefs(Y ,ReasonIn), do(accept proposal(Y ,Actions))}
In the case of uttering accept proposal in response to a propose dialogue move (CR5 ), the
agent (x) does not immediately modify its state according to exchangeResources(Actions)
as it does in CR3 ; it awaits a confirm before doing so (see CR13 below). The precondi-
tion valid(accept(Actions)) is as in CR3. The revision do(accept proposal(Y ,Actions))
would record in x’s state that it has accepted the proposal of Y for Actions (see Definition B.8
in Appendix B).
(CR6 )
In6 = propose(Y ,Z,Actions,ReasonIn)
P6 = {x ∈ Z, ¬acceptableExchange(Actions,ReasonIn,ReasonOut)}
Out6 = reject proposal(x,Y ,Actions,ReasonOut)
X6 = {reviseBeliefs(Y ,ReasonIn)}
CR6 is the analogous of CR4 for proposals.
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Receiving Responses of Requests
(CR7 )
In7 = agree(Y ,x,Actions)
P7 = {valid(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions))}
Out7 = null
X7 = {exchangeResources(Actions), do(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions,agree))}
In the case of receiving agree (CR7 ), the agent (x) revises its state according to
exchangeResources(Actions). The precondition valid(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions)),
which occurs in CR8–CR10 also, checks that the agent is indeed awaiting a response from Y
regarding Actions (see Definition B.3 in Appendix B). The revision do(receiveResponse(Y ,
Actions,Response)), which occurs in CR8–CR10 also, records in x’s state that it has received
a response from Y regarding Actions (see Definition B.9 in Appendix B).
(CR8 )
In8 = refuse(Y ,x,Actions,Reason)
P8 = {valid(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions))}
Out8 = null
X8 = {reviseBeliefs(Y ,Reason), do(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions,refuse))}
In the case of receiving refuse (CR8 ), the agent (x) revises its state according to
reviseBeliefs(Y ,Argument).
Receiving Responses of Proposals
(CR9 )
In9 = accept proposal(Y ,x,Actions)
P9 = {valid(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions))}
Out9 = null
X9 = {do(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions,acceptProposal))}
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In the case of receiving accept proposal (CR9 ), the agent (x) does not yet make any changes
to its state according to exchangeResources(Actions) as it does in CR7. This is only done
when all responding agents involved in the dialogue have accepted and x can confirm the
exchange of resources (see CR11 below).
(CR10 )
In10 = reject proposal(Y ,x,Actions,Reason)
P10 = {valid(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions))}
Out10 = null
X10 = {reviseBeliefs(Y ,Reason), do(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions,rejectProposal))}
CR10 is the analogous of CR8 for proposals.
Ending Proposal Dialogues
(CR11 )
In11 = null
P11 = {valid(confirm(Z,Actions))}
Out11 = confirm(x,Z,Actions)
X11 = {exchangeResources(Actions), do(confirm(Actions))}
The agent (x) confirms a proposal (CR11 above), after receiving acceptance from all agents Z
to whom the proposal was made. The precondition valid(confirm(Z,Actions)) checks that
all responding agents involved in the dialogue have accepted the proposal (see Definition B.4
in Appendix B). The revision do(confirm(Actions)), which also occurs in CR12 and 13,
records in x’s state that the proposal dialogue instance has been ended (see Definition B.10 in
Appendix B).
(CR12 )
In12 = null
P12 = {valid(disconfirm(Z,Actions))}
Out12 = disconfirm(x,Z,Actions)
X12 = {do(confirm(Actions))}
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The agent (x) disconfirms a proposal (CR12 above) if the precondition valid(disconfirm(Z,
Actions)) holds. The precondition checks that all agents Z ′ to whom the proposal was made
have responded (with acceptance or rejection) but only a strict subset Z ⊂ Z ′ of agents
responded with acceptance (see Definition B.5 in Appendix B). The revision do(confirm(
Actions)) is similar as in CR11.
(CR13 )
In13 = null
P13 = {valid(disconfirm(∅,Actions))}
Out13 = null
X13 = {do(confirm(Actions))}
The agent knows that a proposal has ended unsuccessfully without having to utter disconfirm
(CR13 ) in the case of receiving rejection from all the agents to whom the proposal was made.
Receiving Confirm and Disconfirm Responses
(CR14 )
In14 = confirm(Y ,Z,Actions)
P14 = {x ∈ Z, valid(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions))}
Out14 = null
X14 = {exchangeResources(Actions), do(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions))}
In the case of receiving confirm (CR14 ), the agent (x) revises its state according to
exchangeResources(Actions). The precondition valid(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions))
checks that x is indeed awaiting a confirm or disconfirm utterance from Y (see Definition B.6
in Appendix B). The revision do(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions)) would record in x’s state
that it is no longer awaiting a confirm or disconfirm utterance from Y (see Definition B.11
in Appendix B).
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(CR15 )
In15 = disconfirm(Y ,Z,Actions)
P15 = {x ∈ Z, valid(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions))}
Out15 = null
X15 = {do(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions))}
In the case of receiving disconfirm (CR15 ), the agent (x) only needs to update its dialogical
status according to do(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions)), as given in CR14. The precondition
valid(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions)) is also similar as for CR14.
Lastly, dialogue instances and dialogue sequences generated by means of the communication
rules above are as follows:
Definition 5.8 (generated dialogue instance) We say that a dialogue instance is gener-
ated by (means of) communication rules CR1–CR15 if the agents utter dialogue moves making
up a sequence as in Definition 5.2 or 5.3 by applying the communication rules CR1–CR15.
Definition 5.9 (generated dialogue sequence) We say that a dialogue sequence is gener-
ated by (means of) communication rules CR1–CR15 if it is a dialogue sequence as in Defini-
tion 5.6 made up of dialogue instances generated by the communication rules CR1–CR15
5.4 Procedures
We give a definition of the “general procedures” occurring in the communication rules of the
previous section for our particular resource reallocation problem, i.e. such that agents can
generate dialogues between one another for the reallocation of resources in a way that their
individual resource reallocation problem (r.r.p.) is solved and, consequently, the r.r.p. of the
agent system as a whole is solved (where the r.r.p. for an individual agent and an agent
system are as given in Chapter 3). The resulting policy for some agent x is such that x is
willing to exchange a resource it has that solves its r.r.p. for another that solves its r.r.p.
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or is willing to give away a resource it has but does not need (i.e. if as a result of the deal
x’s r.r.p. will still be solved or unsolved, because the resource(s) to be given away do not
solve x’s r.r.p. or x has another resource that solves its r.r.p.). The policy we present is such
that reasons (arguments) are not presented with requests and proposals but only with refusals,
and the procedures hereafter are presented accordingly. Namely, whenever the procedures
generateRequest(Y ,Actions,Reason) and generateProposal(Z,Actions,Reason) evalu-
ate to true, the value of Reason instantiates to null and therefore we present the procedures
instead as generateRequest(Y ,Actions) and generateProposal(Z,Actions) respectively.
Accordingly, we write acceptableExchange(Actions) and ¬acceptableExchange(Actions,
ReasonOut) instead of acceptableExchange(Actions,ReasonIn) and
¬acceptableExchange(Actions,ReasonIn,ReasonOut) respectively. Whilst it would be use-
ful and necessary in the general case to allow the requesting or proposing agent to include
additional information along with its request or proposal, such as a plan which the responding
agent might not be aware of, the need does not arise in our setting since we assume plans to
be shared and known by all agents. As discussed in Chapter 5.1, the exact form arguments
take and how arguments are generated (by the ¬acceptableExchange(Actions,ReasonOut)
procedure) are left deliberately open/unspecified in this chapter to be grounded/instantiated
according to the argumentation framework of choice in Chapter 7.
It is important that agents can operate (i.e. initiate and respond to requests and proposals)
despite having only partial, incomplete and potentially incorrect (dated) information/beliefs
about other agents. Thus we employ a notion of “legitimate assumption” in the sense of a
presumption as discussed in Section 2.4. Moreover, it is important that an agent can make
inferences from its state to aid its decision-making (reasoning), as follows:
Definition 5.10 (assumptions and inferences) We denote that an agent x can legitimately
assume [L] or its negation ¬[L] as `xasm [L] or `
x
asm ¬[L] respectively, and that the inference
[L] or its negation ¬[L] follows from x’s state as `x [L] or `x ¬[L] respectively, where [L] and
¬[L] are sentences in a meta-language ML (see Definition 5.11).
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Definition 5.11 (meta-language for assumptions and inferences) The meta-language
ML consists of all sentences of the form [L] and ¬[L] where [L] takes one of the following
forms (for Y ∈ names(AS), R ∈ R, Rs ⊆ R):
• [Y has R];
• [the r.r.p. of Y is solved with R];
• [the r.r.p. of Y is solved];
• [the r.r.p. of Y would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R];
• [after giving away each resource in Rs, the r.r.p. of x would no longer be solved].
An inference `x [Y has R] or `x ¬[Y has R], where Y 6= x, could be legitimate, for example,
whenever has(Y,R) ∈ B(x) or has(Y,R) /∈ B(x) respectively. Further examples of the con-
ditions under which inferences could be legitimate for an agent can be found in Appendix C.
Generally, exactly when an assumption or inference (by means of `xasm or `
x respectively) is le-
gitimate depends on the underlying argumentation framework of choice. We do however expect
certain consistency properties of `xasm and `
x, as follows:
Postulate 5.1 (Consistency Properties of `xasm and `
x) For some sentence [L] ∈ ML,
the definition of `xasm and `
x should ensure the following consistency properties:
• It should not be possible that `x [L] and `x ¬[L];
• It should not be possible that `xasm [L] and `
x ¬[L].
We have assumed thus far that the agent’s beliefs are necessarily consistent (see Definition 3.1).
We will show in Chapter 7 how an argumentation framework can be used to achieve the desired
consistency properties of Postulate 5.1 even when the agent’s beliefs are not necessarily con-
sistent. We will show how the argumentation framework of Chapter 7 can be used to resolve
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inconsistencies in the agent’s beliefs, as well as for allowing an agent to make assumptions and
inferences in the absence of knowledge.
The procedure generateRequest(Y ,Actions) instantiates an exchange of resources Actions
to request of an agent Y (Y 6= x) if the r.r.p. of x is not solved. By virtue of the exchange x
would receive a resource that fulfils its goal (possibly also giving away a resource owned by x),
as follows:
Definition 5.12 (generateRequest(Y ,Actions)) The procedure evaluates to true instanti-
ating an intended recipient of the request Y and an exchange of resources Actions to request
if (1) the r.r.p. of x is not solved and fulfils(R,G(x)) ∈ B(x) for some R ∈ R; (2)
Y ∈ names(AS) and Y 6= x; and (3) Actions takes one of the following two forms:
(a) {give(Y ,R,x)}, if the following conditions hold:
(i) has(Y ,R) ∈ B(x) or
`xasm [Y has R]; and
(ii) `x [the r.r.p. of Y would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R] or
`xasm [the r.r.p. of Y would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R].
(b) {give(Y ,R,x), give(x,R′,Y )}, if the following conditions hold:
(i) has(Y ,R) ∈ B(x);
(ii) `x [the r.r.p. of Y is solved];
(iii) `x ¬[the r.r.p. of Y would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R];
(iv) `x [the r.r.p. of Y is solved with R′];
(v) R′ ∈ Res(x).
Otherwise, if the above conditions are not met, the procedure evaluates to false.
We note the following property about the generateRequest procedure:
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Lemma 5.3 (requests generated are Min CR from the requestor’s perspective) A
successful request dialogue instance initiated by x regarding Actions where Actions is an ex-
change of resources to request instantiated by the generateRequest(Y ,Actions) procedure of
Definition 5.12 is such that, from x’s perspective (i.e. according to x’s state), Actions is a set
of actions comprising a Min CR deal in which x is to increase in utility.
Proof. Firstly: x would increase utility as a result of Actions as its r.r.p. is not solved and
it is to receive a resource that solves its r.r.p. as part of the resulting deal. Secondly: Y , the
only other agent involved in the deal, would not decrease in utility according to x’s state. If
Actions is of the form {give(Y ,R,x)} this is because x can legitimately infer or assume that
the r.r.p. of Y would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R. If Actions is of
the form {give(Y ,R,x), give(x,R′,Y )} this is because x can infer that Y is to receive a
resource R′ that solves its r.r.p. Lastly: there is no exchange of resources Actions’ ⊂ Actions
such that Actions’ is cooperatively rational according to x’s state. If Actions is of the form
{give(Y ,R,x)} this is trivial. If Actions is of the form {give(Y ,R,x), give(x,R′,Y )}
this is because x can infer that {give(Y ,R,x)} would result in Y ’s r.r.p. becoming unsolved
and that {give(x,R′,Y )} would not increase the utility of any of the agents involved. 2
The procedure generateProposal(Z,Actions) instantiates an exchange of resources Actions
to propose to a set of agents Z if the r.r.p. of x is not solved. By virtue of the exchange x
would receive a resource that fulfils its goal (possibly also giving away a resource owned by x),
as follows:
Definition 5.13 (generateProposal(Z,Actions)) The procedure evaluates to true instanti-
ating a set of intended recipients of the proposal Z and an exchange of resources Actions to
propose if (1) the r.r.p. of x is not solved and fulfils(R2,G(x)) ∈ B(x); (2) Z ⊂ names(AS)
and x 6∈ Z; and (3) Actions is of the form {give(Y2,R2,Y1), . . . , give(Yn+1, Rn+1,Yn)}
for n > 1, {Y1, . . . , Yn+1} = {x} ∪ Z, Y1 = x, |Z| > 1, Y2, . . . , Yn ∈ Z, Y2, . . . , Yn all different,
Yn+1 ∈ {x} ∪ Z, Yn 6= Yn+1, R1, . . . Rn+1 all different, and satisfying the following conditions:
(a) for all Yi ∈ {Y2, . . . , Yn}),
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(i) has(Yi,Ri) ∈ B(x);
(ii) `x [the r.r.p. of Yi is solved];
(iii) `x ¬[the r.r.p. of Yi would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away Ri];
and
(iv) `x [the r.r.p. of Yi is solved with Ri+1];
(b) (i) Yn+1 = x and Rn+1 ∈ Res(x); or
(ii) Yn+1 ∈ {Y2, . . . , Yn−1}, and either has(Yn+1, Rn+1) ∈ B(x) or `
x
asm [Yn+1 has Rn+1];
or
(iii) Yn+1 /∈ {x} ∪ {Y2, . . . , Yn−1}, and either has(Yn+1, Rn+1) ∈ B(x) or `
x
asm [Yn+1 has
Rn+1], and either
• `x [the r.r.p. of Yn+1 would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away
Rn+1], or
• `xasm [the r.r.p. of Yn+1 would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away
Rn+1].
Otherwise, if the above conditions are not met, the procedure evaluates to false.
We note the following property about the generateProposal procedure:
Lemma 5.4 (proposals generated are Min CR from the proposer’s perspective) A
successful proposal dialogue instance initiated by x regarding Actions where Actions is an
exchange of resources to propose instantiated by the generateProposal(Z,Actions) proce-
dure of Definition 5.13 is such that, from x’s perspective (i.e. according to x’s state), Actions
is a set of actions comprising a Min CR deal in which x is to increase in utility.
Proof. Firstly: x would increase utility as a result of Actions as its r.r.p. is not solved and it
is to receive a resource that solves its r.r.p. as part of the resulting deal. Secondly: none of
the agents involved in the deal ({x} ∪Z) would decrease in utility according to x’s state. This
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is because for each give(Y ,R,Y ′) ∈ Actions we have Y ∈ {x} ∪ Z and x can legitimately
infer or assume that R does not solve the r.r.p. of Y or that Y has some other resource that
solves its r.r.p. or that Y is to receive some other resource that solves its r.r.p. as part of the
deal. Lastly: there is no exchange of resources Actions’ ⊂ Actions such that Actions’ is
cooperatively rational according to x’s state. This is because every atom give(Y ,R,Y ′) ∈
Actions is necessary for Actions to be cooperatively rational according to x’s state, as follows:
leaving out give(Y ,R,x) ∈ Actions means no agent increases utility in the resulting deal
according to x and leaving out any give(Y ,R,Y ′) ∈ Actions (Y ′ ∈ Z) means Y ′ decreases
utility in the resulting deal according to x. 2
The procedure acceptableExchange(Actions) determines whether the exchange of resources
in Actions is acceptable for x. We assume that agents are self-interested but generous, and so
we define this procedure so that x agrees to give away the resources required of it in Actions
(i.e. {r | give(x,r, ) ∈ Actions}) that it has if either its r.r.p. is still solved or unsolved by
doing so or it receives a resource in the exchange that fulfils its goal, as follows:
Definition 5.14 (acceptableExchange(Actions)) The procedure evaluates to true if given
Rs = { R | give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions }: (1) for each R ∈ Rs, R ∈ Res(x); and (2) any one of
the following conditions holds:
(a) for all R ∈ Rs, fulfils(R,G(x)) /∈ B(x), or
(b) there is some R /∈ Rs such that R ∈ Res(x) and fulfils(R,G(x)) ∈ B(x), or
(c) give( ,R′,x) ∈ Actions and fulfils(R′,G(x)) ∈ B(x).
Otherwise, if the above conditions are not met, the procedure evaluates to false.
We note the following property about the acceptableExchange procedure:
Lemma 5.5 (agents responding with acceptance do not decrease in utility) The
agent x responding to a request or proposal regarding Actions with acceptance according to
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the acceptableExchange(Actions) procedure of Definition 5.14 results in a deal in which x
does not decrease in utility.
Proof. A deal comprising a set of actions Actions is such that x only gives away resources
that do not solve its r.r.p. (Condition (2a) of Definition 5.14), or x has some other resource
which it is not giving away as part of the deal and which solves its r.r.p. (Condition (2b) of
Definition 5.14), or x is receiving a resource that solves its r.r.p. as part of the deal (Condition
(2c) of Definition 5.14). Each of these conditions implies that x is not to decrease utility in the
deal. 2
The procedure ¬acceptableExchange(Actions,ReasonOut) determines whether the exchange
of resources in Actions is not acceptable for x and instantiates an argument (ReasonOut)
justifying the decision, which may be because x does not have the resource R requested of it
or x’s r.r.p. will no longer be solved if it agrees to Actions, as follows:
Definition 5.15 (¬acceptableExchange(Actions,ReasonOut)) The procedure evaluates to
true instantiating an argument ReasonOut where ReasonOut takes one of the following two
forms:
(a) <¬has(x,R), Support>: if give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions, and R /∈ Res(x); or
(b) <[after giving away each resource in Rs, the r.r.p. of x would no longer be solved],
Support>: if Rs = { R | give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions } and (i) `x [after giving away each
resource in Rs, the r.r.p. of x would no longer be solved] and (ii) there is no give( ,R′,x)
∈ Actions such that fulfils(R′,G(x)) ∈ B(x).
Otherwise, if neither of the above conditions are met, the procedure evaluates to false.
We ignore in this chapter the exact information contained in the Support of the argument
and how it is represented. Intuitively it would contain some of the agent’s beliefs as well as
information about its allocted and needed resources. For example, in case (a) of Definition 5.15
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above, the Support would be expected to represent the information R /∈ Res(x). We show in
Chapter 7 how the argument ReasonOut in Definition 5.15 can be generated and instantiated
concretely for a given general-purpose argumentation framework.
The procedure exchangeResources(Actions) revises x’s owned resources and belief set as to
which agents have which resources according to Actions, as follows:
Definition 5.16 (exchangeResources(Actions)) The procedure revises x’s owned resources
Res(x) and belief set B(x) to produce a new set of owned resources Res′(x) and beliefs B′(x)
as follows:
Res′(x) = Res(x) ∪ { r | give( , r, x) ∈ Actions } − { r | give(x, r, ) ∈ Actions }
B′(x) = B(x) ∪ { has(y, r) | give( , r, y) ∈ Actions, y 6= x }
− { ¬has(y, r) | give( , r, y) ∈ Actions, y 6= x }
− { has(y, r) | give(y, r, ) ∈ Actions, y 6= x }
Note that the new set of owned resources computed is equivalent to the assignment of resources
to an agent following a successful dialogue instance as in Definition 5.5.
The procedure reviseBeliefs(Y ,Reason) modifies x’s belief base given an argument Reason
uttered to it by some agent Y . We define this procedure and the other procedures above
concretely in Chapter 7 by means of a general-purpose argumentation framework. We show
also how such an argumentation framework can be used to resolve contradictory beliefs (in-
consistencies in the agent’s belief set) so that explicit removing (cleaning) of beliefs to enforce
consistency is not necessary.
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5.5 Examples of Generated Dialogue Instances
We present in this section two examples demonstrating how agents could proceed with commu-
nication using the communication rules and procedures defined in this chapter. Note that we
do not assume any explicit turn-taking between the agents during communication, such that
agents are freely (simultaneously) initiating and responding to dialogues (see Example 5.4). In
order to ensure agents do not deadlock (in the sense that each agent is waiting for a response
from another and none can proceed), the communication rules pertaining to initiating dialogue
(CR1–CR2 ) have least priority, such that in a situation where the In and P conditions hold
for one of the communication rules CR3–CR15, then a rule in CR3–CR15 will be chosen for
application and not a rule in CR1–CR2. This ensures that an agent does not initiate dialogue
until/unless it has processed all incoming dialogue moves and could be achieved, for example, by
means of adding a condition requiring M(x) 6= ∅ in the valid(initiateDialogue(Actions))
procedure. Thus also, by means of this prioritisation, agents initiate dialogues with up-to-date
beliefs about the other agents, having processed all incoming dialogue moves.
We show firstly how the request dialogue instance of Example 5.1 could be generated following
an unsuccessful request dialogue instance by means of the communication rules and procedures
defined in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively.
Example 5.5 (Unsuccessful and Successful Request Dialogue Instances) Given the
agent system AS = (A,G,R) of Example 3.1 with A = {〈ag1, Res(ag1), G(ag1), B(ag1)〉,
〈ag2, Res(ag2), G(ag2), B(ag2)〉, 〈ag3, Res(ag3), G(ag3), B(ag3)〉}, G = {g1, g2, g3}, R = {r1,
r2, r3}, plans Pl as depicted in Figure 5.3, and such that
Res(ag1) = {r1}, Res(ag2) = {r2}, Res(ag3) = {r3},
G(ag1) = g1, G(ag2) = g2, G(ag3) = g3,
B(ag1) = {isAgent(ag2), B(ag2) = {isAgent(ag1), B(ag3) = {isAgent(ag2),
isAgent(ag3)} isAgent(ag3)} isAgent(ag2)}
∪ Pl ∪ Pl ∪ Pl
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we show how, over successive time points t0 to t5, ag2 could go about obtaining a resource (r1)
that fulfils its goal (g2) thus solving its own r.r.p. and, consequently, the r.r.p. of the agent
system as a whole (the solution as identified in Example 3.2):
• t0: Since ag2 has no beliefs about the goals and/or resources of both ag1 and ag3, ag2
can assume about either ag1 or ag3 that it has and does not need r1. Applying CR1 for
the instantiation of Y = ag1, ag2 utters
request(ag2, ag1, {give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
• t1: Since r1 solves the r.r.p. of ag1 and giving away r1 would mean the r.r.p. of ag1 is
no longer solved, ag2’s request is not acceptable for ag1. Applying CR4 ag1 utters
refuse(ag1, ag2, {give(ag1,r1,ag2)},
<[after giving away each resource in {r1}, the r.r.p. of ag1 would no longer be solved],
Support>
We ignore here the exact form Support takes and how exactly ag2 would revise its beliefs
according to the argument provided (to be defined concretely in Chapter 7). Assume
Support contains the information that ag1 has r1 but its goal is g1 (and r1 fulfils the goal
g1).
• t2: ag2 receives ag1’s refusal by CR8. Assume ag2 revises B(ag2) to include has(ag1,r1)
and goal(ag1,g1).
• t3: Knowing now that r2 solves ag1’s r.r.p., ag2 applies CR1 again for Y = ag1 and
makes a refined request such that the r.r.p. of both agents would be solved
request(ag2, ag1, {give(ag1,r1,ag2),give(ag2,r2,ag1)})
• t4: Now, ag1 can agree to ag2’s request because ag1’s r.r.p. would still be solved after the
exchange. Applying CR3 ag1 utters
agree(ag1, ag2, {give(ag1,r1,ag2),give(ag2,r2,ag1)})
and revises its state according to
exchangeResources({give(ag1,r1,ag2), give(ag2,r2,ag1)})
120 Chapter 5. Dialogues for Solving the Resource Reallocation Problem
g1
 
  
@
@@
r1 r2
g2
r1
g3
 
  
@
@@
r2 r3
Figure 5.3: Plans Pl in Example 5.5 (and as in Example 3.1).
such that Res(ag1) = {r2}.
• t5: ag2 receives ag1’s acceptance by CR7 and revises its state according to
exchangeResources({give(ag1,r1,ag2),give(ag2,r2,ag1)})
such that Res(ag2) = {r1}.
At this point, the r.r.p. of both agents is solved and neither agent initiates further dialogue.
We show next how the proposal dialogue instance of Example 5.2 could be generated by means
of the communication rules and procedures defined in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively.
Example 5.6 (Successful Proposal Dialogue Instance) Given the agent system of Ex-
ample 3.1 (and of the previous example) but such that the resource allocation is as follows:
Res(ag1) = {r1} Res(ag2) = {r3} Res(ag3) = {r2}
i.e. ag2 and ag3 have resources r3 and r2 respectively, and not r2 and r3 respectively as in the
previous example. Assume also that ag2 has beliefs as to the owned resources and goals of agents
ag1 and ag3 (i.e. has(ag1,r1), goal(ag1,g1), has(ag3,r3), goal(ag3,g3) ∈ B(ag2)).2 We
show how, over successive time points t0 to t6, ag2 could go about obtaining a resource (r1) that
fulfils its goal (g2) thus solving its own r.r.p. and, consequently, the r.r.p. of the agent system
as a whole:
• t0: ag2 is able to generate a proposal which it believes would leave the r.r.p. of all agents
solved. Applying CR2 it utters
2This could be, for example, a result of arguments (Reason) received in previous unsuccessful request dia-
logues initiated by ag2 with ag1 and ag3.
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propose(ag2, {ag1,ag3},
{give(ag2,r3,ag3),give(ag3,r2,ag1),give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
• t1: ag2’s proposal is acceptable for ag1. Applying CR5 it utters
accept proposal(ag1, ag2,
{give(ag2,r3,ag3),give(ag3,r2,ag1),give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
• t1: ag2’s proposal is acceptable for ag3 also. Applying CR5 it utters
accept proposal(ag3, ag2,
{give(ag2,r3,ag3),give(ag3,r2,ag1),give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
• t2: Applying CR9, ag2 receives the accept proposal utterance of ag1.
• t3: Applying CR9, ag2 receives the accept proposal utterance of ag3.
• t4: Applying CR11, ag2 utters
confirm(ag2, {ag1,ag3},
{give(ag2,r3,ag3),give(ag3,r2,ag1),give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
and revises its state according to
exchangeResources({give(ag2,r3,ag3),give(ag3,r2,ag1),give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
• t5–t6: Applying CR14 (separately), ag1 and ag3 receive the confirm utterance of ag2 and
revise their state according to
exchangeResources({give(ag2,r3,ag3),give(ag3,r2,ag1),give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
At this point, the r.r.p. of all agents is solved.
The examples above demonstrate the kinds of dialogue instances (sequences) that agents would
generate according to the negotiation protocols and policy defined in this chapter. It remains to
define concretely the procedures found in the communication rules and the arguments that are
generated and exchanged accordingly. This will be the focus of Chapter 7 for a general-purpose
argumentation framework. We discuss next some properties of the negotiation policy that are
independent of the argumentation framework used to ground the procedures.
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5.6 Properties of Generated Dialogue Instances
We present in this section some properties of the communication policy based on the commu-
nication rules and procedure definitions as given in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. In the lemmas and
theorems that follow we assume an agent system AS = (A,G,R) consisting of agents using
the communication rules CR1–CR15 according to the definitions of the procedures as given
in Definitions 5.12–5.16. We will say that an agent system results from a generated dialogue
instance as follows:
Definition 5.17 (agent system resulting from a generated dialogue instance) An
agent system AS ′ = (A′,G,R) results from a dialogue instance generated by the communi-
cation rules CR1–CR15 if each agent in A is revised (producing A′) according to the revisions
of the communication rules applied in generating the dialogue instance.
Note that the definitions of the control procedures occurring in the communication rules (see
Appendix B) are such that an agent’s resources do not change once it has initiated a request
or accepted a proposal until it receives a response (agree/refuse or confirm/disconfirm respec-
tively) and that dialogue instance ends, i.e. the agent is not engaged in two dialogue instances
simultaneously in which its resources could change. We assume also that the reviseBeliefs
procedure is defined such that an agent x adds beliefs regarding an agent Y and a resource R
or a set of resources Rs such that `x [the r.r.p. of Y is solved] and `x ¬[the r.r.p. of Y would
still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R] hold true only if x has been told by Y itself
as such by means of an argument uttered by Y as part of a dialogue move (dialogue instance).
Firstly, dialogue instances generated are such that no agents decrease in utility, as follows:
Lemma 5.6 (agents’ utilities do not decrease in a dialogue instance) An agent system
AS ′ resulting from a dialogue instance generated by the communication rules CR1–CR15 ac-
cording to the procedures of Definitions 5.12–5.16 is such that for all agents x ∈ names(AS),
uAS(x) ≤ uAS′(x).
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Proof. For all agents x not involved in the dialogue instance (i.e. neither initiator nor responder
in the dialogue instance), none of the communication rules will have been applied by x in
generating the dialogue instance. Therefore x’s resources are unchanged and uAS(x) ≤ uAS′(x).
Also, if uAS(x) = 0, then, trivially, uAS(x) ≤ uAS′(x). We show that this holds for an agent
x involved in the dialogue instance and such that uAS(x) = 1. Firstly, note that x’s owned
resources only change by means of the exchangeResources procedure which is called by x in
ending a successful dialogue instance, i.e. communications rules CR3 or CR7 if x is the initiator
or responder (respectively) of a successful request dialogue instance, and CR11 or CR14 if x
is the initiator or responder (respectively) of a successful proposal dialogue instance. Hence
these are the only cases we need to consider. In the case of x initiating a request or proposal
dialogue instance, we know by Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4 that the resulting exchange of resources will
not decrease x’s utility. In the case of x responding to a request or proposal with acceptance,
we know by Lemma 5.5 that the resulting exchange will not decrease x’s utility. 2
As a consequence of the result above we have that an agent’s utility will never decrease as a
result of any dialogue instance generated and, in particular, an agent that has one or more
resources that solves its r.r.p., at any point thereafter will always have in its possession at least
one resource that solves its r.r.p..
Secondly, an agent will never obtain another resource that solves its r.r.p. once it has one,
whether actively as an initiator of a dialogue instance or accidently as a responder of a dialogue
instance, except in exchange for a resource r it has if r is the only resource it has that solves
its r.r.p., as follows:
Lemma 5.7 (happy agent does not obtain more resources that solve its r.r.p.) Let
Rs = { R | fulfils(R,G(x)) ∈ B(x), R ∈ Res(x) } for an agent x ∈ names(AS) such
that |Rs| ≥ 1, i.e. x has at least one resource that solves its r.r.p. A successful dialogue in-
stance is generated regarding Actions where give( ,r,x) ∈ Actions for some r that solves the
r.r.p. of x only if |Rs| = 1 and give(x,r′, ) ∈ Actions for some r′ ∈ R such that r′ ∈ Rs.
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Proof. Firstly, x cannot initiate a request or proposal dialogue instance according to commu-
nications rules CR1 and CR2 (or, rather, the definitions of the procedures generateRequest
(Definition 5.12) and generateProposal (Definition 5.13)) since |Rs| ≥ 1, i.e. the r.r.p. of x
is solved. The only case to consider then is when x takes the role of responder in a dialogue
instance. Suppose y (y 6= x) is the agent initiating the dialogue instance. By Definitions 5.12
and 5.13, y will only initiate a dialogue instance such that give( ,r,x) ∈ Actions for some
resource r that solves the r.r.p. of x if give(x,r′′, ) ∈ Actions for some r′′ ∈ R and `y
¬[the r.r.p. of x would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away r′′]. Indeed y would
only make such an inference if told by x by means of an argument in a previous (unsuccessful)
dialogue instance, and x would only make such an utterance in case |Rs| = 1 and r′′ = r′. 2
The above lemma is useful for proving that successful request and proposal dialogue dialogue
instances generated by agents result in Min CR deals, as in the following two theorems:
Theorem 5.1 (successful request dialogue instances generated are Min CR) A suc-
cessful request dialogue instance regarding Actions generated by an initiating agent x and
a responding agent y is such that Actions is a set of actions comprising a Min CR deal
δ = (Res,Res′) where Res is the allocation before the dialogue instance and Res′ is the al-
location after the dialogue instance.
Proof. First of all, we know by Lemma 5.3 that an exchange of resources Actions to request
generated by x according to generateRequest(Y ,Actions) (Y = y) would increase x’s utility.
We know also by definition of generateRequest (Definition 5.12) that
• Actions is a non-empty set of atoms of the form give(A,R,B) as in Definition 5.2, i.e.
A,B ∈ {x, y}, A 6= B, R ∈ R, there is at least one give(A, , ) or give( , ,A) in
Actions for each A ∈ {x, y}, and there is at most one give( ,R, ) in Actions for each
R ∈ R; and
• r ∈ Res(x) for each give(x,r, ) ∈ Actions.
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Secondly, we know by Lemma 5.5 that if acceptableExchange(Actions) evaluates to true for
an agent, then that agent (y in this case) does not decrease in utility as a result of Actions. We
know also by definition of acceptableExchange(Actions) (Definition 5.14) that r ∈ Res(y)
for each give(y,r, ) ∈ Actions. Thus every resource to be given away by an agent (i.e. x
and y) in Actions is held by that agent. Lastly, x and y generate Res′(x) and Res′(y) accord-
ing to exchangeResources(Actions) (Definition 5.16) which is equivalent to Definition 5.5.
Moreover, Res′(z) = Res(z) for all agents z ∈ names(AS) such that z /∈ {x, y}. Thus, by
Corollary 5.1, δ = (Res,Res′) is a deal. It remains to show that δ is a Min CR deal. Since, by
Lemma 5.2, the only agents involved in the deal are x and y, and x increases in utility and y does
not decrease in utility, then δ is a CR deal. If |Actions| = 1, then δ is trivially a Min CR deal.
If |Actions| > 1, then, according to Definition 5.12, Actions is of the form {give(y,r,x),
give(x,r′,y)} (for some r, r′ ∈ R), `x [the r.r.p. of y is solved] and `x ¬[the r.r.p. of y would
still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away r]. For x to make such inferences, it must
have been told as such by y in a previous dialogue instance. Since, by Lemma 5.7, y would
never obtain a second resource that solves its r.r.p., then the set of actions {give(y,r,x)} ⊂
Actions does not comprise a CR deal. Also, the set of actions {give(x,r′,y)} ⊂ Actions
does not comprise a CR deal since no agents would increase utility. Therefore, Actions is a set
of actions comprising a Min CR deal. 2
Theorem 5.2 (successful proposal dialogue instances generated are Min CR) A suc-
cessful proposal dialogue instance regarding Actions generated by an initiating agent x and set
of responding agents Z is such that Actions is a set of actions comprising a Min CR deal
δ = (Res,Res′) where Res is the allocation before the dialogue instance and Res′ is the alloca-
tion after the dialogue instance.
Proof. First of all, we know by Lemma 5.4 that an exchange of resources Actions to propose
generated by x according to generateProposal(Z,Actions) would increase x’s utility. We
know also by definition of generateProposal(Z,Actions) (Definition 5.13) that
• Actions is a non-empty set of atoms of the form give(A,R,B) as in Definition 5.3, i.e.
A,B ∈ {x} ∪ Z, A 6= B, R ∈ R, there is at least one give(A, , ) or give( , ,A) in
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Actions for each A ∈ {x} ∪ Z, and there is at most one give( ,R, ) in Actions for
each R ∈ R; and
• r ∈ Res(x) for each give(x,r, ) ∈ Actions.
Secondly, we know by Lemma 5.5 that if acceptableExchange(Actions) evaluates to true for
an agent, then that agent (each of y ∈ Z in this case) does not decrease in utility as a result
of Actions. We know also by definition of acceptableExchange(Actions) (Definition 5.14)
that r ∈ Res(y) for each give(y,r, ) ∈ Actions where y ∈ Z. Thus every resource to be
given away by an agent (i.e. y ∈ {x} ∪Z) in Actions is held by that agent. Lastly, each agent
y ∈ {x} ∪ Z generates Res′(y) according to exchangeResources(Actions) (Definition 5.16)
which is equivalent to Definition 5.5. Moreover, Res′(y) = Res(y) for all agents y ∈ names(AS)
such that y /∈ {x} ∪ Z. Thus, by Corollary 5.1, δ = (Res,Res′) is a deal. It remains to show
that δ is a Min CR deal. Since, by Lemma 5.2, the only agents involved in the deal are
x ∪ Z, and x increases in utility and none of the agents in Z decrease in utility, then δ is
a CR deal. According to Definition 5.13, Actions is of the form {give(Y2,R2,Y1), ...,
give(Yn+1,Rn+1,Yn)} (n > 1, Y1 = x), `
x [the r.r.p. of Yi is solved] (for all 1 < i ≤ n)
and `x ¬[the r.r.p. of Yi would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away Ri] (for
all 1 < i ≤ n). For x to make such inferences, it must have been told as such by each
Y2, . . . , Yn in previous dialogue instances, and, by Lemma 5.7, none of the agents Y2, . . . ,
Yn could have obtained a second resource that solves its r.r.p. since then. Thus the set of
actions {give(Y2,R2,Y1), ..., give(Yi,Ri,Yi−1)} ⊂ Actions (for all 2 < i ≤ n) cannot
be cooperatively rational. Also, the r.r.p. of all agents in Z is solved and believed by x to
be solved, and, by Lemma 5.6, will never be unsolved. Thus, any (strict) subset of Actions
that does not contain {give(Y2,R2,x)} cannot be cooperatively rational since no agents would
increase utility in the resulting deal. Therefore, Actions is a set of actions comprising a Min
CR deal. 2
The above two theorems are sufficient to prove that all successful dialogue instances generated
by agents using the communication rules and procedures defined in this chapter result in Min
CR deals, as follows:
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Corollary 5.2 (successful dialogue instances generated are Min CR) A successful di-
alogue instance regarding Actions generated by an initiating agent x and set of responding
agents Z is such that Actions is a set of actions comprising a Min CR deal δ = (Res,Res′)
where Res is the allocation before the dialogue instance and Res′ is the allocation after the
dialogue instance.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 since dialogue instances
generated by agents are either request or proposal dialogue instances. 2
Lastly, by means of the result above we have the following result regarding dialogue sequences
generated by means of the communication rules and procedures:
Corollary 5.3 (successful dialogue sequences generated end with Min CR deals) A
successful dialogue sequence generated wrt an agent x and a resource r is such that the last di-
alogue instance generated in the sequence results in a Min CR deal.
The result above is an immediate consequence of Definitions 5.6 and 5.9, and Corollary 5.2.
5.7 Discussion
In multi-agent resource reallocation problems of the kind we consider in this thesis where
successive allocations of resources are to be arrived at (given an initial starting allocation of
resources) by the participating agents themselves with minimal disclosure of information, it is
vital that agents can communicate and agree on the exchanges of resources required, as well
as exchange information between one another as necessary. We have presented in this chapter
a mechanism for doing this exactly. Given representation of a resource reallocation problem
in terms of the agents, goals and resources involved according to the framework of Chapter 3,
we identify in this chapter how agents can interact and arrive at decisions (deals of the kind
described in Chapter 4) leading incrementally to an arrangement (allocation) where resources
are best utilised in the agent system, taking into consideration the initial setup. We have
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illustrated at various points in this chapter the kinds of dialogue that are possible between
agents and the communication exchanged between agents in arriving at exchanges of resources
involving two or three agents. Note that our illustrations consist of two or three agents only for
clarity of illustration and agent systems and deals (exchanges of resources) in our framework
are not restricted to consist of just two or three agents. On the contrary we envision that
the agents and resulting dialogues will take place in (Grid computing, scheduling/timetabling,
disaster response etc) systems consisting of large numbers of agents as described in Chapter 1,
Section 1.2 (and also Chapter 3, Section 3.5). In addition, note that the agent decision-making
and communication framework we present in this chapter is truly distributed, in accordance
with the kinds of problems we aim to solve, allowing agents to simultaneously engage in dialogue
instances as initiators and responders, and not relying on turn-taking nor a central controlling
agent to facilitate the communication between agents.
5.8 Conclusion
The results of Endriss et al. [EMST06] and indeed Chapter 4 contain sufficiency results for
agents to reach “optimal” allocations of resources. We have expanded upon this in this chapter
to address the important and complex problem of actually finding the necessary deals (ex-
changes of resources). We have presented in this chapter a distributed negotiation process
(policy) in which agents can identify and generate deals that are minimally cooperative ra-
tional whenever such deals exist. The negotiation policy which we present allows agents to
intermittently generate and request/propose exchanges of resources according to the different
contract types identified by Sandholm [San98] as each being necessary to avoid some of the
local optima that the others allow, but not sufficient in and of itself for reaching the global op-
timum: ‘O-contracts’ (a single resource is given by one agent to another), ‘S-contracts’ (single
resources are exchanged between two agents), ‘M-contracts’ (three or more agents each give
away a single resource) and ‘OCSM-contracts’ (a combination of the different contract types).
The need for ‘C-contracts’ (more than one resource given by one agent to another) does not
arise in our setting since single resources fulfil single goals. In extending our framework to allow
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for multiple resources to fulfil goals, this additional contract type will need to be catered for.
We address a number of the challenges highlighted by Rahwan et al. [RRJ+03] in present-
ing our generative Argumentation-Based Negotiation (ABN) framework. Firstly, we present a
rich communication and domain language that enables agent’s to exchange meta-information,
as well as information that describes outcomes. Namely, agent’s are able to express reasons
(arguments) regarding their beliefs and goals, as well as requests/proposals and responses re-
garding certain exchanges of resources. Secondly, we specify a protocol for each of our two
types of ABN dialogue (requests and proposals), constraining the use of the language and
governing the interaction of participants. We do so by specifying at each stage of a dialogue
instance who is allowed to say what. Our protocols are based solely on the utterances made
by agents rather than to the agents’ internal mental attitudes, hence constituting a public
syntax and pragmatics that can be enforced by an external regulator. Thirdly, we define the
agents’ internal specification (communication rules and associated procedures) to conform to
the protocols. In particular, agents are defined such that dialogues terminate, and terminate
successfully whenever successful termination is possible. Moreover, in addition to interpreting
and evaluating incoming requests/proposals regarding exchanges of resources and generating
outgoing requests/proposals and responses, as is minimally required in negotiation, our agents
are capable of generating and evaluating accompanying arguments (and updating their mental
states accordingly).
Note that the procedures in the communication rules and what exactly it means for an agent
to make assumptions, as well as the exact form arguments take and how these can be gener-
ated, has been left deliberately open in the negotiation policy defined in this chapter. We will
show in Chapter 7 how the negotiation policy can be grounded by means of a general-purpose
argumentation framework defined in the next chapter, and also what role such an argumenta-
tion framework can take to resolve an agent’s contradictory beliefs so that explicit removing
(cleaning) of beliefs (assumed in this chapter) is not necessary.
Chapter 6
Assumption-Based Argumentation for
Communicating Agents
In this chapter we extend the Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) framework of Dung et
al. [DKT09] (see Section 2.4.2) for multi-agent systems, such that agents can build acceptable
arguments according to a particular notion of acceptabilty, but which are also communicable
and can be understood by other agents in the agent system. We term our new framework
“Agent ABA” (AABA). We will use AABA in the next chapter to ground the argumentative
negotiation policy presented in the previous chapter.
6.1 Introduction
ABA is a general-purpose framework for argumentation, where arguments are defined as back-
ward deductions (using sets of rules in an underlying logic) supported by sets of assumptions,
and the notion of attack amongst arguments is reduced to that of contrary of assumptions.
Existing computational models (dispute derivations), such as that of Dung et al. [DMT07],
allow to determine the “acceptability” of claims under the semantics of credulous, admissible
extensions as well as under two sceptical semantics (of grounded and ideal extension). The dis-
pute derivations find a set of assumptions, to defend a given claim, by starting from an initial
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set of assumptions that supports an argument for the claim and adding defending assumptions
incrementally to counter-attack all attacks.
It is important to note that the dispute derivations of Dung et al. [DMT07] take place within
the mind of a single agent, between fictional proponent and opponent. Also, the resulting
arguments (sets of assumptions) are not built to be communicated to other agents, but rather
for an agent to determine within itself whether a claim is acceptable. In this chapter, we focus on
generalising the computational model for admissibility, called AB-dispute derivations [DMT07]
(see Section 2.4.2). The computational model we present is still a dispute derivation within
the mind of a single agent but such that the resulting arguments can be readily communicated
to other agents, similarly to enthymemes as presented by Hunter [Hun07]. Hunter argues
in [Hun07] that arguments presented by real-world agents normally only explicitly represent
some of the premises for entailing their claim and/or they do not explicitly state their claim.
It is argued that this is because there is some common knowledge that can be assumed by a
proponent of an argument and the recipient of it. This allows the proponent of an argument
to encode it by ignoring the common knowledge, and it allows a recipient of an argument to
decode it by drawing on the common knowledge.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 presents our generalised ABA framework and
introduces an example to be referred to throughout the chapter. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 describe
our generalised dispute derivation procedure used to build communicable arguments for a claim.
Section 6.4.1 demonstrates how exchanging communicable arguments can be useful in dialogue
between agents. Section 6.5 gives theoretical results. Section 6.6 presents a discussion of the
use of AABA for multi-agent systems as well as related work. Lastly, Section 6.7 concludes.
Note that we adopt a generalisation of ABA frameworks in this thesis, as originally presented
by Gaertner and Toni [GT08], whereby assumptions allow multiple contraries (i.e. c is a (total)
mapping from A into ℘(L)− {∅}, where any y ∈ c(x) is referred to as a contrary of x).
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6.2 Agent ABA Framework
Let 〈L,R,A, c〉 be an ABA framework as presented by Dung et al. (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2)
for some agent x in a given agent system. In the spirit of Hunter [Hun07], with the view of
allowing agents to exchange arguments and assuming that all agents in an agent system use the
same common knowledge, we partition R for x into Rc and R
p
x (i.e. Rc∩R
p
x = ∅, Rc∪R
p
x = R)
and propose an agent assumption-based argumentation (AABA) framework 〈L, Rc, R
p
x, A, c〉,
where Rc is meant to contain knowledge common to all the agents and R
p
x is meant to contain
personal beliefs of x not necessarily shared by other agents.
Definition 6.1 (AABA framework) An AABA framework 〈L, Rc, R
p
x, A, c〉 for an agent
x is such that Rc ∩R
p
x = ∅ and 〈L, Rc ∪R
p
x, A, c〉 is an ABA framework.
In what follows, we use AF to refer to an ABA framework 〈L, Rc∪R
p
Ag, A, c〉 for some generic
agent (named) Ag and AFAg to refer to an AABA framework 〈L, Rc, R
p
Ag, A, c〉 for Ag. We
restrict RpAg to containing facts only (i.e. inference rules of the form l0 ← , see Section 2.4.2 in
Chapter 2) and refer to these as personal facts. As we will see in Chapter 7, this is sufficient
for realising dialogues as given in Chapter 5. Note that A ∩RpAg = ∅, since we work with flat
frameworks (see Section 2.4.2 in Chapter 2).
The generalised procedures for building arguments, which we present in Sections 6.3 and 6.4,
are such that the necessary personal facts of an agent are accumulated, as well as the necessary
assumptions. In standard ABA instead, only the assumptions are accumulated.
Note that we assume L (as well as A and c) is common to all agents in an agent system as
communication (or, rather, arguments) exchanged between the agents in the system will consist
of sentences in L.
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6.2.1 Example — Exchanging appointments between agents
We introduce here an example to be used throughout the remainder of this chapter to demon-
strate our AABA framework. The example represents situations where agents may need to
exchange appointments, e.g. on behalf of patients, and providing arguments would be useful
for coming to agreement on whether to exchange an appointment or not. This setting has been
touched upon in examples in previous chapters — Examples 3.1 and 5.5 in particular.
Consider two AABA frameworks AFx = 〈L, Rc, R
p
x, A, c〉 and AFy = 〈L, Rc, R
p
y, A, c〉 for
agents x and y respectively.
The language L \ A consists of all ground instances of the following schemata:
• sa(Ag1, Ag2, App1, App2), i.e. agents Ag1 and Ag2 should swap appointments App1 and
App2;
• r(Ag,G), i.e. agent Ag requires G to be fulfilled;
• fr(App,G), i.e. appointment App fulfils requirement G;
• l(Ag,App), i.e. agent Ag likes appointment App;
• h(Ag,App), i.e. agent Ag has appointment App;
• ¬cs(Ag,App1, App2), i.e. agent Ag cannot swap appointment App1 for App2.
The set of assumptions A consists of all ground instances of the following schemata:
• ¬l(Ag,App), i.e. agent Ag does not like appointment App;
• cs(Ag,App1, App2), i.e. agent Ag can swap appointment App1 for App2.
The contraries are as follows:
• c(¬l(Ag,App)) = {l(Ag,App)};
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• c(cs(Ag,App1, App2)) = {¬cs(Ag,App1, App2)}.
Rc consists of inference rules R1–R3 below. There, Ag, Ag1 and Ag2 can be any agents.
R1 : sa(Ag1, Ag2, App1, App2)← h(Ag1, App1), l(Ag1, App2),
¬l(Ag1, App1), cs(Ag2, App2, App1)
Namely, Ag1 and Ag2 should swap App1 and App2 if, it is believed, Ag1 has App1 and Ag1
likes App2, and, it is assumed, Ag1 dislikes App1 and Ag2 can swap App2 for App1.
R2 : l(Ag,App)← r(Ag,G), fr(App,G)
Namely, Ag likes App if, it is believed, Ag requires G to be fulfilled and App fulfils G.
R3 : ¬cs(Ag,App1, App2)← h(Ag,App1), l(Ag,App1), ¬l(Ag,App2)
Namely, Ag cannot swap App1 for App2 if, it is believed, Ag has and likes App1, and, it is
assumed, Ag dislikes App2.
We could include additional inference rules, for example, for the case that an agent cannot
swap an appointment it does not have or to allow agents to have multiple requirements, but
the above three inference rules will be sufficient to demonstrate the AABA framework as is the
focus of the chapter.
The personal facts of agents x and y are as follows:
Rpx = {h(x, app1), h(y, app2), r(x, seeDrAli), fr(app1, fridayApp), fr(app2, seeDrAli)}
Rpy = {h(y, app2), r(y, fridayApp), fr(app2, fridayApp), fr(app2, seeDrAli)}
In general, agents may have incorrect, out of date, or inconsistent beliefs. However, we assume
here, for the sake of simplicity of demonstration, that agents have correct beliefs about the
appointments allocated to themselves and other agents. Our focus in this example are agents
that have incomplete information. Indeed, e.g. y has no knowledge of x’s appointments and
goals. The assumptions in this example allow an agent to reason under the uncertainty due to
incomplete information. In particular, an agent can make assumptions about an agent (itself
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or another) not liking a certain appointment or being able to swap appointments until/unless
it is told or knows otherwise.
6.3 Fact-supported Arguments
We generalise for our AABA framework the notion of an argument that has a support consisting
of assumptions only as in conventional ABA (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2). We will define
arguments as deductions for sentences with a support consisting of assumptions as well as
personal facts. We define first finite (deduction) trees adapted from Dung et al. [DKT09] and
then a specific kind of such trees that is of interest in this chapter. The symbol τ represents
an extra-logical symbol not in L.
Definition 6.2 (finite deduction tree) Given an AABA framework AFAg, a finite (deduc-
tion) tree T for p ∈ L (the conclusion or claim) is as follows:
• the root of T is labelled by p and denoted root(T )
• for every node N of T
– if N is a leaf then N is labelled by a sentence in L or by τ ;
– if N is not a leaf and lN is the label of N , then there is an inference rule lN ←
b1, . . . , bm (m ≥ 0) in Rc and
either m = 0 and the child of N is labelled by τ
or m > 0 and N has m children, labelled by b1, . . . , bm (respectively)
• the set of sentences, not including τ , labelling the leaves of T is denoted leaves(T ).
Nodes in a tree as above are connected by the inference rules, with sentences matching the
conclusion of an inference rule connected as parent nodes to sentences matching the premises of
the inference rule as children nodes. Finite deduction trees as above differ from a deduction tree
in Definition 2 of [DKT09] in that, firstly, only the inference rules in the common knowledge are
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l(x, app2)
 
  
@
@@
r(x, seeDrAli) fr(app2, seeDrAli)
Figure 6.1: A f-argument for l(x, app2) with support {r(x, seeDrAli), fr(app2, seeDrAli)} wrt AFx
as defined in Section 6.2.1.
used in the definition above to produce new branches and, secondly, the leaves in the definition
above may be non-assumptions as well as assumptions. This is different from [DKT09] where,
firstly, all rules are used to produce new branches and, secondly, only assumptions are leaves.
We define next fact-supported arguments (abbreviated ‘f-arguments ’) for a claim p with support
S consisting only of assumptions and personal facts as finite trees with p at the root and S at
the leaves.
Definition 6.3 (f-argument) Given an AABA framework AFAg, a f-argument for p ∈ L
(the conclusion or claim) with support S ⊆ A ∪ RpAg is a finite (deduction) tree T where
root(T ) = p and leaves(T ) = S.
We illustrate in Figure 6.1 a finite tree that is a f-argument. F-arguments for a claim can be
computed by means of backward deductions defined as follows:
Definition 6.4 (backward deduction) Given an AABA framework AFAg and a selection
function f : 2L → L,1 a backward deduction of S ⊆ A ∪ RpAg for a claim p ∈ L according to
AFAg (wrt f) is a finite sequence of tuples
〈C0, S0〉, . . . , 〈Ci, Si〉, . . . , 〈Cn, Sn〉
where n ≥ 1, C0 = {p}, S0 = Cn = ∅, Sn = S, and, for every 0 ≤ i < n, if f(Ci) = σ, then
1. If σ ∈ RpAg or σ ∈ A, then
• Ci+1 = Ci − {σ}
1A selection function f takes as input a set of sentences Ci and returns a single element σ from Ci.
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• Si+1 = Si ∪ {σ}
2. Otherwise, choose σ ← b1, . . . , bm ∈ Rc and
• Ci+1 = (Ci − {σ}) ∪ {b1, . . . , bm}
• Si+1 = Si
We write S `f
AFAg
p if there exists a backward deduction of S for p according to AFAg (wrt
f).2
Backward deductions, as defined above, are a generalisation of SLD resolution (and also deduc-
tions of conclusions based on sets of premises as in Defition 2.2 of [DKT06]), which is the basis
of proof procedures for logic programming. As in SLD, if there is a backward deduction using
one selection function for picking sentences in Ci, then there is a backward deduction using any
other selection function. Thus, different selection functions are simply different but equivalent
ways of generating the same argument for a claim. A backward deduction as above differs
from an argument (“a deduction whose premises are all assumptions”) as in [DKT06] in that
arguments in [DKT06] are only supported by assumptions whereas our backward deductions
are supported by non-assumptions (personal facts of the agent) as well as assumptions.
The following example illustrates the notion of backward deduction.
Example 6.1 (backward deduction) Given the AABA framework AFx from Section 6.2.1,
a backward deduction
{r(x, seeDrAli), fr(app2, seeDrAli)} `AFx l(x, app2)
built by x affirming that it likes app2 is obtained as shown in Table 6.1 and described here:
• At step i = 0, R2 ∈ Rc is chosen in applying Case 2 of Definition 6.4.
2We write `AFAg instead of `
f
AFAg
where the particular selection function is unimportant in the given
context.
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i Ci Si Apply. . .
0 {l(x, app2)} ∅ Case 2
1 {r(x, seeDrAli), fr(app2, seeDrAli)} ∅ Case 1
2 {fr(app2, seeDrAli)} {r(x, seeDrAli)} Case 1
3 ∅ {r(x, seeDrAli), fr(app2, seeDrAli)}
Table 6.1: Backward deduction for l(x, app2) according to AFx where AFx is as defined in Sec-
tion 6.2.1. The underlined atoms are picked by the selection function.
• At step i = 1, Case 1 is applied since r(x, seeDrAli) ∈ Rpx.
• At step i = 2, Case 1 is applied since fr(app2, seeDrAli) ∈ Rpx.
In Definition 6.4, we use the word “choose” to identify backtrackable points in the search for a
backward deduction. The need for this is illustrated by the following example:
Example 6.2 (backtracking in the search for a backward deduction) Consider an
AABA framework AFx for some agent x with
L = {p, q, r}, A = ∅, Rc = {p← q} ∪ {p← r}, R
p
x = {r}
If in the search for a backward deduction for p, p← q ∈ Rc is chosen when applying case 2 of
Definition 6.4, then, since q /∈ Rpx, q /∈ A and there is no inference rule q ← b1, . . . , bm ∈ Rc, the
search for a backward deduction needs to backtrack and choose p← r ∈ Rc, leading eventually
to {r} `AFx p.
We end this section by proving the relationship between f-arguments and backward deductions.
Lemma 6.1 If, for some selection function f , there is a backward deduction S `f
AFAg
p, then
there is a f-argument for p with support S wrt AFAg.
Lemma 6.2 If there is a f-argument for p with support S wrt AFAg, then there is a backward
deduction S `f
AFAg
p for any selection function f .
The proofs of Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 can be found in Appendix D.
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6.4 Computation of Admissible Arguments
The AB-dispute derivations (which we abbreviate ‘dds’) of Dung et al. [DMT07] (see Defi-
nition 2.10) can be used to construct an admissible set of assumptions supporting a claim.
We generalise this for AABA frameworks and present a new computational model, which we
call fact-inclusive AB-dispute derivations (abbreviated ‘fdds’), that constructs an admissible
defence for a claim as well as personal facts used during the construction. These derivations,
similar to dds, can be seen as a game between two fictional players - a proponent and an oppo-
nent. The rules of the game are roughly as follows: the proponent puts forward a f-argument
for a claim; the opponent disputes the proponent’s argument by presenting f-arguments attack-
ing assumptions of the proponent’s argument; the proponent in turn defends its argument by
counter-attacking the opponent’s attacks with other f-arguments, which the opponent in turn
attacks, and so on, until the proponent has defended itself against all attacks.
As for dds, in conducting this game, the proponent cannot attack any of its own assumptions,
nor does it need to counter-attack any assumption it has attacked previously, nor does it need
to defend any assumption it has already defended. Differently from dds, in fdds, f-arguments
are fully constructed before being attacked. Thus only actual f-arguments are manipulated
(rather than “potential”, see [GT08]). Also, in fdds unlike dds, the proponent keeps track of
personal facts used in its arguments. Together, the assumptions and personal facts used by the
proponent make up its defence for a claim.
We define a fdd as a sequence of tuples of the form 〈Pi,Oi,Di, Ci〉. Such a tuple represents the
state of the derivation at the ith step and is to be read as follows: Pi is a set of sentences, the
claims of the proponent to be expanded and defended; Oi are the sets consisting of personal
facts and assumptions that support attacks of the opponent on assumptions of the proponent,
and each such set is to be attacked by the proponent; Di (Defences) is the set of personal
facts and assumptions encountered so far in the derivation sequence that support the claims of
the proponent; Ci (Culprits) is the set of assumptions of the opponent that have already been
attacked by the proponent.
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Definition 6.5 (fact-inclusive AB-dispute derivation) Given an AABA framework AFAg,
and selection functions f : 2L → L and g : 22
L
→ 2L,3 a fdd of a defence set D ⊆ A∪RpAg for
a set of sentences P ⊆ L according to AFAg (wrt f and g) is a finite sequence of tuples
〈P0,O0,D0, C0〉, . . . , 〈Pi,Oi,Di, Ci〉, . . . , 〈Pn,On,Dn, Cn〉
where P0 = P, D0 = P ∩ (A ∪ R
p
Ag), O0 = C0 = ∅, Pn = On = ∅, Dn = D, and, for every
0 ≤ i < n, only one f(Pi) = σ or one g(Oi) = Σ is picked
4 and
1. If f(Pi) = σ is picked, then
(a) if σ ∈ RpAg, then
• Pi+1 = Pi − {σ}
• Oi+1 = Oi
• Di+1 = Di
• Ci+1 = Ci
(b) if σ ∈ A, then
• Pi+1 = Pi − {σ}
• Oi+1 = Oi ∪ {S | σ
′ ∈ c(σ), S `f
AFAg
σ′, S ∩ Ci = ∅ } (filtering of culprits by
culprits)
• Di+1 = Di
• Ci+1 = Ci
(c) if σ /∈ A∪RpAg, choose a backward deduction S `
f
AFAg
σ such that S∩Ci = ∅ (filtering
of defences by culprits), then
• Pi+1 = (Pi − {σ}) ∪ ((S ∩ A)−Di) (filtering of defences by defences)
• Oi+1 = Oi
• Di+1 = Di ∪ S
3f takes as input a set of sentences Pi and returns a single element σ ∈ Pi, while g takes as input a set of
sets of sentences Oi and returns a single element Σ ∈ Oi.
4Depending on the player choice, as discussed later.
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• Ci+1 = Ci
2. If g(Oi) = Σ is picked, then
(a) if Σ ∩ Ci 6= ∅ (filtering of culprits by culprits), then
• Pi+1 = Pi
• Oi+1 = Oi − {Σ}
• Di+1 = Di
• Ci+1 = Ci
(b) if Σ ∩ Ci = ∅, choose σ ∈ Σ such that σ ∈ A and σ /∈ Di (filtering of culprits by
defences), and choose σ′ ∈ c(σ), then
• Pi+1 = Pi ∪ {σ
′}
• Oi+1 = Oi − {Σ}
• Di+1 = Di ∪ ({σ
′} ∩ (A ∪RpAg))
• Ci+1 = Ci ∪ {σ}
We write D |=f,g
AFAg
P if there exists a fdd of D for P according to AFAg (wrt f and g). We
write D |=f,g
AFAg
p if P = {p}. 5
Similarly to Definition 6.4, we use the word “choose” in Definition 6.5 above to identify back-
trackable points in the search for a fdd.
Intuitively, two choices (at least) have to be made at each step in a derivation. First, a (fictional)
player must be chosen: either the proponent (Pi) or the opponent (Oi). If the proponent is
chosen, then a sentence σ in Pi is picked and one of three cases (1a, 1b or 1c) apply. If the
opponent is chosen, then a set Σ in Oi is picked and one of two cases (2a or 2b) apply.
In case 1a, the proponent plays and σ is a personal fact: this is simply removed from the
proponent’s set. Indeed, σ will have been added to the defence set previously.
5We write |=AFAg instead of |=
f,g
AFAg
where the particular selection functions are unimportant in the given
context.
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In case 1b, the proponent plays and σ is an assumption: this is removed from the proponent’s
set and all (suppports of) f-arguments that attack σ and contain no culprit assumptions are
added to the opponent’s set.
In case 1c, the proponent plays and σ is neither a personal fact nor an assumption: σ is removed
from the proponent’s set and, choosing a support S for σ that contains no culprit assumptions,
replaced by the assumptions of S after the defence assumptions have been filtered.
In case 2a, the opponent plays and Σ contains a culprit assumption: Σ is simply removed from
the opponent’s set, as it has already been counter-attacked.
In case 2b, the opponent plays and Σ contains no culprit assumptions: Σ is removed from the
opponent’s set. A non-defence (trivially non-culprit) assumption σ in Σ is chosen and added
to the set of culprits. Also, a contrary σ′ of σ is chosen, added to the proponent’s set and, if σ′
is a personal fact or assumption, also added to the defence set.
We demonstrate in Examples 6.3 and 6.4 below a successful and a failed (respectively) fdd.
Here and in the remainder of the chapter, “fdd of D for p” will stand for “fdd of D for {p}”.
Example 6.3 (successful fdd) Given the AABA framework AFx of Section 6.2.1, a fdd
S |=AFx sa(x, y, app1, app2) is obtained as shown in Table 6.2 and described as follows:
• At step i = 0, sa(x, y, app1, app2) ∈ P0 is picked and S `AFx sa(x, y, app1, app2) cho-
sen in applying Case 1c, where S = {h(x, app1), r(x, seeDrAli), fr(app2, seeDrAli),
¬l(x, app1), cs(y, app2, app1).
• At step i = 1, ¬l(x, app1) ∈ P1 is picked and Case 1b applied. Note that c(¬l(x, app1)) =
{l(x, app1)} and l(x, app1) has no support in AFx, hence O2 = O1 = ∅.
• At step i = 2, cs(y, app2, app1) ∈ P2 is picked and Case 1b applied. Note that c(cs(y, app2,
app1)) = {¬cs(y, app2, app1)} and ¬cs(y, app2, app1) has no support in AFx, hence O3 =
O2 = ∅.
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i Pi Oi Di Ci Apply. . .
0 {sa(x, y, app1, app2)} ∅ ∅ ∅ Case 1c
1 {¬l(x, app1), cs(y, app2, app1)} ∅ S ∅ Case 1b
2 {cs(y, app2, app1)} ∅ S ∅ Case 1b
3 ∅ ∅ S ∅
Table 6.2: Fdd for sa(x, y, app1, app2) according to AFx where AFx is as defined in Section 6.2.1.
S = {h(x, app1), r(x, seeDrAli), fr(app2, seeDrAli), ¬l(x, app1), cs(y, app2, app1)}. The underlined
atoms are picked by f .
Note that S includes facts to be communicated, which would not be accumulated by the dd
procedure.
Example 6.4 (failed fdd attempt) Given the AABA framework AFy of Section 6.2.1 but
such that additionally h(x, app1), r(x, seeDrAli) ∈ Rpy, a fdd for sa(x, y, app1, app2) according
to AFy cannot be found, as shown in Table 6.3 and described as follows:
• At step i = 0, sa(x, y, app1, app2) ∈ P0 is picked and S `AFy sa(x, y, app1, app2) chosen
in applying Case 1c of Definition 6.5 (where S is as in Example 6.3).
• At step i = 1, cs(y, app2, app1) ∈ P1 is picked and Case 1b applied. Note that c(cs(y, app2,
app1)) = {¬cs(y, app2, app1)} and S ′ is the only support for ¬cs(y, app2, app1) in AFy,
hence O2 = O1 ∪ {S
′} (where S ′ = {h(y, app2), r(y, fridayApp), fr(app2, fridayApp),
¬l(y, app1)}).
• At step i = 2, S ′ ∈ O2 is picked and in applying Case 2b, (the only assumption)
¬l(y, app1) ∈ S ′ and (the only contrary) l(y, app1) ∈ c(¬l(y, app1)) chosen.
• At step i = 3, picking l(y, app1) ∈ P3, the fdd fails since none of the cases 1a to 1c are
applicable for l(y, app1) according to AFy. In particular, l(y, app1) /∈ R
p
y nor is there a
support for l(y, app1) in AFy. Further, there are no points in the derivation sequence
where backtracking can be successfully applied.
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i Pi Oi Di Ci Apply. . .
0 {sa(x, y, app1, app2)} {} {} {} Case 1c
1 {¬l(x, app1), cs(y, app2, app1)} {} S {} Case 1b
2 {¬l(x, app1)} {S′} S {} Case 2b
3 {¬l(x, app1), l(y, app1)} {} S {¬l(y, app1)}
Table 6.3: Attempt to build a fdd for sa(x, y, app1, app2) according to AFy where AFy is as defined
in Section 6.2.1. S is as defined in Table 6.2. S′ = {h(y, app2), r(y, fridayApp), fr(app2, fridayApp),
¬l(y, app1)}. The underlined elements are picked by f and g.
6.4.1 Example — Arguments in Dialogue
Fdds, giving D |=AFAg p, can be seen as a means of generating “communicable arguments” for
claims p to be exchanged between communicating agents. Note that typically these are not
f-arguments as they could include in D additional facts and assumptions needed to defend the
claim against attacks (see step t=3 in the example that follows below where the support of the
f-argument S |=AFx sa(x, y, app1, app2) is augmented with S
′′ to produce the fdd S ∪ S ′′ |=AFx
sa(x, y, app1, app2)). We refer to these “arguments” as fdd-arguments.
We demonstrate in this section how exchanging fdd-arguments between agents can be useful in
dialogue. Note that this section is solely for illustration and not intended to define a dialogue
game for argumentation. Whilst frameworks have been presented for argumentation-based
dialogue games, e.g. [Pra05], our work here in this chapter is orthogonal and presents instead
a means of representing and generating arguments that could be fed into such frameworks.
Given the AABA frameworks AFx and AFy of Section 6.2.1 and ignoring details of the com-
munication protocol and policy, we demonstrate how, by exchanging arguments, agents x and
y could come to an agreement that sa(x, y, app1, app2) is an acceptable action. Informally, the
dialogue between the two agents proceeds as follows:
x: We should swap app1 and app2 because . . . (reasons) . . .
. . . and I assume you can swap app2 for app1.
y: I cannot swap app2 for app1 because . . . (reasons) . . .
. . . and I assume app1 is no good for me.
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x: Ah, but app1 is good for you because . . . (reasons) . . . ,
hence we should swap app1 and app2.
y: Ok. I agree to the swap.
We show in Table 6.4 and explain here the fdd-arguments uttered by the agents and the beliefs
each agent adds to its personal facts as a result of the dialogue. The dialogue takes place over
time points 1–4. Time 0 is prior to the dialogue.
t=0: There is a fdd S |=AFx sa(x, y, app1, app2) (as derived in Table 6.2). However, there is
no fdd for sa(x, y, app1, app2) according to AFy.
t=1: x communicates its fdd-argument S |=AFx sa(x, y, app1, app2) to y and y revises R
p
y to
include h(x, app1) and r(x, seeDrAli), given in S. Then, y knows what x has and requires.
t=2: y can now build S `AFy sa(x, y, app1, app2). However, a fdd for sa(x, y, app1, app2)
according to AFy still does not exist, as shown in Table 6.3. The successfully attacking ar-
gument in the failed fdd sequence is S ′ |=AFy ¬cs(y, app2, app1). Then, y communicates this
fdd-argument to x and x revises Rpx to include r(y, fridayApp) and fr(app2, fridayApp), given
in S ′.
t=3: x can now build a f-argument S ′ `AFx ¬cs(y, app2, app1). However, this is not an
acceptable argument in AFx since the (only) assumption ¬l(y, app1) in S
′ has a contrary
l(y, app1) for which there is an acceptable fdd S ′′ |=AFx l(y, app1). By means of this defending
argument, a fdd S ∪ S ′′ |=AFx sa(x, y, app1, app2) exists. Then x communicates this fdd-
argument to y and y revises Rpy to include fr(app1, fridayApp), given in S
′′.
t=4: y is now able to build a f-argument S ′′ `AFy l(y, app1) as well as an acceptable fdd for
sa(x, y, app1, app2) according to AFy. Hence the agents end in agreement.
We present next properties of the AABA framework.
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t x utters. . . y utters. . .
1 S |=AFx sa(x, y, app1, app2)
2 S′ |=AFy ¬cs(y, app2, app1)
3 S′′′ |=AFx sa(x, y, app1, app2)
4 S′′′ |=AFx sa(x, y, app1, app2)
t Rpx plus. . . R
p
y plus. . .
1 h(x, app1), r(x, seeDrAli)
2 r(y, friApp),fr(app2, friApp)
3 fr(app1, fridayApp)
4
Table 6.4: Arguments exchanged between x and y regarding the acceptability of sa(x, y, app1, app2),
and respective changes to each agent’s personal facts. S and S′ are as defined in Tables 6.2 and 6.3
(respectively). S′′ = {r(y, fridayApp), fr(app1, fridayApp)}. S′′′ = S ∪ S′′.
6.5 Theoretical Results for AABA
In this section, we state the following main results for any ABA framework AF and corre-
sponding AABA framework AFAg:
• fdds correspond to (a variant of) the dds of Dung et al. [DMT07] (see Theorems 6.1
and 6.2, and Corollary 6.1);
• fdds are correct in that the assumptions in the defence of the input claims they compute
is indeed admissible (see Corollary 6.2);
• fdds are complete for p-acyclic ABA frameworks (see Corollary 6.3).
The variant of dds we use is as defined by Gaertner [Gae09]. The cases 2ic.1 and 2ic.2 of the
dds of Dung et al. [DMT07] (see Definition 2.10) are combined into one single case 2ic which
states:
Pi+1 = Pi ∪ {c(σ)}; Oi+1 = Oi − S; Di+1 = Di ∪ (A ∩ {c(σ)}); Ci+1 = Ci ∪ {σ}.
The variant is proven by Gaertner in [Gae09] to be correct, and to be equivalent to the original
version under the restriction that, when the contrary of an assumption is an assumption, its
original contrary is the original assumption. This restriction also held (implicitly) in [DMT07].
We prove our results for ABA frameworks where the contrary of every assumption is a singleton
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set. This can be done without loss of generality since there is a one-to-one correspondence
between such ABA frameworks and ABA frameworks with multiple contraries [GT08]. When
c(σ) is a singleton set {σ′}, we denote c(σ) simply as σ′, i.e. c(σ) = σ′.
Theorem 6.1 (fdd implies dd) If, using some selection functions f and g, D |=f,g
AFAg
p,
then, using some selection function f ′, there is a dd of D ∩A for p.
Theorem 6.2 (dd implies fdd) If, using some selection function f , there is a dd of a defence
set A ⊆ A for a claim p, then, for some selection function g, A∪F |=f,g
AFAg
p for some F ⊆ RpAg.
The proofs of Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 can be found in Appendix D.
Corollary 6.1 (fdd iff dd) If RpAg = ∅, then there is a fdd of a defence set D for p according
to AFAg iff there is a dd of D for p.
The proof of Corollary 6.1 follows straightforwardly from Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 above.
Corollary 6.2 (soundness of fdd) For every fdd of a defence set D = A ∪ F (A ⊆ A,
F ⊆ RpAg) for p ∈ L, the set of assumptions A is admissible and there exist some A
′ ⊆ A and
F ′ ⊆ F such that A′ ∪ F ′ `AFAg p.
The proof of Corollary 6.2 follows straightforwardly from Theorem 6.1 above and the soundness
theorem for dds (i.e. Theorem 4.3 of [DMT07], as formulated in [Gae09]).
We define a positively acyclic (or p-acyclic for short) ABA framework as in [DMT07]. By AF+
we denote the ABA framework obtained by deleting all assumptions appearing in the premises
of the inference rules of AF . The dependency graph of AF+ is a directed graph where:
• the nodes are the atoms occurring in AF+;
• a (directed) arc from a node p to a node q is in the graph if and only if there exists an
inference rule p← B in AF+ such that q occurs in B.
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Definition 6.6 (p-acyclic frameworks) An ABA framework AF is p-acyclic if the depen-
dency graph of AF+ is acyclic. An AABA framework 〈L, Rc, R
p
Ag, A, c〉 is p-acyclic iff
〈L, Rc ∪R
p
Ag, A, c〉 is p-acyclic.
Definition 6.7 (Partial Deduction) A partial deduction for a claim p, given a selection
function f , is a sequence 〈C0, S0〉, . . . , 〈Cj, Sj〉 where j ≥ 0, C0 = {p}, S0 = ∅ and each
〈Ci+1, Si+1〉 (0 ≤ i < j) is constructed from 〈Ci, Si〉 by picking f(Ci) = σ and applying case 1
or 2 of Definition 6.4.
Theorem 6.3 (no infinite partial deductions for p-acyclic frameworks) Given a
p-acyclic framework, there exists no infinite partial deduction.
The proof of Theorem 6.3 is trivial since there is a well-ordering of all sentences in the language
of p-acyclic frameworks, i.e. whenever a sentence belongs to the premise of an inference rule,
then the sentence is lower in ordering than the conclusion of the inference rule.
Theorem 6.3 guarantees that the search for a f-argument always terminates (either successfully,
finding such an argument, or not). In the case of p-acyclic frameworks with a finite underlying
language L the fdds are complete, in the following sense:
Corollary 6.3 (completeness of fdds) Let AFAg be a p-acyclic AABA framework such that
L is finite. Then, for each sentence l ∈ L, if l is an admissible claim then
• there exists a fdd for l according to AFAg;
• for each admissible set A ⊆ A, if, for some A′ ⊆ A and F ⊆ RpAg, A
′ ∪ F `AFAg l, then
there is a fdd D |=AFAg l such that A
′ ∪ F ⊆ D.
The proof of Corollary 6.3 follows straightforwardly from Theorem 6.2 above and the complete-
ness theorem for dds for p-acyclic ABA frameworks (i.e. Theorem 4.4 of [DMT07]).
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6.6 Discussion
We have proposed an extension to the ABA framework of Dung et al. [DKT09] for multi-agent
system settings where agents have some common knowledge but may also have some personal
beliefs not necessarily shared by all agents. Moreover, our extension of the ABA framework
ties in to the kinds of problems of interest to us in this thesis where agents need to interact —
constructing and sharing arguments between one another to come to agreement over actions to
be undertaken. In exchanging arguments between one another, agents would need to include
personal beliefs that the recipient agent may be unaware of and which could result in the
recipient agent revising its belief base and thus in turn revising its stance or position in an
interaction. In the context of a resource reallocation problem, as is the focus in this thesis,
these arguments might express, for example, why an agent is requesting a particular resource
(e.g. “I need it for my goal which is . . . ”) or why an agent cannot give away a particular
resource (e.g. “The resource is not currently free as it is allocated to . . . ”). Such arguments,
which would include only some (and not necessarily all) of the premises for entailing the claim,
can be seen as enthymemes [Hun07]. Notably, beliefs that are assumed by the utterer to be
common between it and the recipient(s) are omitted in contruction of an argument.
The benefits of allowing agents to exchange arguments can be found in many different types of
dialogues, e.g. information-seeking [DMWB06], inquiry [STT01, BH08b], negotiation [RRJ+03,
APM00, HT08, KJRM09], deliberation [MHP02] as well as of course persuasion [AMP00,
Pra05]. Thus a computational model that can generate communicable, acceptable arguments
as part of a larger dialogue is clearly needed. The computational model which we have set
out in this chapter is useful for this purpose exactly and for the purposes of the kinds of
distributed (resource allocation) applications which we consider in this thesis (see Chapter 1,
Section 1.2). Notably, to fit in and serve as the agent’s decision-making mechanism as part of
its negotiation (dialogue) policy for deciding upon deals (exchange of resources) to propose to
other agents and for evaluating deals proposed by other agents, and to generate communicable
arguments accordingly. Beside the framework which we aim to set up in this thesis, the only
other framework we are aware of which makes use of enthymemes in dialogue is that of Black
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and Hunter [BH08b]. However, there enthymemes are characterised in inquiry dialogues rather
than negotation dialogues, as is the focus in this thesis.
6.7 Conclusion
We have proposed a revised notion of ABA argument that accumulates an agent’s personal
beliefs as well as its assumptions. Accordingly, we have proposed a computational model for
generating admissible arguments, called fact-inclusive AB-dispute derivations (fdds), which
accumulates an agent’s personal facts as well as its assumptions. We have illustrated how such
outcomes of fdds could be usefully exchanged between agents in dialogue. In the next chapter
we will apply our framework and the exchange of arguments in the context of concrete inter-
agent communication, where consistency in the agents’ beliefs is not explicitly enforced and
agents may have inconsistent (internally or across agents) as well as incomplete beliefs.
Chapter 7
AABA Negotiation Policy for Socially
Optimal Resource Allocation
We complete in this chapter the generative agent policy of Chapter 5 which supports distributed
multi-agent resource reallocation amongst goal-driven agents. The policy specifies how agents
initiate requests or proposals, directed at one or more agents respectively, depending on their
beliefs about themselves and other agents. These beliefs may be partial, in that agents may
have incomplete knowledge about the goals and resources held by other agents. Agents also
need to take into consideration the possibility of resources changing hands between agents
and thus their beliefs becoming incorrect over time. Furthermore, the policy as completed in
this chapter does not require an explicit removing (cleaning) of the agent’s beliefs to enforce
consistency in the agent’s beliefs as assumed in Chapters 3 and 5 for when the agent engages in
dialogue instances. The policy relies on Agent Assumption-Based Argumentation (AABA) as
defined in Chapter 6 (i) to fill the gaps in the agents’ knowledge at request and proposal time,
(ii) to resolve inconsistencies arising in the beliefs of agents over time, and (iii) to compute
“reasons” (in the form of arguments) to be communicated to other agents. When agents share
from the onset knowledge as to which resources fulfil which goals, the policy allows to compute
socially optimal allocations (with a maximal number of agents obtaining a resource that fulfils
its goal) finitely and effectively.
151
152 Chapter 7. AABA Negotiation Policy for Socially Optimal Resource Allocation
7.1 Introduction
Argumentation-based negotiation is a particular class of negotiation allowing agents to provide
arguments and justifications as part of the negotiation process, thus increasing the likelihood
and/or speed of agreements being reached (see Section 2.3, Chapter 2). We focus in this
chapter on substantiating this claim, by showing how AABA can be used to realise the policy
of Chapter 5.
We consider the two types of dialogue introduced in Chapter 5 that agents use to try obtain
a needed resource. The first, a request, is a dialogue between two agents (an initiator and a
responder). The second, a proposal, is a dialogue between three or more agents (an initiator
and a set of responders). Agents agree to release resources they have but do not need or agree
to exchange a resource for another of at least equal value, and refuse otherwise. We allow
agents to provide “reasons” (arguments) with their refusals to other agents, thus filling in gaps
in their knowledge.
Whilst there has been discussion on protocols for argumentation-based negotiation (e.g. [vVP05,
RSD03]), little work exists on the agents’ decision making models to support argumentative
negotiation, i.e. how the agents would be built and the strategic reasoning that is to go on
in the agents’ minds to determine the best course of action at any given time. We adopt a
fully “generative” approach to negotiation, by providing constructive policies for the automatic
generation of dialogue instances by autonomously reasoning agents.
In order to be fully generative, our negotiation policy presented in Chapter 5 is complemented
here by AABA for defining and evaluating the conditions in the procedures of the communi-
cation rules constituting the policy. The evaluation includes the computation of arguments.
Moreover, AABA allows agents to make assumptions to complete their partial/incomplete be-
liefs when it is admissible to do so and to deal with inconsistencies arising over time from
conflicting information, as well as computing arguments to be provided with dialogue moves.
The chapter is structured as follows: In Section 7.2 we provide the core representation in AABA
of the (resource reallocation) agents in agent systems as given in Chapter 3, and generating
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dialogue instances as given in Chapter 5. In Section 7.3 we discuss properties of the agents
grounded in AABA. In Section 7.4 we give a concrete instantiation of the procedures for the
policies of Chapter 5 by means of AABA, and discuss the correlation between the two sets of
definitions. In Section 7.5 we present an example of the kinds of dialogue instances our AABA
agents would generate. Lastly, in Sections 7.6 and 7.7, we discuss related work and conclude.
7.2 Resource Reallocation Agents as AABA frameworks
Resource reallocation agents in our agent systems (see Definition 5.7) can be represented as
AABA frameworks combining an agent’s beliefs, owned resources, goal and dialogical status, as
well as introducing “reasoning rules” and “assumptions” needed to support/generate dialogue
instances. The elements of the AABA framework pertaining to an agent’s dialogical status, as
well as the “control procedures” outlined in Section 5.3, Chapter 5, can be defined in a number
of ways to guarantee its dialogical properties and, straightforwardedly, in a manner that is
independent of AABA. Thus we focus instead in this chapter on the elements of the AABA
framework needed to define the “general procedures” which are based on an agent’s beliefs, goal
and resources. We do, however, provide an example definition of an agent’s dialogical status
and the “control procedures” by means of AABA in Appendix E.
We refer to agent 〈x, , , 〉 as x, as throughout the thesis. An agent x can be represented in
AABA as a tuple AFx = 〈L, Rc, R
p
x, A, c〉 where
• (L,Rc ∪ R
p
x) is a deductive system, consisting of a language L and a set Rc ∪ R
p
x of
inference rules (Rc ∩ R
p
x = ∅) such that Rc contains knowledge common to all agents in
an agent system and Rpx contains knowledge personal (or private) to x, not necessarily
shared by all agents;
• A ⊆ L is the set of (candidate) assumptions ;
• c is a (total) mapping from A into ℘(L) − {∅}, where any y ∈ c(x) is referred to as a
contrary of x.
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A computational mechanism, called fact-inclusive dispute derivations (fdds), has been defined
in Chapter 6 for computing admissible supports (defences) for conclusions and this will be used
in this chapter in defining the procedures occurring in the communication rules of the policies.
We use the following terminology in this chapter: given some L ⊆ L,
• |=AFx L stands for “there exists a fdd of some defence set X ⊆ R
p
x ∪ A for L according
to AFx”;
• X |=AFx L stands for “there exists a fdd of defence set X for L according to AFx”;
• 2AFx L stands for “it is not the case that |=AFx L”.
Note that we write |=AFx L if |=AFx {L} as in Chapter 6, and likewise X |=AFx L and 2AFx L
for X |=AFx {L} and 2AFx {L} respectively.
Aside from the personal facts, as in Chapter 6, the other elements of the AABA framework are
intended to be shared between the agents in the agent system, such that agents can, to some
extent, reconstruct arguments exchanged between one another. Indeed the personal facts of an
agent is a belief set from which the agent’s belief base is derived.
We define now the elements that make up the agent framework for our negotiation domain,
beginning with the non-assumptions that make up the language, as follows:
Definition 7.1 (Non-assumptions in L) The non-assumptions L\A are (instances of) the
following schemata, for X, Y ∈ names(AS), R ∈ R, Rs ∈ 2R, G ∈ G, T ∈ N, L ∈ L:
• thisAgent(X), standing for “the agent’s own name is X”;
• isAgent(X), standing for “X is an agent other than itself in the agent system”;
• (¬) has(X,R), standing for “X has (does not have) resource R”;
• goal(X,G), standing for “X’s goal is G”;
• fulfils(R,G), standing for “resource R fulfils goal G”;
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• (¬) useful(R,X), standing for “R is (not) useful for X in that it (does not) fulfils X’s
goal”;
• needs(X,Rs), standing for “X’s r.r.p. is solved and would become unsolved if it simply
gave away the set of resources Rs, or is unsolved and would become solved if it obtained
Rs”;
• needsToRetain(X,Rs), standing for “X’s r.r.p. is solved and would become unsolved if
it simply gave away the set of resources Rs”;
• ¬needs(X,Rs), standing for “X’s r.r.p. is solved and would still be solved even if it
simply gave away the set of resources Rs”;
• gaveAwayAfter(X,R, T ), standing for “X has given away R at some point in time after
time T”;
• done(give(X,R, Y ), T ), standing for “X has given R to Y at time T”;
• uttered(X,L, T ), standing for “X has uttered L at time T”.
Note that thisAgent(X), isAgent(X), ¬has(X,R), has(X,R), goal(X,G) and fulfils(R,G)
as above correspond to literals in B(x). However, as we will see in defining Rc below (Defini-
tion 7.4), ¬has(X,R) and has(X,R) are not meant in AFx as primitive facts as they are in the
agent’s belief set B(x). Instead, ¬has(X,R) and has(X,R) are meant in AFx as inferences, as
are useful(R,X), ¬useful(R,X), needs(X,Rs), needsToRetain(X,Rs) and ¬needs(X,Rs).
Note also the asymmetry in the interpretation of needs(X,Rs) and ¬needs(X,Rs) above. This
will be explained when these sentences are used to define Rc below.
In the absence of beliefs about other agents and in the absence of contrary beliefs, by virtue of
their representation as AABA frameworks, agents are allowed to make assumptions about the
resources and goals that other agents have. The assumptions that make up the language are
as follows:
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Definition 7.2 (Assumptions and Contraries) The assumptions A (and their associated
contraries) in the language L are all instances of the following schemata, for X ∈ names(AS),
R ∈ R, Rs ∈ 2R, T ∈ Z:
• asm(has(X,R)), standing for “assume that agent X has resource R”,
with c(asm(has(X,R))) = {¬has(X,R)} ∪ {has(Y,R) | Y 6= X}
• asm(¬has(X,R)), standing for “assume that X does not have R”,
with c(asm(¬has(X,R))) = {has(X,R)}
• asm(¬useful(R,X)), standing for “assume that R does not solve the r.r.p. of X”,
with c(asm(¬useful(R,X))) = {useful(R,X)}
• asm(needs(X,Rs)), standing for “assume that X’s r.r.p. is solved and would become
unsolved if it simply gave away the set of resources Rs, or is unsolved and would become
solved if it obtained Rs”,
with c(asm(needs(X,Rs))) = {¬needs(X,Rs)}
• asm(¬needs(X,Rs)), standing for “assume that X’s r.r.p. is solved and would still be
solved even if it simply gave away the set of resources Rs, or is unsolved and would still
be unsolved even if it obtained Rs”,
with c(asm(¬needs(X,Rs))) = {needs(X,Rs)}
• asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(X,R, T )), standing for “assume that X has not given away re-
source R after time T”,
with c(asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(X,R, T ))) = {gaveAwayAfter(X,R, T )}
An agent x is initiated with facts in Rpx representing which resources it itself has and its goal,
as well as beliefs analogous to its beliefs in Definition 3.3 about the identity of the other agents
in the system and available plans. Beliefs as to the resources and goals of other agents would
be accumulated and modified (within Rpx) as a result of dialogues. Formally, an agent’s initial
personal facts are as follows:
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Definition 7.3 (Initial Personal Facts) The set of personal facts in Rpx for an agent x ∈
names(AS) are initially as follows
{isAgent(Y ) | Y ∈ names(AS), Y 6= x} ∪ PlAS(x) ∪
{done(give(x,R, x), 0) | R ∈ Res(x)} ∪ {goal(x, g) | G(x) = g}
The initial facts represent x’s beliefs (first two subsets), allocated resources (third subset) and
goal (fourth subset). Note that in our AABA representation has(X,R) and ¬has(X,R) are
not facts like they are beliefs in the belief set B(x). We will see in Section 7.3 how holding
facts regarding the exchange of resources between agents rather than which agents have (or do
not have) which resources directly allows us to deal with the possibilities of agents having and
communicating to one another conflicting claims as to which agents have (or do not have) which
resources, without requiring an explicit removing of facts from Rpx to maintain consistency.
Example 7.1 (Initial Personal Facts) Given plans Pl as in Example 3.1 as follows:
Pl = {fulfils(r1, g1), fulfils(r2, g1), fulfils(r1, g2), fulfils(r1, g3), fulfils(r3, g3}
and agent ag1 specified in Example 3.1 as follows:
Res(ag1) = {r1} G(ag1) = g1 B(ag1) = {isAgent(ag2), isAgent(ag3)} ∪ Pl
Then, initially, Rpag1 = {isAgent(ag2), isAgent(ag3), done(give(ag1, r1, ag1), 0), goal(ag1, g1)}
∪ Pl.
As a consequence of dialogues, agents modify their personal facts (and thus their representation
as an AABA framework) by adding facts about goals held by other agents, resources changing
hands between agents and assumptions uttered by other agents. We define now the general
purpose inference rules. These will be used in the next section along with the AABA fdd
mechanism for determining when claims and assumptions are “admissible” for an agent, for
158 Chapter 7. AABA Negotiation Policy for Socially Optimal Resource Allocation
computing fdd-arguments to be communicated accordingly, and thereby concretely defining
the procedures that make up the negotiation policy.
Definition 7.4 (General-purpose Inference rules in Rc) The set of general-purpose in-
ference rules Rc for an agent x ∈ names(AS) are all the instances of the following schemata,
for X, Y ∈ names(AS), R ∈ R, Rs ∈ 2R, G ∈ G, T, T ′ ∈ N:
gaveAwayAfter(X,R, T ) ← done(give( , R, Y ), T ′), X 6= Y , T ′ > T
has(X,R) ← done(give( , R,X), T ), asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(X,R, T ))
¬has(X,R) ← has(Y,R), X 6= Y
¬has(X,R) ← uttered(X, asm(¬has(X,R)), ), asm(¬has(X,R))
¬has(x,R) ← asm(¬has(x,R))
useful(R,X) ← goal(X,G), fulfils(R,G)
¬useful(R,X) ← asm(¬useful(R,X))
¬needs(X,Rs) ← has(X,R), R /∈ Rs, useful(R,X)
needs(X,Rs) ← R ∈ Rs, useful(R,X), asm(needs(X,Rs))
needsToRetain(X,Rs) ← R ∈ Rs, has(X,R), useful(R,X), asm(needs(X,Rs))
We describe in the remainder of this section the intuitive reading of the above inference rules
as well as demonstrating some of the benefits of an AABA representation of agents. We discuss
in Section 7.3 instead more formally properties of the inference rules and our AABA agents
defined as in this section.
The first general-purpose inference rule of Definition 7.4 allows an agent x to determine whether
an agent X (which may or may not be itself) has given away a resource R after a time T (i.e.
gaveAwayAfter(X,R, T )). This holds true if x has a belief (personal fact) that some other
agent Y has been given R at a time T ′ which is later than T . The first general-purpose inference
rule is used together with the second general-purpose inference rule above to determine whether
an agent X can be believed to have a resource R (i.e. has(X,R)). Indeed a backward deduction
exists for has(X,R) according to x’s personal facts if x has a belief that X has been given R at
a time T . However, has(X,R) is only considered an “admissible” claim for x if the assumption
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asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(X,R, T )) is admisssible for x, i.e. x does not have a contrary belief
that X has given R away at a time after T .
We demonstrate in the following three examples the conditions under which has(X,R) is and
is not admissible, as well as demonstrating the use of assumptions for completing an agent’s
information, the use of fdds for generating communicable arguments and how contradictory
assertions by agents as to which agents have which resources can be resolved by means of the
AABA framework without requiring facts to be removed from an agent’s personal facts.
Example 7.2 (has(X,R) and assumptions) Suppose an agent ag1 has no personal facts
about a resource r1 changing hands between agents (i.e. done(give( , r1, ), )) /∈ Rpag1), then
2AFag1 has(Ag, r1) for all agents Ag ∈ names(AS). It is also the case that 2AFag1 ¬has(Ag, r1)
for all agents Ag ∈ names(AS) such that Ag 6= ag1 and uttered(Ag, asm(¬has(Ag, r1)), ) /∈
Rpag1. Then, though ag1 has no facts as to which agent has r1, it can make the assump-
tion |=AFag1 asm(has(Ag, r1)) for all agents Ag ∈ names(AS) such that Ag 6= ag1 and
uttered(Ag, asm(¬has(Ag, r1)), ) /∈ Rpag1. We will see in Definitions 7.5 and 7.6 how such
assumptions are useful for an agent to initiate requests and proposals in the absence of infor-
mation.
Example 7.3 (has(X,R) and argument generation) Suppose a resource r2 has changed
hands from an agent ag2 to an agent ag3 at time 1, ag2 records this is in its personal facts (i.e.
done(give(ag2, r2, ag3), 1) ∈ Rpag2) and ag2 is not aware of r2 changing hands between agents
at a later time point. Then,
{done(give(ag2, r2, ag3), 1), asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(ag3, r2, 1))} |=AFag2 has(ag3, r2).
Indeed, the defence and claim of such a fdd make up a communicable argument (as understood
in Chapter 5)
(has(ag3, r2), {done(give(ag2, r2, ag3), 1), asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(ag3, r2, 1))})
which could be conveyed from ag2 to another agent to attempt to convince it that ag3 has r2.
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Example 7.4 (has(X,R) and inconsistency resolution) Suppose an agent ag1 has been
told by some agent that ag3 has r2 based on the fact done(give(ag2, r2, ag3), 1) but told also con-
tradictively by another agent that ag4 has r2 based on the fact done(give(ag3, r2, ag4), 2). Sup-
pose also that ag1’s personal facts Rpag1 include done(give(ag2, r2, ag3), 1), done(give(ag3, r2,
ag4), 2) and no other facts about r2 changing hands between agents. Then, the assumption
asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(ag3, r2, 1)) is not admissible for ag1 as it is for ag2 in Example 7.3,
there is no backward deduction for gaveAwayAfter(ag4, r2, 2) according to AFag1, and so,
{done(give(ag3, r2, ag4), 2), asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(ag4, r2, 2))} |=AFag1 has(ag4, r2).
The third, fourth and fifth general-purpose inference rules of Definition 7.4 allow an agent x to
(respectively) exploit beliefs on the single-unity of resources, determine when an agent X that
has previously said it does not have a resource R still does not have it, and impose a form of
closed world assumption over the resources it does not itself have. Together with the first two
rules these rules are used to determine whether an agent X (which may or may not be itself)
can be believed to not have a resource R (i.e. ¬has(X,R)). This is demonstrated as follows:
Example 7.5 (fdds for ¬has(X,R)) Given AFag1 as in Example 7.4 such that done(give(ag2,
r2, ag3), 1), done(give(ag3, r2, ag4), 2) ∈ Rpag1 and ag1 has no other facts about r2 changing
hands between agents. Then,
{done(give(ag3, r2, ag4), 2), asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(ag4, r2, 2))} |=AFag1 ¬has(Ag, r2)
for all Ag ∈ names(AS) such that Ag 6= ag4. Moreover, the following fdd exists also for
¬has(Ag, r2) according to AFag1:
{asm(¬has(ag1, r2))} |=AFag1 ¬has(ag1, r2).
The sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth general-purpose inference rules in Definition 7.4 allow an
agent x to determine when a resource R is believed to solve the r.r.p. of an agent X irrespective
of other resources X may have (i.e. useful(R,X)), impose a form of closed world assumption
over resources not being useful for agents (i.e. ¬useful(R,X)), determine when the r.r.p. of
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an agent X is believed to be solved irrespective of whether it does or does not have some set of
resources Rs (i.e. ¬needs(X,Rs)), determine when the r.r.p. of an agent X is believed to be
unsolved but would be solved if given a set of resources Rs, or solved and would be unsolved
if X gave away a set of resources Rs (i.e. needs(X,Rs)). We demonstrate in the following
three examples the conditions under which ¬needs(X,Rs) and needs(X,R) are and are not
admissible:
Example 7.6 (fdd for ¬needs(X,Rs)) Suppose an agent ag4 has a resource r2 and D1 |=AFag4
has( ag4, r2) where D1 = {done(give(ag3, r2, ag4), 2), asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(ag4, r2, 2))}.
Suppose also that D2 |=AFag4 useful(r2, ag4) where D2 = {goal(ag4, g1), fulfils(r2, g1)}.
Then, the r.r.p. of ag4 is solved by r2 and the following fdd exists for all sets of resources
Rs such that r2 /∈ Rs:
D1 ∪ D2 |=AFag4 ¬needs(ag4, Rs)
Trivially, 2AFag4 asm(needs(ag4, Rs)) and hence 2AFag4 needs(ag4, Rs) for all sets of resources
Rs such that r2 /∈ Rs.
Example 7.7 (fdd for needs(X,Rs) where agent’s r.r.p. is solved) Given AFag4 as in
Example 7.6 for an agent ag4 whose r.r.p. is solved and such that for all resources R 6= r2:
2AFag4 {has(ag4, R), useful(R, ag4)}, i.e. ag4 has no useful resource other than r2. Then,
D2 ∪ {asm(needs(ag4, {r2}))} |=AFag4 needs(ag4, {r2})
where D2 is a defence for useful(r2, ag4) as in Example 7.6.
Suppose instead that D3 |=AFag4 has(ag4, r3) and D4 |=AFag4 useful(r3, ag4) for some resource
r3 6= r2 and defence sets D3 and D4, then the following fdd exists for all sets of resources Rs
such that r3 /∈ Rs (including Rs = {r2}):
D3 ∪ D4 |=AFag4 ¬needs(ag4, Rs).
The fdd of Example 7.6 also still holds for all sets of resources Rs such that r2 /∈ Rs (including
Rs = {r3}). Moreover, now, 2AFag4 needs(ag4, {r2}) since |=AFag4 ¬needs(ag4, {r2}). In-
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tuitively, this is because an agent only needs one resource that solves its r.r.p., so any set of
resources not containing either of r2 or r3 is not “needed” by ag4.
Example 7.8 (fdd for needs(X,Rs) where agent’s r.r.p. is not solved) Suppose an agent
ag1 is such that 2AFag1 {has(ag1, R), useful(R, ag1)} for all resources R ∈ R, i.e. ag1 has
no resource that solves it r.r.p. Then, |=AFag1 needs(ag1, Rs) for all sets of resources Rs such
that R ∈ Rs and |=AFag1 useful(R, ag1).
The last general-purpose inference rule (needsToRetain(X,Rs)) in Definition 7.4 is exactly the
same as the inference for needs(X,Rs) except that it is more specific in that it is for the case
where X is believed to have a resource R ∈ Rs, which if X gave away together with the other
resources in Rs, X’s r.r.p. would no longer be solved. Naturally, the defence of an fdd for
needsToRetain(X,Rs) would include that X has such a resource R. This will be useful, as we
will see in Section 7.4, for the agent when refusing a request or proposal and providing argument
as to which particular resource, if given away, would cause its r.r.p. to become unsolved.
We end this section with an example of the kinds of claims that could be admissible for an
agent at start-up.
Example 7.9 (admissible claims at start-up) Given AFag1 = 〈L, Rc, R
p
ag1, A, c〉 where
L, Rc, A and c are as defined in this section, and R
p
ag1 is as in Example 7.1, some of the claims
admissible for ag1 initially are: has(ag1, r1), ¬has(ag2, r1), ¬has(ag1, r2), useful(r1, ag1),
needs(ag1, r1), ¬needs(ag1, r2).
Note that a choice of two assumptions which conflict in their pragmatic meaning could be
admissible for an agent, though of course an assumption and its contrary claims can never
both be admissible. For example, in the example above, ag1 could (admissibly) assume either
asm(has(ag2, r2)) or asm(¬has( ag2, r2)). This is because ag1 has no information regarding
whether or not ag2 has r2, and thus no contrary beliefs for these assumptions. Likewise, ag1
could (admissibly) assume either asm(needs(ag2, r2)) or asm(¬needs(ag2, r2)). Indeed it is
important for agents to be able to make assumptions in the absence of beliefs to proceed with
obtaining resources that fulfil their goals, as we will see in Section 7.4.
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7.3 Consistency Properties of an AABA agent
We prove in this section some consistency properties of an AABA agent x defined as in Sec-
tion 7.2. We assume Rpx is such that if done(give(Y,R, Z), T ), done(give(Y
′, R, Z ′), T ) ∈ Rpx
then Y = Y ′ and Z = Z ′ (i.e. resources are not given away or received by two different
agents at the same point in time and agents have no facts as such). We assume also that facts
done(give(Y,R,X), T ) are correct (i.e. such a fact originates and is communicated only if Y
has given R to X at time T ).
Structuring the first two inference rules of Definition 7.4 for determining when an agent has a
resource as they are avoids the possibility of holding conflicting beliefs in this regard. Notably,
an agent x will never believe a resource to be held by two agents simultaneously, as in the
lemma below. In addition, the need to manually remove facts from Rpx as to which agent has a
given resource for the sake of maintaining consistency of the agent’s belief set (personal facts)
is eliminated.
Lemma 7.1 (consistency of has) If |=AFx has(X,R) for some agent X ∈ names(AS) and
resource R ∈ R, then 2AFx has(Y,R) for all agents Y ∈ names(AS) such that Y 6= X.
Proof. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that
• {done(give( , R,X), T ), asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(X,R, T ))} |=AFx has(X,R); and
• {done(give( , R, Y ), T ′), asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(Y,R, T ′))} |=AFx has(Y,R)
for some T, T ′ ∈ N and Y ∈ names(AS) such that Y 6= X. Note that T 6= T ′ since, by
assumption, a resource R cannot be received by two agents at the same point in time and facts
about resources changing hands are correct. Then, either
• T ′ > T and hence {done(give( , R, Y ), T ′)} |=AFx gaveAwayAfter(X,R, T ). But then
asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(X,R, T )) cannot be an admissible assumption defending the claim
has(X,R); or
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• T > T ′ and hence {done(give( , R,X), T )} |=AFx gaveAwayAfter(Y,R, T
′). But then
asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(Y,R, T ′)) cannot be an admissible assumption defending the
claim has(Y,R).
Contradiction. 2
Likewise for has(X,R), structuring the inference rules for determining when an agent does not
have some resource according to Definition 7.4 avoids the need to manually remove facts as
to which agents do not have a a given resource for the sake of maintaining consistency of the
agent’s belief set (personal facts). Also, the possibility of deriving conflicting claims regarding
an agent both having and not having a certain resource is avoided, as follows:
Lemma 7.2 (consistency of has and ¬has) It can never be the case that both |=AFx has(X,R)
and |=AFx ¬has(X,R) for any agent X ∈ names(AS) and resource R ∈ R.
Proof. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that |=AFx has(X,R) and |=AFx ¬has(X,R)
for some X ∈ names(AS) and R ∈ R. Then, for it to be the case that |=AFx ¬has(X,R),
either |=AFx has(Y,R) for some Y 6= X (by the third inference rule of Definition 7.4) or
|=AFx asm(¬has(X,R)) (by the fourth and fifth inference rules of Definition 7.4). We look
at each case in turn. Firstly, if |=AFx has(Y,R) for some Y 6= X, then, by Lemma 7.1, 2AFx
has(X,R). Contradiction. Secondly, if |=AFx asm(¬has(X,R)), then it cannot be the case
that the contrary has(X,R) is admissible, i.e. 2AFx has(X,R). Contradiction. 2
Similarly as for Lemma 7.2 whereby an agent will never claim an agent to both have and not
have a particular resource, an agent will never claim an agent to both need and not need a
particular set of resources, as follows:
Lemma 7.3 (consistency of needs and ¬needs) It can never be the case that both |=AFx
needs(X,Rs) and |=AFx ¬needs(X, Rs).
Proof. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that both D1 |=AFx needs(X,Rs) and D2 |=AFx
¬needs(X,Rs) where D1 and D2 are admissible defence sets. Then, according to Definition 7.4,
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D1 consists of a single (admissible) assumption asm(needs(X,Rs)). However, it cannot then
be that the contrary ¬needs(X,Rs) is an admissible claim, i.e. 2AFx ¬needs(X,Rs). Contra-
diction. 2
We define `xasm and `
x (see Definition 5.10) now in terms of |=AFx for the sentences of the
meta-language ML (see Definition 5.11) occurring in Definitions 5.12–5.15, as follows:
• `x [Y has R] iff |=AFx has(Y,R);
• `x ¬[Y has R] iff |=AFx ¬has(Y,R);
• `xasm [Y has R] iff |=AFx asm(has(Y,R));
• `xasm ¬[Y has R] iff |=AFx asm(¬has(Y,R));
• `x [the r.r.p. of Y is solved with R] iff |=AFx useful(R, Y );
• `x ¬[the r.r.p. of Y is solved with R] iff |=AFx ¬useful(R, Y );
• `xasm ¬[the r.r.p. of Y is solved with R] iff |=AFx asm(¬useful(R, Y ));
• `x [the r.r.p. of Y is solved] iff |=AFx {useful(R, Y ), has(Y,R)} for some resource R;
• `x [the r.r.p. of Y would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R] iff |=AFx
¬needs(Y, {R});
• `x ¬[the r.r.p. of Y would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R] iff |=AFx
needs(Y, {R});
• `xasm [the r.r.p. of Y would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R] iff |=AFx
asm(¬needs(Y, {R}));
• `xasm ¬[the r.r.p. of Y would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R] iff |=AFx
asm(needs(Y, {R}));
• Given some set of resources Rs: `x [after giving away each resource in Rs, the r.r.p. of
Y would no longer be solved] iff |=AFx needsToRetain(Y,Rs).
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Further, we donote the following conditions occurring in Definitions 5.12–5.15 in terms of AFx:
• the r.r.p. of x is not solved and fulfils(R,G(x)) ∈ B(x) iff |=AFx {¬has(x,R),
needs(x, {R})};
• Y ∈ names(AS) and Y 6= x iff |=AFx isAgent(Y );
• It is the case that each of `x [Y has R], `x [the r.r.p. of Y is solved], `x ¬[the r.r.p. of
Y would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R] and `x [the r.r.p. of Y is
solved with R′] holds iff |=AFx {has(Y,R), needs(Y, {R}), useful(R
′, Y )};
• Given some set of resources Rs: (for all R ∈ Rs, fulfils(R,G(x)) /∈ B(x), or there
is some R /∈ Rs such that R ∈ Res(x) and fulfils(R,G(x)) ∈ B(x)) iff (|=AFx
asm(¬needs(x,Rs))).
The definition of AFx (Definitions 7.1–7.4) as well as the consistency properties demonstrated
in this section (Lemmas 7.1–7.3) make the mapping of `xasm and `
x to |=AFx as above legitimate
according to the requirements of Postulate 5.1. Notably, for some sentence [L] ∈ML, it is not
possible that `x [L] and `x ¬[L], nor is it possible that `xasm [L] and `
x ¬[L].
7.4 Procedures defined using AABA
We re-define now the procedures of Section 5.4 for an agent x in terms of the AABA framework
AFx defined above.
Firstly, the agent x requests for another agent Y to simply give away a resource R which x
needs or to exchange R for another resource R′ which x has according to the generateRequest
procedure, which occurs in the preconditions of communication rule CR1, as follows:
Definition 7.5 (generateRequest(Y ,Actions)) The procedure evaluates to true instantiat-
ing an intended recipient of the request Y and an exchange of resources Actions to request if
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(1) |=AFx ¬has(x,R), needs(x, {R}); (2) |=AFx isAgent(Y ); and (3) Actions takes one of the
following two forms:
(a) {give(Y ,R,x)}, if the following conditions hold:
(i) |=AFx has(Y,R) or |=AFx asm(has(Y,R)); and
(ii) |=AFx ¬needs(Y, {R}) or |=AFx asm(¬needs(Y, {R})).
(b) {give(Y ,R,x), give(x,R′,Y )}, if the following conditions hold:
(i) |=AFx has(Y,R), needs(Y, {R}), useful(R
′, Y ); and
(ii) |=AFx has(x,R
′).
Otherwise, if the above conditions are not met, the procedure evaluates to false.
We show next that the definition of generateRequest given above in terms of AABA is synony-
mous to the non-AABA definition of generateRequest given in Chapter 5, and thus Lemma 5.3
holds for the AABA definition also.
Lemma 7.4 (correspondence of generateRequest(Y ,Actions) procedures) The
generateRequest(Y ,Actions) procedure according to Definition 7.5 evaluates to true iff the
generateRequest(Y , Actions) procedure of Definition 5.12 evaluates to true.
Proof. Under both the non-AABA and AABA definitions of generateRequest, Actions can
take the form {give(Y ,R,x)} or {give(Y ,R,x),give(x,R′,Y )}. We show that whenever
the conditions for the AABA definition hold, they hold also for the corresponding conditions of
the non-AABA definition, and vice versa: Firstly, Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 7.5 hold iff
the corresponding Conditions 1 and 2 (respectively) of Definition 5.12 hold. These conditions
are common to both forms of Actions. Secondly, Conditions 3ai and 3aii of Definition 7.5 hold
iff the corresponding Conditions 3ai and 3aii of Definition 5.12 hold. Thus, when all necessary
conditions of Definition 7.5 hold for the case where Actions takes the form {give(Y ,R,x)},
all necessary conditions of Definition 5.12 hold also, and vice versa. Thirdly, Conditions 3bi
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and 3bii of Definition 7.5 hold iff the corresponding Conditions 3bi and 3bii (respectively) of
Definition 5.12 hold. Thus, when all necessary conditions of Definition 7.5 hold for the case
where Actions takes the form {give(Y ,R,x), give(x,R′,Y )}, all necessary conditions of
Definition 5.12 hold also, and vice versa. 2
The generateProposal procedure, which occurs in the preconditions of communication rule
CR2, on the other hand is used for proposing exchanges of resources involving two or more
agents besides x, as follows:
Definition 7.6 (generateProposal(Z,Actions)) The procedure evaluates to true instanti-
ating a set of intended recipients of the proposal Z and an exchange of resources Actions to
propose if (1) |=AFx ¬has(x, R2), needs(x, {R2}); and (2) for each Y ∈ Z, |=AFx isAgent(Y );
and (3) Actions takes the form {give(Y2,R2,Y1), . . . , give(Yn+1,Rn+1,Yn)} for n > 1,
{Y1, . . . , Yn+1} = {x} ∪ Z, Y1 = x, |Z| > 1, Y2, . . . , Yn ∈ Z, Y2, . . . , Yn all different, Yn+1 ∈
{x} ∪ Z, Yn 6= Yn+1, R1, . . . Rn+1 all different, and satisfying the following conditions:
(a) for all Yi ∈ {Y2, . . . , Yn}, |=AFx has(Yi, Ri), needs(Yi, {Ri}), useful(Ri+1, Yi);
(b) (i) Yn+1 = x and |=AFx has(x,Rn+1); or
(ii) Yn+1 ∈ {Y2, . . . , Yn−1}, and either |=AFx has(Yn+1, Rn+1) or |=AFx asm(has(Yn+1, Rn+1));
or
(iii) Yn+1 /∈ {x} ∪ {Y2, . . . , Yn−1}, and
• |=AFx has(Yn+1, Rn+1) or |=AFx asm(has(Yn+1, Rn+1)), and
• |=AFx ¬needs(Yn+1, {Rn+1}) or |=AFx asm(¬needs(Yn+1, {Rn+1})).
Otherwise, if the above conditions are not met, the procedure evaluates to false.
We show next that the definition of generateProposal given above in terms of AABA is
synonymous to the non-AABA definition of generateProposal given in Chapter 5, and thus
Lemma 5.4 holds for the AABA definition also.
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Lemma 7.5 (correspondence of generateProposal(Z,Actions) procedures) The
generateProposal(Z,Actions) procedure according to Definition 7.6 evalutes to true iff the
generateProposal(Z, Actions) procedure of Definition 5.13 evalutes to true.
Proof. Under both the non-AABA and AABA definitions of generateRequest, Actions takes
the form {give(Y2,R2,Y1), . . . , give(Yn+1,Rn+1,Yn)} for n > 1, {Y1, . . . , Yn+1} = {x} ∪ Z,
Y1 = x, x 6∈ Z, |Z| > 1, Y2, . . . , Yn ∈ Z, Y2, . . . , Yn all different, Yn+1 ∈ {x} ∪ Z, Yn 6= Yn+1,
R1, . . . Rn+1 all different. It is trivial to see that each of the Conditions 1, 2, 3a and 3bi–3biii
of Definition 7.6 holds iff the corresponding Condition 1, 2, 3a and 3bi–3biii (respectively) of
Definition 5.13 holds. 2
The acceptableExchange procedure, which occurs in the preconditions of communication rules
CR3 and CR5, is used when the agent takes the role of responder in a dialogue instance for
deciding when an exchange of resources is acceptable for it, as follows:
Definition 7.7 (acceptableExchange(Actions)) The procedure evaluates to true if Rs = {
R | give(x, R, ) ∈ Actions } and: (1) for each R ∈ Rs, |=AFx has(x,R); and (2) any one
of the following conditions holds:
(a) |=AFx asm(¬needs(x,Rs)), or
(b) give( ,R′,x) ∈ Actions and |=AFx useful(R
′, x).
Otherwise, if the above conditions are not met, the procedure evaluates to false.
We show next that the definition of acceptableExchange given above in terms of AABA is
synonymous to the non-AABA definition of acceptableExchange given in Chapter 5, and thus
Lemma 5.5 holds for the AABA definition also.
Lemma 7.6 (correspondence of acceptableExchange(Actions) procedures) The
acceptableExchange(Actions) procedure according to Definition 7.7 evalutes to true iff the
acceptableExchange(Actions) procedure of Definition 5.14 evalutes to true.
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Proof. It is trivial to see that Condition 1 of Definition 7.7 holds iff the corresponding Condition
1 of Definition 5.14 holds. Moreover, Condition 2a of Definition 7.7 holds iff Condition 2a
or 2b of Definition 5.14 holds, and Condition 2b of Definition 7.7 holds iff Condition 2c of
Definition 5.14 holds. 2
The ¬acceptableExchange procedure, which occurs in the preconditions of communication
rules CR4 and CR6, is used when the agent takes the role of responder in a dialogue instance
for deciding when an exchange of resources is not acceptable for it. The procedure generates an
argument according to the reason for which the exchange of resources is not acceptable. This
may be because the agent does not have a resource which it would be required to give away in
the exchange, as follows:
Definition 7.8 (¬acceptableExchange(Actions,Reason)) The procedure evaluates to true
instantiating an argument Reason where Reason takes one of the following two forms:
(a) <¬has(x,R), Support>: if give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions and Support |=AFx ¬has(x,R);
or
(b) <needsToRetain(x,Rs), Support>: if Rs = { R | give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions }, and (i)
Support |=AFx needsToRetain(x,Rs), and (ii) there is no give( ,R
′,x) ∈ Actions such
that |=AFx useful(R
′, x).
Otherwise, if neither of the above conditions are met, the procedure evaluates to false.
Note that the argument generated as in Condition (a) above would include in the support who
the agent believed to have the resource according to the associated general-purpose inference
rule in Rc, if it had such a belief. The other reason why the exchange of resources may not be
acceptable for the agent (Condition (b)) is because it needs to retain the set of resources which
it is required to give away in the exchange.
We show next that the definition of ¬acceptableExchange given above in terms of AABA is
synonymous to the non-AABA definition of ¬acceptableExchange given in Chapter 5.
7.4. Procedures defined using AABA 171
Lemma 7.7 (correspondence of ¬acceptableExchange(Actions,Reason) procedures)
The ¬acceptableExchange(Actions,Reason) procedure according to Definition 7.8 evaluates
to true iff the ¬acceptableExchange(Actions,Reason) procedure of Definition 5.15 evaluates
to true.
Proof. It is trivial to see that Condition (a) or (b) of Definition 7.8 holds iff the corresponding
Condition (a) or (b) (respectively) of Definition 5.15 holds. 2
The exchangeResources procedure, which occurs in the revisions of communication rules CR3,
CR7, CR11 and CR14, records in the agent’s belief base an exchanges of resources that it is
involved in, as initiator or responder of a dialogue instance, as follows:
Definition 7.9 (exchangeResources(Actions)) For each give(Y ,R,Z) ∈ Actions, x adds
done(give(Y,R, Z), T ) to Rpx, where T is the current time.
We show next that the definition of exchangeResources given above in terms of AABA revises
the agent’s state as to which agents have which resources synonymously to the non-AABA
definition of exchangeResources given in Chapter 5.
Lemma 7.8 (correspondence of exchangeResources(Actions) procedures) The beliefs of
agent x regarding the owners of resources following execution of the exchangeResources(
Actions) procedure of Definition 7.9 corresponds to the beliefs of x following execution of
the exchangeResources(Actions) procedure of Definition 5.16.
Proof. According to Definition 7.9, for each give(Y ,R,Z) ∈ Actions, x adds done(give(Y,R,
Z), T ) to Rpx, where T is the current time, and thus |=AFx has(Z,R). Likewise, according to
Definition 5.14:
• for each give(Y ,R,x) ∈ Actions, the revised resources of x (i.e. Res′(x)) are such that
R ∈ Res′(x); and
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• for each give(Y ,R,Z) ∈ Actions (Z 6= x), the revised beliefs of x (i.e. B′(x)) are such
that has(Z,R) ∈ B′(x).
Thus, for each give(Y ,R,Z) ∈ Actions, `x [Z has R]. 2
The reviseBeliefs procedure, which occurs in the revisions of communication rules CR3–
CR6, CR8 and CR10, modifies the agent’s set of private facts according to an argument pro-
vided to it by another agent, as follows:
Definition 7.10 (reviseBeliefs(Y ,<Conclusion,Support>)) For each A ∈ Support such
that A ∈ A (i.e. A is an assumption), x adds uttered(Y,A, T ) to Rpx, where T is the current
time, and, for each F ∈ Support such that F /∈ A (i.e. F is a fact), x adds F to Rpx.
Note that such revisions make sense since agents are assumed to be trustworthy and only share
facts (in arguments) that they themselves hold to be true (admissible).
We have shown in Lemmas 7.4–7.8 the correspondence between Definitions 7.5–7.9 and Def-
initions 5.12–5.16. As a result, it is clear that all successful dialogue instances generated by
the agents grounded in AABA do indeed result in minimally cooperatively rational deals, as
follows:
Corollary 7.1 (successful dialogue instances generated are Min CR) A successful di-
alogue instance generated by an initiating (AABA) agent x and set of responding (AABA)
agents Z all defined according to Definitions 7.1–7.4 and all using the communication rules
CR1–CR15 according to the definitions of the procedures given in Definitions 7.5–7.9 results in
a minimally cooperatively rational deal δ = (Res,Res′) where Res is the allocation before the
dialogue instance and Res′ is the allocation after the dialogue instance.
The result above is an immediate consequence of Corollary 5.2 and Lemmas 7.4–7.8.
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Figure 7.1: Plans Pl in Example 7.10.
7.5 Example of Dialogue Instances Generated by the
AABA Agents
We present in this section an example of the different kinds of dialogue instances our AABA
agents would generate in pursuit of resources that solve their r.r.p.
Example 7.10 (dialogue instances generated by AABA agents) Consider a system of
three agents, ag1, ag2, ag3, and a set of plans Pl (depicted in Figure 7.1) which all agents are
aware of, as follows:
Res(ag1) = {r1}, G(ag1) = g1
Res(ag2) = {r2}, G(ag2) = g2
Res(ag3) = {r3}, G(ag3) = g3
Pl = {fulfils(r1, g1), fulfils(r3, g1), fulfils(r1, g2), fulfils(r2, g2), fulfils(r2, g3)}
and with AABA representations and procedures as defined in Sections 7.2 and 7.4. Let AFag1,
AFag2 and AFag3 denote the AABA representations of agents ag1, ag2 and ag3 respectively.
The r.r.p. of ag1 and ag2 is solved but the r.r.p. of ag3 is not. ag3, starting with no knowledge
of the other agents, would proceed to try and solve its r.r.p. as follows:
t=0: It is the case that |=AFag3 needs(ag3, {r2}). Also, in the absence of contrary beliefs, the as-
sumptions asm(has(ag1, r2)), asm(¬needs(ag1, {r2})), asm(has(ag2, r2)) and asm(¬needs(
ag2, {r2})) are all admissible for ag3. Based on this, the procedure
generateRequest(Y ,Actions) evaluates to true for Y = ag1 and Actions = {give(ag1,r2,
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ag3)}, as well as Y = ag2 and Actions = {give(ag2,r2,ag3)}. So, by CR1, ag3 can initiate
request with ag1 or ag2. Assume it selects ag1, then it utters
request(ag3, ag1, {give(ag1,r2,ag3)})
t=1: ag1 receives ag3’s request by CR2 since the procedure ¬acceptableExchange({give(ag1,
r2,ag3)},Reason) evaluates to true for Reason = <¬has(ag1, r2),{asm(¬has(ag1, r2))}>. In
so doing, ag1 utters
refuse(ag1, ag3, {give(ag1,r2,ag3)},<¬has(ag1, r2),{asm(¬has(ag1, r2))}>)
t=2: ag3 receives ag1’s refusal by CR8 and executes the reviseBeliefs procedure. In so
doing, ag3 adds uttered(ag1, asm(¬has(ag1, r2)), 2) to Rpag3.
t=3: Now, 2AFag3 asm(has(ag1, r2)) and so generateRequest(Y ,Actions) evaluates to true
for Y = ag2 and Actions = {give(ag2,r2, ag3)} only. So, by CR1, ag3 utters
request(ag3, ag2, {give(ag2,r2,ag3)})
t=4: ag2 receives ag3’s request by CR2 since the procedure ¬acceptableExchange({give(ag2,
r2,ag3)},Reason) evaluates to true for Reason = <needsToRetain(ag2, {r2}),Support>
where Support = {goal(ag2, g2), fulfils(r2, g2), done(give(ag2, r2, ag2), 0), asm(
¬gaveAwayAfter(ag2, r2, 0)), asm(needs(ag2, {r2}))}. In so doing, ag2 utters
refuse(ag2, ag3, {give(ag2,r2,ag3)}, <needsToRetain(ag2, {r2}),Support>)
t=5: ag3 receives ag2’s refusal by CR8 and executes the reviseBeliefs procedure according
to the providing argument. In so doing, ag3 adds F to Rpag3 for each fact F in Support, and
uttered(ag2, A, 5) for each assumption A in Support.
t=6: Now, |=AFag3 needs(ag2, {r2}). However, given that |=AFag3 useful(r1, ag2) also, and
that asm(has(ag1, r1)) and asm(¬needs(ag1, {r1})) are admissible assumptions, the procedure
generateProposal(Z,Actions) evaluates to true for Z = {ag1, ag2} and Actions = {give(
ag2,r2,ag3),give(ag1,r1,ag2)}. Hence ag3 utters
propose(ag3, {ag1,ag2}, {give(ag2,r2,ag3),give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
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t=7: ag2 receives ag3’s proposal by CR5 and responds with accept proposal since the proce-
dure acceptableExchange({give(ag2,r2,ag3),give(ag1,r1,ag2)}) evaluates to true.
Separately, ag1 receives ag3’s proposal by CR6 but responds with reject proposal since the
procedure ¬acceptableEchange({give(ag2,r2,ag3),give(ag1,r1,ag2)},<needsToRetain(
ag1, {r1}), Support>) evaluates to true, where Support = {goal(ag1, g1), fulfils(r1, g1),
done(give(ag1, r1, ag1), 0), asm(¬gaveAwayAfter(ag1, r1, 0)), asm(needs(ag1, {r1}))}.
t=8: ag3 receives ag2’s accept proposal utterance by CR9.
t=9: ag3 receives ag1’s reject proposal utterance by CR10 and executes the reviseBeliefs
procedure according to the provided argument.
t=10: Applying CR12, ag3 utters
disconfirm(ag3, {ag1}, {give(ag2,r2,ag3),give(ag1,r1,ag2)})
t=11: Now, 2AFag3 asm(¬needs(ag1, {r1})). In addition, |=AFag3 needs(ag1, {r1}) so the pre-
vious proposal cannot be generated. Instead, now that |=AFag3 useful(r3, ag1), as well as |=AFag3
has(ag3, r3) as before, the procedure generateProposal(Z,Actions) evaluates to true for
Z = {ag1, ag2} and Actions = {give(ag2,r2,ag3),give(ag1,r1,ag2),give(ag3,r3,ag1)}.
Hence ag3 utters
propose(ag3, {ag1,ag2}, {give(ag2,r2,ag3),give(ag1,r1,ag2),give(ag3,r3,ag1)})
t=12: ag3’s proposal is acceptable for both ag1 and ag2 since the procedure acceptableExchange
evalutes to true for each, and hence both ag1 and ag2 utter accept proposal.
t=13: Applying CR9, ag3 receives the accept proposal utterance of ag1.
t=14: Applying CR9, ag3 receives the accept proposal utterance of ag2.
t=15: Applying CR11, ag3 utters confirm.
t=16: Applying CR14 (separately), ag1 and ag2 receive the confirm utterance of ag3. As
a result, ag3 applying CR11 and agents ag1 and ag2 applying CR13, each agent revises its
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state according to the procedure exchangeResources({give(ag2,r2,ag3),give(ag1,r1,ag2),
give(ag3,r3,ag1)}) and the r.r.p. of all agents is solved.
7.6 Discussion
We have shown in this chapter how a general-purpose argumentation framework can be used to
underpin an agent’s dialogue policy, guiding its decision-making and thereby also its uterrances
and supporting arguments. We have done this in this thesis for a particular negotiation problem
(and such that agent utterances conform to the protocol set out in Chapter 5) but the prin-
ciple, which we have demonstrated in this chapter, of using a general-purpose argumentation
framework for concretely defining an agent’s communication rules (policy) could be applied to
other negotiation problems/protocols or, even, other types of dialogue besides negotiation (i.e.
information-seeking, persuasion etc). In the context of resource reallocation as we consider in
this thesis, we have presented in this chapter a fully worked out, generative policy for solving
a (Grid computing, scheduling/timetabling etc) problem represented as an agent system in the
format of Chapter 3. Our agents progress from an initial to an optimal allocation of resources by
means of request-agree (if two agents involved; see Definition 5.2) and propose-accept-confirm
(if three or more agents involved; see Definition 5.3) instances of dialogue which result in ex-
changes of resources. As part of the (dialogues) generated, our agents also disclose additional
information as relevant and required in assisting recipient agents to find resources sufficient for
fulfilling their goals or to become aware that a particular goal or plan is currently out of reach
(not posssible). This additional disclosure of information in the negotiation method set out
in this thesis takes the form of arguments justifying agent utterances as to why a particular
resource cannot be given away (e.g. “I do not have it . . . ”, “it has been given to another agent
. . . ”, “I need it . . . ”). The need does not rise in this thesis but in future work, in considering
more general resource reallocation problems, it could be necessary at times, according to the
situation, for agents to include arguments (justifications) with their requests/proposals also, to
convince recipient agents of the acceptability of a request/proposal.
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We compare in the remainder of this section the negotiation process/policy defined (completed)
in this chapter and the scope of our work with similar recent work in the argumentation-based
negotiation research community. Indeed there are a number of interest- (argument-) based
multi-agent negotiation frameworks that are related to our framework. However, most are
restricted to two agents (e.g. [RPSD07, RSD03, PHD+07, HDM10]), a restriction we do not
impose, and most are protocols for the allowed types of negotiation (e.g. [RPSD07, vVP05,
RSD03]) rather than (fully) generative models that discuss the agents’ decision making mod-
els, as we have presented in this thesis. In addition, much in the framework of Rahwan et
al. [RPSD07] rests on the setting of positive interaction between agents’ shared or common
goals such that an agent benefits from a common goal achieved by the other agent. The setting
of Pasquier et al. [PHD+07], on the other hand, rests on there being no overlap in the agents’
goals (and needed resources). Both of these differ from our setting wherein agents may have
common goals which interact negatively such that agents ‘compete’ to fulfil their individual
goals. Whilst the work of Hadidi et al. [HDM10] is more elaborate than others in that it
presents a strategy for argumentative negotiation as well as a protocol, it differs from our focus
in this thesis in that it is based on an abstract argumentation framework and not a concrete
argumentation framework, which gives structure to the arguments such that arguments can be
constructed (generated), as is the focus in this thesis.
Sierra et al. [SJNP97] present a negotiation language and protocol that allows for the exchange
of complex proposals which can include compelling arguments for why a proposal should be
adopted. Whilst [SJNP97] does not concentrate on the way in which arguments are built and
analysed, the work is extended by Parsons et al. [PSJ98] by indicating how argumentation can
be used to construct proposals, create critiques, provide explanations and meta-information.
However, even in [PSJ98], further expansion is required for agents to be able to generate and rate
arguments, and for any kind of implementation to be produced. In particular, the acceptability
classes used in [PSJ98] to rank arguments are not sufficient to resolve inconsistencies that may
arise within and between agents. A more fine-grained mechanism is required. We use an existing
argumentation framework (AABA) for this purpose, that is able to build and determine the
acceptability of arguments, even as the knowledge bases of agents change over time (as a result
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of the dialogues). The AABA framework also allows agents to make assumptions, enabling
agents to make decisions even despite incomplete information.
The ABN framework of Karunatillake et al. [KJRM09] is supplemented with a number of con-
crete negotiation strategies which allow agents to exchange arguments as part of the negotiation
process. The example scenario/context considered allows for multiple (more than two) agents.
However, in [KJRM09], the authors are mainly concerned with the systematic impact of ABN
in an agent society, identifying how and when argumentation can be useful for agent societies.
Hence the authors abstract away from the defeat-status computation of arguments. Instead,
a simple validation heuristic that simulates a defeasible model is used for evaluating justifica-
tions, comparing arguments and, ultimately, deciding utterances. We use an argumentation
framework to evaluate preconditions for utterances and to generate justifications/arguments
for utterances. The argumentation framework we use allows an agent to make assumptions in
the presence of incomplete information to resolve inconsistencies and avoid incorrect decisions.
These assumptions are communicated and can be inspected by other agents. Also, in [KJRM09],
deals involving more than two agents are not possible, as is required in our resource allocation
setting in order to reach optimal allocations.
Multi-agent negotiation processes are also presented by Andersson and Sandholm [AS99] and
Nongaillard et al. [NMJ08]. These negotiation processes considered in [AS99, NMJ08], however,
are such that all agents engage in a single “contract type” only (‘OCSM-contracts’ are not
considered, as well as ‘M-contracts’ in the case of [NMJ08]). The outcomes (solution quality in
terms of social welfare) and the number of contracts tried/performed before a (local) optimum
is reached are compared for societies of agents based on each of the different “contract types”.
The negotiation processes of [AS99, NMJ08] are exhaustive searches through the search space
of all possible deals. It would be interesting to compare the efficiency of these approaches in
reaching an optimum with our approach which allows agents to exchange beliefs/arguments to
guide their search for goal-fulfilling resources.
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7.7 Conclusion
We have instantiated in this chapter the agent policy described in Chapter 5 for solving the re-
source reallocation problem by means of agents and procedures grounded in AABA. AABA has
allowed us (1) to realise the reasoning of agents, allowing each agent to deal with inconsistency
and incompleteness in its beliefs, and in deciding what actions to undertake; and (2) to allow
agents to exchange reasons (arguments) as part of their utterances (dialogue moves) which are
understandable to one another and which can be used to revise their beliefs. In particular,
we have defined the language which agents use internally for reasoning as well as externally
for exchanging “arguments” between one another. The language includes “assumptions” which
agents can use for reasoning and building arguments in the absence of contrary beliefs. Finally,
we have defined the reasoning (inference) rules and discussed how these definitions together en-
sure certain consistency properties that are required of the agent reasonism mechanism. These
fundamental components which make up the AABA framework for our negotiation agents are
then used to ground the procedures of the negotiation policy, and we have shown that desired
properties of the procedures persist.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this chapter we conclude the research described in this thesis, summarising the achievements
of this thesis in Section 8.1, discussing possible directions for future work in Section 8.2 and
ending with some final remarks in Section 8.3.
8.1 Summary of Thesis Achievements
In Chapter 2 we presented background on the resource reallocation problem, social welfare,
agent communication (negotiation and argumentation-based negotiation dialogues in partic-
ular) and argumentation (assumption-based argumentation in particular). Following this, in
Chapter 3, we set out the key components of our problem domain amounting to the notion of
agent system, resource reallocation problem, and individual and social welfare.
In Chapter 4 we defined a class of deals which we termed “minimally cooperatively rational
deals”. We showed the sufficiency and completeness of these deals for solving our resource
reallocation problem. We showed also that it is possible to characterise the actions that make
up these deals in terms of the number of resources that agents involved receive and give away,
and in terms of which agents change (increase) utility as a result of these deals.
In Chapter 5 we defined a communication language and protocol for negotiation that captured
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and allowed for minimally cooperatively rational deals, such that more than two agents can
be involved in a deal and the agents involved can give away more than one resource. The
communication language and protocol defined allowed for agents to share arguments during
negotiation. We defined also in that chapter a set of communication rules and associated
procedures based on the communication language and protocol which made up a negotiation
policy for generating dialogue moves (instances) that solve the resource reallocation problem
of interest in this thesis.
In Chapter 6 we extended the Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) framework for multi-
agent systems where agents have some common knowledge but may also have personal knowl-
edge not necessarily shared by all agents. The framework defined was such that agents can
build acceptable (admissible) arguments which are communicable and can be understood by
other agents in the agent system. We termed our new framework Agent ABA (AABA).
In Chapter 7 we instantiated the negotiation policy of Chapter 5 by means of AABA. In partic-
ular, AABA realised the reasoning of agents, allowing each agent to deal with inconsistency and
incompleteness in its beliefs, and in deciding what actions to undertake. Moreoever, AABA
allowed a concrete means of representing and generating the arguments exchanged between
agents as part of their dialogue moves during negotiation.
8.2 Future Work
We have made a number of simplifying assumptions. The negotiation policy is designed so
that agents are truthful and only provide arguments that they hold as true. Moreover, the use
of argumentation is limited to internal decision-making and reasoning, and for the exchange
of arguments that are justifications for actions chosen: in general, it would be useful to allow
agents to argue with one another, for example for persuasion or in case agents are found to
be untruthful. It will also be interesting to investigate the case where agents do not share
knowledge at the outset as to which resources fulfil which goals, and the role of agent dialogues
and argumentation in resolving this incompleteness and inconsistency in beliefs for achieving
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optimal allocations. Agents are assumed to have single goals: it would be interesting to extend
this to allow agents to have multiple goals, and, possibly even, conflicting goals and preferences
over goals. Also, we have assumed that single resources suffice for the achievement of goals:
the next step on from this would be to consider the case where multiple resources may be
required to fulfil a goal, and to investigate the class of deals that are required to solve the
resource reallocation problem in such cases, as well as the definitions of the procedures required
to capture the necessary deals. Lastly, resources are assumed to be single unit, indivisible and
unsharable: this is often not the case in applications. Future work will look at dropping the
above assumptions.
A further direction for future work will be to investigate the possibility and also the suit-
ability of using other general-purpose argumentation frameworks for instantiating an agent’s
argumentation-based negotiation policy as opposed to Agent Assumption-Based Argumentation
which we have used in this thesis. In addition to the above, we hope to define the operational
semantics for the dialogue instances that our agens engage in, as has been done recently for
some negotiation and argumentation dialogue protocols [Kar06, MVEPA03, MP05], and thus
viewing the participating agents and their shared dialogues as part of a large abstract or virtual
computer whose overall state may be altered by the utterance of valid locutions or by internal
decision processes of the participants [MP09]. Lastly, we aim to translate our fully worked our
generative argumentation-based negotiation policy into a fully-fledged implementation which
can capture the different kinds of problems that we have set out to solve (as described in Chap-
ter 1, Section 1.2). A possible approach, using existing agent programming tools, is to use
Jade (Java Agent DEvelopment Framework) [BCG07] and SICStus Prolog [Proa], interfacing
the two by means of PrologBeans [Prob]. Jade would be used for its naming, messaging and
yellow pages services, as well as its capability to support the scheduling of cooperative ‘be-
haviours’ (where a ‘behaviour’ would represent a ‘communcation rule’ in our case). Prolog, on
the other hand, would be used for the AABA representation of the agents (language, inference
rules, assumptions, contrary relationships, backward deductions, dispute derivations). The im-
plementation will be used additionally to test and validate findings in this thesis as well as to
experiment and evaluate agent systems of varying sizes and complexity.
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8.3 Final Remarks
We set out in this thesis to present a fully worked out, generative model for solving a particular
class of resource reallocation problem (described in Section 3) by means of the multi-agent
paradigm, but such that our model and its constituent parts would not be restricted to this
class of problems and is instead a first step which can be built upon and applied more generally
in future work. We set out to present our model in such a manner that the computation
of optimal allocations of resources is arrived at by the participating agents themselves and,
also, such that the disclosure of information (in the form of communicable arguments) between
agents is kept minimal and relevant. The application domain of interest has been systems
where agents could benefit, both individually and in a societal sense, from sharing (distributing)
resources that would otherwise go un-utilised and thus making the best possible use of resources
collectively despite their individualistic nature. Moreover, we have been interested in this
thesis in application domains where it would be difficult or impossible to arrange a central,
all-knowing, decision-making agent, citing a number of examples of real-life problems that are
of interest to us in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.
Over the course of the thesis we have made individual contributions to three different subject
areas — resource allocation (Chapter 4), argumentation-based negotiation (Chapter 5) and
assumption-based argumentation (Chapter 6) — bridging the separate contributions together
in Chapter 7 to present our generative, argumentation-based negotiation method for solving
(optimising) resource allocation problems captured as agent systems in the format of Chapter 3.
Although we have focused on defining a negotiation policy for a particular class of resource allo-
cation problem, the tools we have set out can be applied more generally. Namely, the procedures
used by an agent in evaluating a communication rule could be defined differently (by means of
Agent Assumption-Based Argumentation as in this thesis or other general-purpose argumenta-
tion frameworks) or, even, the agent could have additional or different communication rules to
those set out in this thesis, allowing it to engage in dialogue protocols different to those which
we consider.
In closing, acknowledging the assumptions and limitations of the work as stated in this section
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above and the previous section, we remind the reader of what we have achieved in relation to the
state of the art in the research community, which has been to produce a representation format
for resource reallocation problems in terms of multi-agent systems and an argumentation-based
negotiation framework built (grounded) by means of a general-purpose argumentation frame-
work. We use our general-purpose argumentation framework to underpin the agents’ decision-
making and for the automatic generation of dialogues by agents, allowing disclosure of relevant
(useful) information, capturing deals involving multiple agents (and multiple resources), and
leading to optimal allocations of resources for the problem domain focused on in this thesis.
Appendix A
Additional properties of the CR and
Min CR deals of Chapter 4
We present in this appendix properties of cooperatively rational (CR) and minimally coopera-
tively rational (Min CR) deals additional to those given in Chapter 4.
A.1 Number of resources agents receive in Min CR deals
Below are the three corollaries that combine to prove Corollary 4.2 of Chapter 4.
Corollary A.1 For any Min CR deal δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′ such
that |Actionsδ| = 1, there are two agents involved (i.e. |Agentsδ| = 2) — one agent x ∈ Agentsδ
receives exactly one resource and the other agent y ∈ Agentsδ (y 6= x) receives no resources.
Proof. The proof of this is trivial since Actionsδ = {give(y,r,x)} for some x, y ∈ names(AS)
(x 6= y), i.e. x receives exactly one resource r and y receives no resources. 2
Corollary A.2 For any Min CR deal δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′ such
that |Actionsδ| = 2, one agent z1 ∈ Agents
δ receives zero or one resources and all other agents
z ∈ Agentsδ (z 6= z1) receive exactly one resource each.
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Proof. By Theorem 4.6 we know that Actionsδ = {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y)} for some
x, y, z1 ∈ names(AS) where x 6= y, y 6= z1 and x and z1 are possibly the same. Thus x and y
receive exactly one resource each. The only other agent involved in the deal is z1. In the case
that z1 6= x, then z1 receives no resources. Otherwise, if z1 = x, then z1 (i.e. x) receives exactly
one resource. 2
Corollary A.3 For any Min CR deal δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′ such
that |Actionsδ| = n + 2 (n ≥ 1), one agent zn+1 ∈ Agents
δ receives zero or one resources and
all other agents z ∈ Agentsδ (z 6= zn+1) receive exactly one resource each.
Proof. By Theorem 4.7 we know that Actionsδ = {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y), . . . ,
give(zn+1,rn+1,zn)} for some x, y, z1, . . . , zn+1 ∈ names(AS) where x, y, z1, . . . , zn are all dif-
ferent, zn 6= zn+1 and one of x, y, z1, . . . , zn−1 is possibly the same as zn+1. Thus x, y, z1, . . . , zn
receive exactly one resource each. The only other agent involved in the deal is zn+1. In the
case that zn+1 /∈ {x, y, z1, . . . , zn−1}, then zn+1 receives no resources. Otherwise, if zn+1 ∈
{x, y, z1, . . . , zn−1}, then zn+1 receives exactly one resource. 2
A.2 Number of resources agents give away in Min CR
deals
Below are the three corollaries that combine to prove Corollary 4.3 of Chapter 4.
Corollary A.4 For any Min CR deal δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′ such
that |Actionsδ| = 1, there are two agents involved (i.e. |Agentsδ| = 2) — one agent y ∈ Agentsδ
gives away exactly one resource and the other agent x ∈ Agentsδ (x 6= y) gives away no
resources.
Proof. Trivial since Actionsδ = {give(y,r,x)} for some x, y ∈ names(AS) (x 6= y), i.e. y
gives away exactly one resource r and x gives away no resources. 2
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Corollary A.5 For any Min CR deal δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′ such
that |Actionsδ| = 2, one agent x ∈ Agentsδ gives away zero or one resources and all other
agents z ∈ Agentsδ (z 6= x) give away exactly one resource each.
Proof. By Theorem 4.6 we know that Actionsδ = {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y)} for some
x, y, z1 ∈ names(AS) where x 6= y, y 6= z1 and x and z1 are possibly the same. Thus y and
z1 give away exactly one resource each. The only other agent involved in the deal is x. In the
case that x 6= z1, then x gives away no resources. Otherwise, if x = z1, then x (i.e. z1) gives
away exactly one resource. 2
Corollary A.6 For any Min CR deal δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′ such
that |Actionsδ| = n+ 2 (n ≥ 1), one agent x ∈ Agentsδ gives away zero or one resources, one
agent zn+1 ∈ Agents
δ gives away one or two resources and all other agents z ∈ Agentsδ (z 6= x,
z 6= zn+1) give away exactly one resource each.
Proof. By Theorem 4.7 we know that Actionsδ = {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y), . . . ,
give(zn+1,rn+1,zn)} for some x, y, z1, . . . , zn+1 ∈ names(AS), i.e. Agents
δ =
{x, y, z1, . . . , zn+1}, where x, y, z1, . . . , zn are all different, zn 6= zn+1 and one of x, y, z1, . . . , zn−1
is possibly the same as zn+1. Thus, if x 6= zn+1, then x gives away no resources. If x = zn+1,
then x gives away exactly one resource. If zn+1 ∈ {y, z1, . . . , zn−1}, then zn+1 gives away ex-
actly two resources. Lastly, since y, z1, . . . , zn are all distinct, each agent z ∈ Agents
δ (z 6= x,
z 6= zn+1) gives away exactly one resource. 2
A.3 Changes in utility of agents in Min CR deals
Below are the three corollaries that combine to prove Corollary 4.4 of Chapter 4.
Corollary A.7 For any Min CR deal δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′ such
that |Actionsδ| = 1, only one agent increases in utility and none of the agents decrease in
utility, i.e. swAS(AS
′) = swAS(AS) + 1.
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Proof. The fact that none of the agents decrease in utility is trivial since δ is a CR deal. It
remains to show that only one agent increases in utility. Since |Actionsδ| = 1, then Actionsδ
= {give(y,r,x)} for some x, y ∈ names(AS) and r ∈ R. We know, by Theorem 4.5, that
x /∈ happyAS(AS) and x ∈ happyAS(AS
′). It suffices to show that y does not change (increase
or decrease) in utility. This is the case since, by Theorem 4.5, y ∈ happyAS(AS
′) iff y ∈
happyAS(AS). 2
Corollary A.8 For any Min CR deal δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′ such
that |Actionsδ| = 2, only one agent increases in utility and none of the agents decrease in
utility, i.e. swAS(AS
′) = swAS(AS) + 1.
Proof. The fact that none of the agents decrease in utility is trivial since δ is a CR deal. It
remains to show that only one agent increases in utility. Since |Actionsδ| = 2, then Actionsδ
= {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y)} for some x, y, z1 ∈ names(AS) and r, r1 ∈ R. We know,
by Theorem 4.6, that x /∈ happyAS(AS), x ∈ happyAS(AS
′), y ∈ happyAS(AS) and y ∈
happyAS(AS
′). It suffices to show that z1 does not change (increase or decrease) in utility
except in the case where z1 = x (and x increases in utility). Indeed this is the case since, by
Theorem 4.6, when z1 6= x we have z1 ∈ happyAS(AS
′) iff z1 ∈ happyAS(AS). 2
Corollary A.9 For any Min CR deal δ = (Res,Res′) resulting in an agent system AS ′ such
that |Actionsδ| = n + 2 (n ≥ 1), only one agent increases in utility and none of the agents
decrease in utility, i.e. swAS(AS
′) = swAS(AS) + 1.
Proof. The fact that none of the agents decrease in utility is trivial since δ is a CR deal. It
remains to show that only one agent increases in utility. Since |Actionsδ| = n + 2 (n ≥ 1),
then, by Theorem 4.7, Actionsδ = {give(y,r,x), give(z1,r1,y), . . . , give(zn+1,rn+1,zn)}
for some x, y, z1, . . . , zn+1 ∈ names(AS) (x, y, z1, . . . , zn all different, zn 6= zn+1 and one of
x, y, z1, . . . , zn−1 possibly the same as zn+1), where x /∈ happyAS(AS), x ∈ happyAS(AS
′),
{y, z1, . . . , zn} ⊂ happyAS(AS) and {y, z1, . . . , zn} ⊂ happyAS(AS
′). It suffices to show that
zn+1 does not change (increase or decrease) in utility except in the case where zn+1 = x (and
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x increases in utility). Indeed this is the case since, by Theorem 4.7, when zn+1 6= x we have
zn+1 ∈ happyAS(AS
′) iff zn+1 ∈ happyAS(AS). 2
Appendix B
Example Definition of the Control
Procedures of Chapter 5
We give in this section an example definition of the elements needed to ensure that dialogue
instances, as defined in Chapter 5, are appropriately sequenced and interleaved.
Let D(x), the dialogical status of the agent, be a consistent set of ground literals of the fol-
lowing form (for X, Y ∈ names(AS), Z ∈ 2names(AS), R ∈ R, Response ∈ {acceptProposal,
rejectProposal}):
• initiatedDialogue(X,Z,Actions), representing that X has initiated a request or pro-
posal dialogue instance directed at a set of agents Z regarding Actions and has not yet
received responses from all agents Z;
• acceptedProposal(X,Y ,Actions), representing that X has accepted a proposal sent
to it from Y regarding Actions and is awaiting confirmation;
• receivedResponse(X,Y ,Actions,Response): representing thatX has received response
(Response) from Y following a proposal dialogue move it sent regarding Actions.
Furthermore, we assume that the agent is able to make the following inferences:
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• `x [R does not solve the r.r.p. of x] iff fulfils(R,G(x)) /∈ PlAS(x).
• `x [x is not awaiting a response from any agent] iff initiatedDialogue(x, ,Actions)
/∈ D(x), and for all acceptedProposal(x, ,Actions) ∈ D(x) such that give( ,R,x) ∈
Actions, it is the case that `x [R does not solve the r.r.p. of x].
• `x [x has offered R to some agent] iff either of the following two conditions hold:
– initiatedDialogue(x, ,Actions) ∈ D(x) and give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions; or
– acceptedProposal(x, ,Actions) ∈ D(x) and give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions.
• `x [x has not presently offered R to any agent] iff 0x [x has offered R to some agent].
The first inference above represents that a resource R does not solve the r.r.p. of x if x does
not know of a plan such that R fulfils its goal G(x). The second inference above represents that
x is not awaiting a response from any agent for a resource that could solve its r.r.p. if it does
not “remember” initiating a (request or proposal) dialogue instance or accepting a proposal
in which it is to receive a resource that solves its r.r.p. The third inference above represents
that x has offered to give away a resource R if it “remembers” initiating a dialogue instance or
accepting a proposal as such. The fourth inference above holds whenever the third does not.
We now provide definitions of the “control procedures” occurring in the communication rules
of our negotiation policy for an agent x (see Chapter 5).
The valid(initiateDialogue(Actions)) procedure, which occurs in the preconditions of
communication rules CR1 and CR2, is defined below to return successfully if the agent is
deemed to be in a state where it is not currently awaiting a response from any agent, and it
has not currently offered away any resources which it would also be offering away in Actions:
Definition B.1 (valid(initiateDialogue(Actions))) The procedure evaluates to true if
the following conditions hold:
• `x [x is not awaiting a response from any agent]; and
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• for all give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions, it is the case that `x [x has not presently offered R to
any agent].
The procedure evaluates to false otherwise.
The valid(accept(Actions)) procedure, which occurs in the preconditions of communication
rules CR3 and CR5, is defined below to return successfully if the agent has not presently offered
to give away any of its resources which solve its r.r.p., nor any resources which it would be
required to give away in Actions:
Definition B.2 (valid(accept(Actions))) The procedure evaluates to true if the following
conditions hold:
• for all resources R for which the condition `x [x has offered R to some agent] holds, it is
the case that `x [R does not solve the r.r.p. of x]; and
• for all give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions, it is the case that `x [x has not presently offered R to
any agent].
The procedure evaluates to false otherwise.
The reason for the first condition in the definition above being independent of Actions is to
avoid the situation arising whereby the agent has offered to give away a resource which solves
its r.r.p. as part of another dialogue instance, and then it offers to give another one away here
also (as part of Actions), possibly offering to give away the only two resources it has that solve
its r.r.p.
The valid(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions)) procedure, which occurs in the preconditions of
communication rules CR7–CR10, is defined to check that the agent is indeed awaiting a response
from Y regarding Actions, as follows:
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Definition B.3 (valid(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions))) The procedure evaluates to true if
the condition initiatedDialogue(x,Z,Actions) ∈ D(x) holds, and Y ∈ Z. The procedure
evaluates to false otherwise.
Note that, according to Definition B.1, the agent only initiates one dialogue instance at a time.
Therefore, it has at most one initiatedDialogue(x, , ) literal in D(x) at any given time
and, in receiving a response from an agent Y according to the procedure above, confusion would
not arise as to which proposal it is a response to.
The valid(confirm(Z,Actions)) procedure, which occurs in the preconditions of communi-
cation rule CR11, returns successfully if the agent has initiated a proposal directed at a set of
(responding) agents Z and all agents in Z have accepted the proposal, as follows:
Definition B.4 (valid(confirm(Z,Actions))) The procedure evaluates to true if
initiatedDialogue(x,Z,Actions) ∈ D(x), and for all Y ∈ Z, it is the case that
receivedResponse(x,Y ,Actions,acceptProposal) ∈ D(x). The procedure evaluates to false
otherwise.
The valid(disconfirm(Z,Actions)) procedure, which occurs in the preconditions of com-
munication rules CR12 and CR13, returns successfully if the agent has initiated a proposal
directed at a set of (responding) agents Z ′, all agents Z ′ have responded but only a subset
Z ⊂ Z ′ have accepted the proposal, as follows:
Definition B.5 (valid(disconfirm(Z,Actions))) The procedure evaluates to true if the
following conditions hold:
• initiatedDialogue(x,Z ′,Actions) ∈ D(x); and
• for all Y ∈ Z ′, receivedResponse(x,Y ,Actions, ); and
• Z = { Y | receivedResponse(x,Y ,Actions,acceptProposal) ∈ D(x) } ⊂ Z ′.
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The procedure evaluates to false otherwise.
The valid(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions)) procedure, which occurs in the preconditions of
communication rules CR14 and CR15, returns successfully if the agent can receive a confirm
or disconfirm dialogue move following an earlier accept proposal dialogue move it itself made
regarding Actions, as follows:
Definition B.6 (valid(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions))) The procedure evaluates to true if
the condition acceptedProposal(x,Y ,Actions) ∈ D(x) holds, and evaluates to false other-
wise.
The do(initiateDialogue(Z,Actions)) procedure, which occurs in the revisions of com-
munication rules CR1 and CR2, updates the agent’s state so that it knows it has initiated a
dialogue instance with a set of responding agents Z regarding Actions, as follows:
Definition B.7 (do(initiateDialogue(Z,Actions))) x adds initiatedDialogue(x,Z,
Actions) to D(x) when the procedure is called.
The do(accept proposal(Y ,Actions)) procedure, which occurs in the revisions of commu-
nication rule CR5, updates the agent’s state so that it knows it has accepted a proposal from
Y regarding Actions, as follows:
Definition B.8 (do(accept proposal(Y ,Actions))) x adds acceptedProposal(x,Y ,
Actions) to D(x) when the procedure is called.
The do(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions,Response)) procedure, which occurs in the revisions
of communication rules CR7–CR10, updates the agent’s state so that it knows it has received a
response from Y regarding Actions following an earlier request or proposal it sent, as follows:
Definition B.9 (do(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions,Response))) x updates its state accord-
ing to the value of Response when the procedure is called, as follows:
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• if Response ∈ {agree, refuse}, then initiatedDialogue(x,{Y },Actions) is removed
from D(x);
• otherwise, if Response ∈ {acceptProposal, rejectProposal}, then receivedResponse(x,
Y ,Actions,Response) is added to D(x).
The do(confirm(Actions)) procedure, which occurs in the revisions of communication rules
CR11–CR13, updates the agent’s state so that it knows it has ended a proposal dialogue
instance which it initiated, as follows:
Definition B.10 (do(confirm(Actions))) x removes initiatedDialogue(x,Z,Actions)
from D(x) when the procedure is called, and for all Y ∈ Z, removes receivedResponse(x,Y ,
Actions, ) from D(x).
The do(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions)) procedure, which occurs in the revisions of commu-
nication rules CR14 and CR15, updates the agent’s state so that it knows it has received a
confirm or disconfirm dialogue move from Y regarding Actions, and thus the proposal dialogue
instance has ended, as follows:
Definition B.11 (do(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions))) x removes acceptedProposal(x,Y ,
Actions) from D(x) when the procedure is called.
Note that in completing a dialogue instance and executing one of the procedures of Defini-
tions B.9–B.11 the “flags” in D(x) alluding to the agent’s involvement in the dialogue instance
are removed, as are the dialogue moves received in M(x) as they are “processed” according to
the communication rules. As such, no “record” of the dialogue instance is kept in the agent’s
state and the agent could well initiate the same initial dialogue move at some point in the fu-
ture. We allow for this and whether or not the same initial dialogue move is made at some point
in the future depends on the agent’s beliefs and the “general procedures” (see Section 5.4).
Appendix C
Conditions for Inferences of Chapter 5
We present in this appendix conditions under which the sentences inML (see Definition 5.11)
could be inferred from an agent x’s state, as follows:
• `x [Y has R] if either
– Y = x and R ∈ Res(x); or
– Y 6= x and has(Y ,R) ∈ B(x).
• `x ¬[Y has R] if either
– Y = x and R /∈ Res(x); or
– Y 6= x and has(Y ,R) /∈ B(x).
• `x [the r.r.p. of Y is solved with R] if either
– Y = x and fulfils(R,G(x)) ∈ B(x); or
– Y 6= x and goal(Y,G), fulfils(R,G) ∈ B(x).
• `x ¬[the r.r.p. of Y is solved with R] if either
– Y = x and fulfils(R,G(x)) /∈ B(x); or
– Y 6= x and it is not the case that goal(Y,G), fulfils(R,G) ∈ B(x) for any G ∈ G.
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• `x [the r.r.p. of Y is solved] if either
– Y = x, fulfils(R,G(x)) ∈ B(x) and R ∈ Res(x) for some R ∈ R; or
– Y 6= x and goal(Y,G), fulfils(R,G), has(Y ,R) ∈ B(x) for some R ∈ R.
• `x ¬[the r.r.p. of Y is solved] if either
– Y = x, and it is not the case that fulfils(R,G(x)) ∈ B(x) and R ∈ Res(x) for
any R ∈ R; or
– Y 6= x, and it is not the case that goal(Y,G), fulfils(R,G), has(Y ,R) ∈ B(x)
for any R ∈ R.
• `x [the r.r.p. of Y would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R] if either
– `x ¬[the r.r.p. of Y is solved with R]; or
– for some R′ ∈ R where R′ 6= R, it is the case that `x [Y has R′] and `x [the r.r.p.
of Y is solved with R′].
• `x ¬[the r.r.p. of Y would still be solved or unsolved by simply giving away R] if
– `x [Y has R];
– `x [the r.r.p. of Y is solved with R]; and
– there is no R′ ∈ R such that R′ 6= R, `x [Y has R′] and `x [the r.r.p. of Y is solved
with R′].
• `x [after giving away each resource in Rs, the r.r.p. of x would no longer be solved] if
– for some R ∈ Rs, `x [Y has R], `x [the r.r.p. of Y is solved with R]; and
– there is no R′ ∈ R such that R′ /∈ Rs, `x [Y has R′] and `x [the r.r.p. of Y is solved
with R′].
• `x ¬[after giving away each resource in Rs, the r.r.p. of Y would no longer be solved] if
either
– for each R ∈ Rs, `x ¬[the r.r.p. of Y is solved with R]; or
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– there is some R′ ∈ R such that R′ /∈ Rs, `x [Y has R′] and `x [the r.r.p. of Y is
solved with R′].
We re-formulate the meta-language ML and inferences above for a general-purpose argumen-
tation framework in Chapter 7, taking into consideration in particular “assumptions” (see
Definition 5.10) for agents to make inferences in the absence of knowledge (i.e. given the
incompleteness of their beliefs).
Appendix D
Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems
pertaining to AABA (in Chapter 6)
We present in this appendix the proofs omitted in Chapter 6 pertaining to the backward
deductions (Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2) and fact-inclusive AB-dispute derivations (Theorems 6.1
and 6.2) of AABA.
D.1 Proofs pertaining to backward deductions of AABA
D.1.1 Proof of Lemma 6.1
Let < C0, S0 >, . . . , < Ci, Si >, . . . , < Cn, Sn > be a backward deduction S `
f
AFAgent
p
where C0 = {p}, S0 = Cn = {} and Sn = S. We show, inductively, that for each such
backward deduction there exists a sequence of trees T0, . . . , Ti, . . . , Tn and at each (ith) step of
the backward deduction, root(Ti) = p and leaves(Ti) = Ci ∪ Si.
For a given backward deduction, construct a sequence of trees as follows:
• for the initial step, T0 is a tree consisting of a single node (a leaf) labelled by p. Hence
root(T0) = p and leaves(T0) = {p} = C0 ∪ S0.
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• assume that < C0, S0 >, . . . , < Ci, Si > (i < n) is a sub-sequence of the backward
deduction with corresponding sequence of trees T0, . . . , Ti constructed such that root(Ti) =
p and leaves(Ti) = Ci ∪ Si. Then,
– if f(Ci) = σ and σ ∈ R
p ∪ A, then by applying case 1 of Definition 6.4, Ci+1 =
Ci−{σ}, Si+1 = Si∪{σ} and hence Ci+1∪Si+1 = Ci∪Si. Construct Ti+1 = Ti and,
trivially, leaves(Ti+1) = Ci+1 ∪ Si+1.
– if f(Ci) = σ and σ ← b1, . . . bm ∈ Rc (m = 0) is chosen in applying case 2 of
Definition 6.4, then Ci+1 = Ci−{σ}, Si+1 = Si and hence Ci+1∪Si+1 = (Ci∪Si)−{σ}.
Construct Ti+1 from Ti by adding a child labelled by τ to each leaf node in Ti that is
labelled by σ. Trivially, leaves(Ti+1) = leaves(Ti)− {σ}. Since leaves(Ti)− {σ} =
(Ci ∪ Si)− {σ} by hypothesis, leaves(Ti+1) = Ci+1 ∪ Si+1.
– if f(Ci) = σ and σ ← b1, . . . bm ∈ Rc (m > 0) is chosen in applying case 2 of
Definition 6.4, then Ci+1 = Ci−{σ}∪{b1, . . . , bm}, Si+1 = Si and hence Ci+1∪Si+1 =
(Ci∪Si)−{σ}∪{b1, . . . , bm}. Construct Ti+1 from Ti by adding m children, labelled
by b1, . . . bm (respectively), to each leaf node in Ti that is labelled by σ. Trivially,
leaves(Ti+1) = leaves(Ti)−{σ}∪{b1, . . . , bm}. Since leaves(Ti)−{σ}∪{b1, . . . , bm} =
(Ci ∪ Si)− {σ} ∪ {b1, . . . , bm} by hypothesis, leaves(Ti+1) = Ci+1 ∪ Si+1.
• Then, by construction, root(Tn) = p and leaves(Tn) = Cn ∪ Sn. Since Cn = {} and
Sn = S, we have leaves(Tn) = S, as required. 2
D.1.2 Proof of Lemma 6.2
Let T be a tree corresponding to the f-argument for p supported by S (i.e. root(T ) = p and
leaves(T ) = S). We contruct a finite sequence of trees T0, . . . , Ti, . . . , Tn (0 ≤ i ≤ n) where
root(Ti) = p (for 0 ≤ i ≤ n), leaves(Ti)/(R
p ∪ A) 6= ∅ (for 0 ≤ i < n), leaves(T0) = {p} and
Tn = T . We show, inductively, that for each Ti (0 ≤ i ≤ n) there exists a partial deduction
< C0, S0 >, . . . , < Cji , Sji > (see Definition 6.7) such that Cji = leaves(Ti)/(R
p ∪ A) and
Sji = leaves(Ti) ∩ (R
p ∪ A). We construct the sequence of trees as follows:
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• for the initial step, if p /∈ (Rp ∪ A), then, trivially, C0 = leaves(T0)/(R
p ∪ A) and
S0 = leaves(T0) ∩ (R
p ∪ A). Otherwise, if p ∈ Rp ∪ A, then, by applying case 1 of
Definition 6.4, C1 = C0 − {p} = {} = leaves(T0)/(R
p ∪ A) and S1 = S0 ∪ {p} = {p} =
leaves(T0) ∩ (R
p ∪ A).
• assume given Ti (0 ≤ i < n) such that there exists a partial deduction < C0, S0 >, . . . ,
< Cji , Sji > and Cji = leaves(Ti)/(R
p ∪ A) and Sji = leaves(Ti) ∩ (R
p ∪ A). Then,
– Let f(Cji) = σ (σ /∈ R
p∩A by hypothesis). If Ti+1 is constructed from Ti by choosing
inference rule σ ← b1, . . . , bm ∈ Rc (m = 0) and adding a single child labelled by τ
to each leaf node in Ti labelled by σ, then leaves(Ti+1) = leaves(Ti)− {σ}. Choose
σ ← b1, . . . , bm ∈ Rc in applying case 2 of Definition 6.4. Then, Cji+1 = Cji − {σ}
and Sji+1 = Sji . Since Cji = leaves(Ti)/(R
p ∪ A) by hypothesis, trivially, we have
Cji − {σ} = leaves(Ti)/(R
p ∪ A)− {σ}
which, since σ /∈ Rp ∪ A, is equivalent to
Cji − {σ} = (leaves(Ti)− {σ})/(R
p ∪ A)
which is equivalent to
Cji+1 = leaves(Ti+1)/(R
p ∪ A).
Also, since σ /∈ Rp ∪ A and Sji = leaves(Ti) ∩ (R
p ∪ A) by hypothesis, we have
Sji = (leaves(Ti) − {σ}) ∩ (R
p ∪ A), which is equivalent to Sji+1 = leaves(Ti+1) ∩
(Rp∪A). Thus for Ti+1 there exists a partial deduction < C0, S0 >, . . . , < Cji , Sji >,
< Cji+1, Sji+1 > such that Cji+1 = leaves(Ti+1)/(R
p∪A) and Sji+1 = leaves(Ti+1)∩
(Rp ∪ A).
– Let f(Cji) = σ (σ /∈ R
p ∩ A by hypothesis). If Ti+1 is constructed from Ti by
choosing inference rule σ ← b1, . . . , bm ∈ Rc (m > 0) and adding m children
labelled by b1, . . . , bm (respectively) to each leaf node in Ti labelled by σ, then
leaves(Ti+1) = leaves(Ti)−{σ}∪{b1, . . . , bm}. Construct < Cji+1, Sji+1 > by choos-
ing σ ← b1, . . . , bm ∈ Rc and applying case 2 of Definition 6.4. Subsequently, con-
struct sequence < Cji+1, Sji+1 >, . . . , < Ck, Sk > by applying case 1 of Definition 6.4
for each bh ∈ {b1, . . . , bm} ∩ (R
p ∪ A). Then,
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∗ Ck = Cji − {σ} ∪ ({b1, . . . , bm}/(R
p ∪ A))
∗ Sk = Sji ∪ ({b1, . . . , bm} ∩ (R
p ∪ A))
Since Cji = leaves(Ti)/(R
p ∪ A) by hypothesis, trivially, we have
Cji − {σ} ∪ ({b1, . . . , bm}/(R
p ∪ A))
= leaves(Ti)/(R
p ∪ A)− {σ} ∪ ({b1, . . . , bm}/(R
p ∪ A))
which, since σ /∈ (Rp ∪ A), is equivalent to
Cji − {σ} ∪ ({b1, . . . , bm}/(R
p ∪ A))
= (leaves(Ti)− {σ} ∪ ({b1, . . . , bm}/(R
p ∪ A)))/(Rp ∪ A)
which is equivalent to
Ck = leaves(Ti+1)/(R
p ∪ A).
Also, since Sji = leaves(Ti) ∩ (R
p ∪ A) by hypothesis, trivially, we have
Sji ∪ ({b1, . . . , bm} ∩ (R
p ∪ A))
= (leaves(Ti) ∩ (R
p ∪ A)) ∪ ({b1, . . . , bm} ∩ (R
p ∪ A))
= (leaves(Ti) ∪ {b1, . . . , bm}) ∩ (R
p ∪ A)
which, since σ /∈ (Rp ∪ A), is equivalent to
Sji ∪ ({b1, . . . , bm} ∩ (R
p ∪ A))
= (leaves(Ti)− {σ} ∪ {b1, . . . , bm}) ∩ (R
p ∪ A)
which is equivalent to
Sk = leaves(Ti+1) ∩ (R
p ∪ A).
Thus for Ti+1 there exists a partial deduction < C0, S0 >, . . . , < Cji , Sji >, . . . ,
< Ck, Sk > such that Ck = leaves(Ti+1)/(R
p∪A) and Sk = leaves(Ti+1)∩ (R
p∪A).
• Then, by construction, for Tn, there exists a partial deduction < C0, S0 >, . . . , <
Cjn , Sjn > such that Cjn = leaves(Tn)/(R
p ∪ A) and Sjn = leaves(Tn) ∩ (R
p ∪ A).
Since Tn = T , leaves(T ) = S and S ⊆ R
p ∪ A, then Cjn = {}, Sjn = S and hence
< C0, S0 >, . . . , < Cjn , Sjn > is a backward deduction for p supported by S. 2
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D.2 Proofs pertaining to fact-inclusive AB-dispute deriva-
tions of AABA
Given a tuple 〈Pi,Oi,Di, Ci〉 of a fact-inclusive AB-dispute derivation (fdd) (see Definition 6.5)
and a tuple 〈P ′j,O
′
j, A
′
j, C
′
j〉 of a AB-dispute derivation (dd) (see Definition 2.10)
1, we write
〈Pi,Oi,Di, Ci〉 ≈ 〈P
′
j,O
′
j, A
′
j , C
′
j〉
in the proofs of Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 below if Pi = P
′
j, Oi = O
′
j, Di ∩ A = A
′
j and Ci = C
′
j .
For the proofs of Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 below, we need to use the fact that the existence of a
dd is independent of the selection function used during the derivation as noted in [DKT06]. If
there exists a derivation wrt some choices, then there exists a derivation with respect to any
other choices.
D.2.1 Proof of Theorem 6.1
Let 〈P0,O0,D0, C0〉, . . . , 〈Pi,Oi,Di, Ci〉, . . . , 〈Pn,On,Dn, Cn〉 be a fdd D |=
f,g
AFAgent
P , i.e.
P0 = P , Dn = D. We show that for each such derivation there exists a dd 〈P
′
0,O
′
0, A
′
0, C
′
0〉, . . . ,
〈P ′j,O
′
j, A
′
j, C
′
j〉, . . . , 〈P
′
m,O
′
m, A
′
m, C
′
m〉 (m ≤ n) where P
′
0 = P and A
′
m = D ∩A.
For a given fdd, construct the dd as follows:
• For the initial step, trivially P0 = P
′
0, O0 = O
′
0 = {}, D0 ∩ A = A
′
0 = P ∩ A and
C0 = C
′
0 = {}. Hence 〈P0,O0,D0, C0〉 ≈ 〈P
′
0,O
′
0, A
′
0, C
′
0〉.
• Assume that 〈P ′0,O
′
0, A
′
0, C
′
0〉, . . . , 〈P
′
j,O
′
j, A
′
j , C
′
j〉 (j < m) is a sub-sequence of a dd
corresponding to the sub-sequence 〈P0,O0,D0, C0〉, . . . , 〈Pi,Oi,Di, Ci〉 (i < n) of a fdd
such that 〈Pi,Oi,Di, Ci〉 ≈ 〈P
′
j,O
′
j, A
′
j , C
′
j〉. Then,
1We refer to the variant of the AB-dispute derivation procedure as discussed in Section 6.5 where the cases
2ic.1 and 2ic.2 are combined into one single case 2ic.
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1. If the player choice is the proponent, f(Pi) = σ and σ ∈ R
p, then by applying case
1a of Definition 6.5, Pi+1 = Pi − {σ}, Oi+1 = Oi, Di+1 = Di and Ci+1 = Ci. Select
f ′(P ′j) = σ and apply case 1ii of the dds, then P
′
j+1 = P
′
j − {σ} (since σ is a fact),
O′j+1 = O
′
j, A
′
j+1 = A
′
j (since σ is a fact) and C
′
j+1 = C
′
j. The only change in both
derivation sequences is the removal of σ from the proponent’s set. Thus, trivially by
hypothesis, 〈Pi+1,Oi+1,Di+1, Ci+1〉 ≈ 〈P
′
j+1,O
′
j+1, A
′
j+1, C
′
j+1〉.
2. If the player choice is the proponent, f(Pi) = σ and σ ∈ A, then by applying case 1b
of Definition 6.5, Pi+1 = Pi − {σ}, Oi+1 = Oi ∪ {S | S `
f
AFAgent
c(σ), S ∩ Ci = φ },
Di+1 = Di and Ci+1 = Ci. Select f
′(P ′j) = σ and construct sequence 〈P
′
j,O
′
j, A
′
j , C
′
j〉,
〈P ′j+1,O
′
j+1, A
′
j+1, C
′
j+1〉, . . . , 〈P
′
k,O
′
k, A
′
k, C
′
k〉 (j+1 ≤ k) by applying case 1i of the dd
procedure once, followed by applying case 2ii of the dd procedure repeatedly (initially
selecting {c(σ)} ∈ O′j+1) unfolding the different f-arguments for c(σ) that contain
no culprit assumptions. Then, P ′k = P
′
j − {σ}, O
′
k = O
′
j ∪ { S | S `
f ′
AFAgent
c(σ),
S ∩ C ′j = φ }, A
′
k = A
′
j and C
′
k = C
′
j . Since Oi = O
′
j and Ci = C
′
j by hypothesis, and
since the set of all f-arguments for c(σ) is irrespective of the selection function used,
trivially, we have
Oi ∪ {S | S `
f
AFAgent
c(σ), S ∩ Ci = φ}
= O′j ∪ {S | S `
f ′
AFAgent
c(σ), S ∩ C ′j = φ}
which is equivalent to Oi+1 = O
′
k. The sets of culprits and defences are unchanged
in both derivations, and the only change in the proponent’s set in both deriva-
tions is the removal of σ. Thus, trivially by hypothesis, 〈Pi+1,Oi+1,Di+1, Ci+1〉 ≈
〈P ′k,O
′
k, A
′
k, C
′
k〉.
3. If the player choice is the proponent, f(Pi) = σ, σ /∈ A ∪ R
p and S `f
AFAgent
σ is
chosen in applying case 1c of Definition 6.5, then, Pi+1 = (Pi−{σ})∪((S∩A)−Di),
Oi+1 = Oi, Di+1 = Di ∪ S and Ci+1 = Ci. Construct sequence 〈P
′
j,O
′
j, A
′
j, C
′
j〉, . . . ,
〈P ′k,O
′
k, A
′
k, C
′
k〉 (j < k) by applying case 1ii of the dd procedure repeatedly (initially
selecting f ′(Pj) = σ) unfolding S from σ (with filtering of defence assumptions by
defences), followed by applying case 1ii repeatedly removing each personal fact in S
(leaving S∩A). Then, P ′k = (P
′
j−{σ})∪((S∩A)−A
′
j), O
′
k = O
′
j, A
′
k = A
′
j∪(A∩S)
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and C ′k = C
′
j. Since Pi = P
′
j and Di ∩ A = A
′
j by hypothesis, trivially, Pi+1 = P
′
k.
Since Di ∩ A = A
′
j by hypothesis, trivially, Di+1 ∩ A = A
′
k. The sets of culprits
and defences are unchanged in both derivations. Thus 〈Pi+1,Oi+1,Di+1, Ci+1〉 ≈
〈P ′k,O
′
k, A
′
k, C
′
k〉.
4. If the player choice is the opponent, g(Oi) = Σ and there is a σ ∈ Σ such that σ ∈ Ci
(i.e. Σ∩Ci 6= φ), then, applying case 2a of Definition 6.5, Pi+1 = Pi, Oi+1 = Oi−{Σ},
Di+1 = Di and Ci+1 = Ci. Select Σ ∈ O
′
j and f
′(Σ) = σ, and applying case 2ib of
the dd procedure, P ′j+1 = Pj, O
′
j+1 = O
′
j − {Σ}, A
′
j+1 = Aj and C
′
j+1 = Cj. The
only change in both derivation sequences is the removal of Σ from the opponent’s
set. Thus, trivially, 〈Pi+1,Oi+1,Di+1, Ci+1〉 ≈ 〈P
′
j+1,O
′
j+1, A
′
j+1, C
′
j+1〉.
5. If the player choice is the opponent, g(Oi) = Σ and σ ∈ Σ is chosen in applying
case 2b of Definition 6.5 (i.e. σ ∈ A, σ /∈ Ci, σ /∈ Di), then Pi+1 = Pi ∪ {c(σ)},
Oi+1 = Oi−{Σ}, Di+1 = Di∪({c(σ)}∩(A∪R
p)) and Ci+1 = Ci∪{σ}. Select Σ ∈ O
′
j
and f ′(Σ) = σ, and applying case 2ic of the dd procedure, P ′j+1 = Pj∪{c(σ)}, O
′
j+1 =
O′j − {Σ}, A
′
j+1 = Aj ∪ ({c(σ)} ∩ A) and C
′
j+1 = Cj. Since Pi = P
′
j by hypothesis,
trivially, Pi+1 = P
′
j+1. Since Oi = O
′
j by hypothesis, trivially, Oi+1 = O
′
j+1. Since
Di ∩A = A
′
j by hypothesis, trivially, Di+1 ∩A = A
′
j+1. Since Ci = C
′
j by hypothesis,
trivially, Ci+1 = C
′
j+1. Thus 〈Pi+1,Oi+1,Di+1, Ci+1〉 ≈ 〈P
′
j+1,O
′
j+1, A
′
j+1, C
′
j+1〉.
By construction, 〈Pn,On,Dn, Cn〉 ≈ 〈P
′
m,O
′
m, A
′
m, C
′
m〉 and hence Dn∩A = A
′
m. Thus a defence
set derived by the fdd procedure (minus the facts) is also derivable by the dd procedure. 2
D.2.2 Proof of Theorem 6.2
Let 〈P ′0,O
′
0, A
′
0, C
′
0〉, . . . , 〈P
′
j,O
′
j, A
′
j , C
′
j〉, . . . , 〈P
′
m,O
′
m, A
′
m, C
′
m〉 be a dd. We show that for each
such derivation there exists a fdd 〈P0,O0,D0, C0〉, . . . , 〈Pi,Oi,Di, Ci〉, . . . , 〈Pn,On,Dn, Cn〉
(Dn |=
f,g
AFAgent
P0) (m ≤ n) such that the defence set A
′
m = (Dn ∩ A).
We assume that the player choice and selection function is such that if there is a Σ in the
opponent’s set that contains a σ /∈ A ∩ Rp, then the player choice will be the opponent and
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Σ as well as σ will be selected. This ensures in the proof that the opponent’s f-arguments are
fully contructed in the dds before being dealt with (by one of the cases 2ia–2ic) or before the
proponent plays again.
For a given dd, construct the fdd as follows:
• For the initial step, trivially P0 = P
′
0, O0 = O
′
0 = {}, D0 ∩ A = A
′
0 = P ∩ A and
C0 = C
′
0 = {}. Hence 〈P0,O0,D0, C0〉 ≈ 〈P
′
0,O
′
0, A
′
0, C
′
0〉.
• Assume that 〈P ′0,O
′
0, A
′
0, C
′
0〉, . . . , 〈P
′
j,O
′
j , A
′
j, C
′
j〉 (j < m) is a sub-sequence of a dd cor-
responding to the sub-sequence 〈P0,O0,D0, C0〉, . . . , 〈Pi,Oi,Di, Ci〉 (i < n) of a fdd such
that 〈Pi,Oi,Di, Ci〉 ≈ 〈P
′
i,O
′
i, A
′
i, C
′
i〉. Then,
1. If the player choice is the proponent, f(P ′j) = σ and σ ∈ A, then, by apply-
ing case 1i of the dds, P ′j+1 = P
′
j − {σ}, O
′
j+1 = O
′
j ∪ {{c(σ)}}, A
′
j+1 = A
′
j,
C ′j+1 = C
′
j. By assumption of the player choice and selection function, the sequence
〈P ′j+1,O
′
j+1, A
′
j+1, C
′
j+1〉, . . . , 〈P
′
k,O
′
k, A
′
k, C
′
k〉 (j + 1 ≤ k) is constructed, applying
case 2ii of the dd repeatedly unfolding all f-arguments for c(σ) that contain no
culprit assumptions (filtering of culprits by culprits). Then, P ′k = P
′
j+1, O
′
k =
O′j ∪ { S | S `
f
AFAgent
c(σ), S ∩ C ′j = φ } A
′
k = A
′
j+1, C
′
k = C
′
j+1. Pick f(Pi) = σ and
apply case 1b of Definition 6.5, then Pi+1 = Pi − {σ}, Oi+1 = Oi ∪ { S | S `
f
AFAgent
c(σ), S ∩ Ci = φ }, Di+1 = Di, Ci+1 = Ci. Since Oi = O
′
j and Ci = C
′
j by hypoth-
esis, trivially, Oi+1 = O
′
k. The sets of culprits and defences are unchanged in both
derivations, and the only change in the proponent’s set in both derivations is the
removal of σ. Thus, by hypothesis, 〈Pi+1,Oi+1,Di+1, Ci+1〉 ≈ 〈P
′
k,O
′
k, A
′
k, C
′
k〉.
2. If the player choice is the proponent, f(P ′j) = σ and σ /∈ A, then there are two
possibilities to consider.
– σ ∈ Rp. Apply case 1ii of the dds, then P ′j+1 = P
′
j−{σ}, O
′
j+1 = O
′
j, A
′
j+1 = A
′
j,
C ′j+1 = C
′
j. Pick f(Pi) = σ and apply case 1a of Definition 6.5, then Pi+1 =
Pi − {σ}, Oi+1 = Oi, Di+1 = Di, Ci+1 = Ci. The only change in both derivation
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sequences is the removal of σ from the proponent’s set. Thus, by hypothesis,
〈Pi+1,Oi+1,Di+1, Ci+1〉 ≈ 〈P
′
j+1,O
′
j+1, A
′
j+1, C
′
j+1〉.
– σ /∈ Rp. Construct sequence 〈P ′j,O
′
j, A
′
j , C
′
j〉, . . . , 〈P
′
k,O
′
k, A
′
k, C
′
k〉 (j < k) by
applying case 1ii of the dds repeatedly, unfolding a f-argument for σ with support
S (such that C ′j∩S 6= φ) while filtering defence assumptions by defences, followed
by applying 1ii for each personal fact in S (removing it from the proponent’s
set). Then, P ′k = P
′
j−{σ}∪((S∩A)−A
′
j), O
′
k = O
′
j, A
′
k = A
′
j∪(A∩S), C
′
k = C
′
j.
Pick f(Pi) = σ and choose S `
f
AFAgent
σ in applying case 1c of Definition 6.5,
then Pi+1 = Pi − {σ} ∪ ((S ∩ A) − Di), Oi+1 = Oi, Di+1 = Di ∪ S, Ci+1 = Ci.
Since Pi = P
′
j and Di ∩ A = A
′
j by hypothesis, trivially, Pi+1 = P
′
k. Since
Di ∩ A = A
′
j by hypothesis, trivially, Di+1 ∩ A = A
′
k. The opponent’s set and
the set of culprits are unchanged in both derivations. Thus, by hypothesis,
〈Pi+1,Oi+1,Di+1, Ci+1〉 ≈ 〈P
′
k,O
′
k, A
′
k, C
′
k〉.
3. If the player choice is the opponent, Σ ∈ O′j is selected, f(Σ) = σ and a se-
quence 〈P ′j,O
′
j, A
′
j , C
′
j〉, . . . , 〈P
′
k,O
′
k, A
′
k, C
′
k〉 is constructed by applying case 2ia
of the dds repeatedly, ignoring assumptions in Σ until 〈P ′k+1,O
′
k+1, A
′
k+1, C
′
k+1〉 is
constructed by selecting σ ∈ Σ and applying case 2ib (or 2ic) of the dds. Then
〈P ′k+1,O
′
k+1, A
′
k+1, C
′
k+1〉 is exactly as it would be if constructed directly from 〈P
′
j,O
′
j, A
′
j, C
′
j〉
by selecting σ ∈ Σ and applying case 2ib (or 2ic respectively) of the dds. Then, as
shown in points 4 and 5 below, an 〈Pi+1,Oi+1,Di+1, Ci+1〉 can be constructed from
〈Pi,Oi,Di, Ci〉 by selecting Σ ∈ Oi, σ ∈ Σ and applying case 2a (or 2b respectively)
of Definition 6.5 such that 〈Pi+1,Oi+1,Di+1, Ci+1〉 ≈ 〈P
′
k+1,O
′
k+1, A
′
k+1, C
′
k+1〉.
4. If the player choice is the opponent, Σ ∈ O′j is selected, f(Σ) = σ, σ ∈ A, σ /∈ Ai
and σ ∈ C ′, then, by applying case 2ib of the dds, P ′j+1 = P
′
j, O
′
j+1 = O
′
j − {Σ},
A′j+1 = A
′
j, C
′
j+1 = C
′
j. Pick g(Oi) = Σ and apply case 2a of Definition 6.5, then
Pi+1 = Pi, Oi+1 = Oi − {Σ}, Di+1 = Di, Ci+1 = Ci. The only change in both
derivations is the removal of Σ from the opponent’s set. Thus, trivially by hypothesis,
〈Pi+1,Oi+1,Di+1, Ci+1〉 ≈ 〈P
′
j+1,O
′
j+1, A
′
j+1, C
′
j+1〉.
5. If the player choice is the opponent, Σ ∈ O′j is selected f(Σ) = σ, σ ∈ A, σ /∈ Ai and
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σ /∈ C ′, then, by applying case 2ic of the dds, P ′j+1 = P
′
j ∪{c(σ)}, O
′
j+1 = O
′
j −{Σ},
A′j+1 = A
′
j ∪ (A ∩ {c(σ)}), C
′
j+1 = C
′
j ∪ {σ}. Pick g(Oi) = Σ and choose σ ∈ Σ
in applying case 2b of Definition 6.5, then Pi+1 = Pi ∪ {c(σ)}, Oi+1 = Oi − {Σ},
Di+1 = Di ∪ ({c(σ)} ∩ (A ∪ R
p)), Ci+1 = Ci ∪ {σ}. Since Pi = P
′
j by hypothesis,
trivially, Pi+1 = P
′
j+1. Since Oi = O
′
j by hypothesis, trivially, Oi+1 = O
′
j+1. Since
Di ∩A = A
′
j by hypothesis, trivially, Di+1 ∩A = A
′
j+1. Since Ci = C
′
j by hypothesis,
trivially, Ci+1 = C
′
j+1. Thus 〈Pi+1,Oi+1,Di+1, Ci+1〉 ≈ 〈P
′
j+1,O
′
j+1, A
′
j+1, C
′
j+1〉.
6. Given our assumption of the player choice and selection function, the case where 2ii
of the dds is applied will not arise except following on immediately from when case
1i is applied, which is covered by point 1 above.
By construction, 〈Pn,On,Dn, Cn〉 ≈ 〈P
′
m,O
′
m, A
′
m, C
′
m〉 and hence Dn∩A = A
′
m. Thus a defence
set derived by the dd procedure (consisting of assumptions only) is contained in the defence
set derived by the fdd procedure (consisting of facts and assumptions). 2
Appendix E
Definition of the Control Procedures of
Chapter 5 by means of AABA
We give in this section an example definition of the elements needed to ensure that dialogue
instances, as defined in Section 5, are appropriately sequenced and interleaved. We define these
here using AABA for consistency with Chapter 7, though the use of AABA for this is not
essential. We define first in Section E.1 the components that make up the dialogical status
of the agent thereby completing the representation of our (resource reallocation) agents as an
AABA framework (see Chapter 7) and then in Section E.2 we present the “control procedures”
(see Chapter 5) based on this. The dialogical status and control procedures are defined here to
correspond to the (non-AABA) definitions of Appendix B.
E.1 Dialogical Status as AABA framework
We provide in this section definitions for Ld, Ad, Rc,d and R
p,d
x which pertain to the dialogical
status of some agent x, thus obtaining the full AABA framework AFx,d = 〈L ∪ Ld, Rc ∪
Rc,d, R
p
x ∪R
p,d
x , A ∪Ad, c〉, where L, Rc, R
p
x and A are as defined in Section 7.2.
The non-assumptions that make up Ld are as follows:
209
210 Appendix E. Definition of the Control Procedures of Chapter 5 by means of AABA
Definition E.1 (Non-assumptions in Ld) The non-assumptions Ld \Ad are (instances of)
the following schemata, for X, Y ∈ names(AS), Z ∈ 2names(AS), R ∈ R, Response ∈
{acceptProposal, rejectProposal}:
• (¬) offered(X,R), standing for “agent X has (not) presently offered resource R to an
agent as part of a request or proposal dialogue instance, neither as initiator nor respon-
der”;
• (¬) awaitingResponse(X), standing for “X is (not) awaiting a response from some (any)
agent, which may be following an earlier request, proposal or accept proposal dialogue move
it has sent”;
• initiatedDialogue(X,Z,Actions), standing for “X has initiated a request or proposal
dialogue instance directed at a set of agents Z regarding Actions and has not yet received
responses from all agents Z”;
• acceptedProposal(X, Y,Actions), standing for “X has accepted a proposal sent to it from
Y regarding Actions and is awaiting confirmation”;
• receivedResponse(X, Y,Actions, Response), standing for “X has received response of the
form Response from Y following a proposal dialogue move it sent regarding Actions”.
The latter three sentences in Definition E.1 are intended as facts to be added to and removed
from Rp,dx as x engages in dialogue instances. The other sentences in Ld are intended as
inferences and will be given meaning in terms of Rc,d below.
The assumptions Ad that make up Ld are as follows:
Definition E.2 (Assumptions in Ad and their contraries) The assumptions Ad (and their
associated contraries) in the language Ld are all instances of the following schemata, for
X ∈ names(AS), R ∈ Res:
• asm(¬awaitingResponse(X)), standing for “assume that agent X is not awaiting any
responses from any agents following earlier dialogue moves it may have sent”,
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with c(asm(¬awaitingResponse(X))) = {awaitingResponse(X)};
• asm(¬offered(X,R)): standing for “assume that X has not presently offered R to any
agent as part of a request or proposal dialogue instance, neither as initiator nor respon-
der”,
with c(asm(¬offered(X,R))) = {offered(X,R)}.
Each of the non-assumptions (as well as the assumptions) that make up Ld are given meaning
for our negotiation policy in terms of the inference rules in Rc,d, as follows:
Definition E.3 (Inference rules in Rc,d) The set of inference rules Rc,d for agent x ∈
names(AS) are all instances of the following schemata, for R ∈ R:
awaitingResponse(x) ← initiatedDialogue(x, , )
awaitingResponse(x) ← acceptedProposal(x, ,Actions),
give( ,R,x) ∈ Actions, useful(R, x)
¬awaitingResponse(x) ← asm(¬awaitingResponse(x))
offered(x,R) ← initiatedDialogue(x, ,Actions), give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions
offered(x,R) ← acceptedProposal(x, ,Actions), give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions
¬offered(x,R) ← asm(¬offered(x,R))
Rc,d contains inference rules representing that x is awaiting a response from some agent(s) if
either it has initiated a request or proposal dialogue instance and has not yet received responses
from all responder agents (first rule), or it has accepted a proposal in which it is to receive
a useful resource and has not yet received a confirm or disconfirm from the initiatior agent
(second rule), as well as a general-purpose inference rule (third rule) imposing a form of closed
world assumption for when x is not awaiting a response. Also, inference rules representing that
x has offered to give away a resource R if either it “remembers” initiating a dialogue instance or
accepting a proposal as such (fourth and fifth rules), as well as a general-purpose inference rule
(sixth rule) imposing a form of closed world assumption for those resources x has not offered
to give away.
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E.2 Control Procedures
We now provide a definition of the “control procedures” occurring in the communication rules
of our negotiation policy for an agent x in terms of the AABA framework AFx,d defined above.
The definitions of the procedures below correlate with the definitions of Appendix B.
The valid(initiateDialogue(Actions)) procedure, which correlates with Definition B.1, is
as follows:
Definition E.4 (valid(initiateDialogue(Actions))) The procedure evaluates to true if
the following conditions hold:
• |=AFx ¬awaitingResponse(x); and
• for all give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions, it is the case that |=AFx ¬offered(x,R).
And evaluates to false otherwise.
The valid(accept(Y ,Actions)) procedure, which correlates with Definition B.2, is as follows:
Definition E.5 (valid(accept(Actions))) The procedure evaluates to true if the following
conditions hold:
• for all resources R for which the condition |=AFx offered(x,R) holds, it is the case that
|=AFx ¬useful(x,R); and
• for all give(x,R, ) ∈ Actions, it is the case that |=AFx ¬offered(x,R).
And evaluates to false otherwise.
The valid(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions)) procedure, which correlates with Definition B.3,
is as follows:
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Definition E.6 (valid(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions))) The procedure evaluates to true if
the condition |=AFx initiatedDialogue(x, Z,Actions) holds, and Y ∈ Z. The procedure evalu-
ates to false otherwise.
The valid(confirm(Z,Actions)) procedure, which correlates with Definition B.4, is as fol-
lows:
Definition E.7 (valid(confirm(Z,Actions))) The procedure evaluates to true if the condi-
tion |=AFx initiatedDialogue(x, Z,Actions) holds, and for all Y ∈ Z, it is the case that |=AFx
receivedResponse(x, Y,Actions, acceptProposal). The procedure evaluates to false otherwise.
The valid(disconfirm(Z,Actions)) procedure, which correlates with Definition B.5, is as
follows:
Definition E.8 (valid(disconfirm(Z,Actions))) The procedure evaluates to true if the
following conditions hold:
• |=AFx initiatedDialogue(x, Z
′,Actions); and
• for all Y ∈ Z ′, |=AFx receivedResponse(x, Y,Actions, ); and
• Z = {Y | |=AFx receivedResponse(x, Y,Actions, acceptProposal)} ⊂ Z
′.
And evaluates to false otherwise.
The valid(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions)) procedure, which correlates with Definition B.6, is
as follows:
Definition E.9 (valid(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions))) The procedure evaluates to true if
the condition |=AFx acceptedProposal(x, Y,Actions) holds, and evaluates to false otherwise.
The do(initiateDialogue(Z,Actions)) procedure, which correlates with Definition B.7, is
as follows:
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Definition E.10 (do(initiateDialogue(Z,Actions))) x adds initiatedDialogue(x, Z,
Actions) to Rp,dx .
The do(accept proposal(Y ,Actions)) procedure, which correlates with Definition B.8, is as
follows:
Definition E.11 (do(accept proposal(Y ,Actions))) x adds acceptedProposal(x, Y,
Actions) to Rp,dx .
The do(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions,Response)) procedure, which correlates with Defini-
tion B.9, is as follows:
Definition E.12 (do(receiveResponse(Y ,Actions,Response))) x updates its state accord-
ing to the value of Response, as follows:
• if Response ∈ {agree, refuse}, then initiatedDialogue(x, {Y },Actions) is removed from
Rp,dx ;
• otherwise, if Response ∈ {acceptProposal, rejectProposal}, then receivedResponse(x, Y,
Actions, Response) is added to Rp,dx .
The do(confirm(Actions)) procedure, which correlates with Definition B.10, is as follows:
Definition E.13 (do(confirm(Actions))) x removes initiatedDialogue(x, Z,Actions)
from Rp,dx , and for all Y ∈ Z, removes receivedResponse(x, Y,Actions, ) from R
p,d
x .
The do(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions)) procedure, which correlates with Definition B.11, is as
follows:
Definition E.14 (do(receiveConfirm(Y ,Actions))) x removes acceptedProposal(x, Y,
Actions) from Rp,dx .
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